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The real tragedy of our postcolonial world is not that the majority of people 
had no say in whether or not they wanted this new world; rather, it is that the 
majority have not been given the tools to negotiate this new world. 












The present research has the occurrence of overlapping regionalisms as its object, with a 
comparative cut for South America and Africa. The purpose of this thesis is to study types of 
institutional interaction and to analyze the effects of overlapping in the coexistence between 
regional processes in order to understand their dynamics in the above-mentioned regions. The 
observation of organizational behaviors and interaction is made through cases of political 
crises on the selected regions, as we assume that the interactions between overlapping 
regional organizations in those situations would tend to be more fragmenting than 
complementary as they go beyond the traditional membership-mandate relationship. 
Therefore, we also analyze overlapping performances and seek to understand how regional 
organizations will behave and interact while dealing with political crises, which constitute 
critical junctures, in accordance with the theoretical and methodological framework of the 
thesis. This work aims to produce a broad qualitative analysis of the given regions by 
considering applicable cases that cover all of the sub-regions and hence to contribute to the 
field of comparative regionalism by providing generalization and institutional learnings which 
are not derived by a given model of regionalism, but nonetheless based on a cross regional 
approach. The data is processed through document analysis and further systemized via the 
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A presente pesquisa tem por objeto a ocorrência de regionalismos sobrepostos, com recorte 
comparativo para a América do Sul e a África. O propósito desta tese é estudar tipos de 
interação institucional e analisar os efeitos da sobreposição na coexistência entre processos 
regionais, de modo a entender sua dinâmica nas regiões supramencionadas. A observação de 
comportamentos organizacionais e interações é feita através de casos de crises políticas nas 
regiões selecionadas, uma vez que se assume que ditas interações entre organizações regionais 
sobrepostas tenderiam a produzir efeitos mais fragmentantes do que complementares para o 
espaço, uma vez que as mesmas ultrapassam a tradicional relação entre filiação e mandato. 
Portanto, se analisa também a sobreposição de performances enquanto se procura 
compreender como as organizações regionais irão se comportar e interagir ao lidar com crises 
políticas, que constituem conjunturas críticas, de acordo com o referencial teórico-
metodológico da pesquisa. A tese pretende produzir uma análise qualitativa de grande 
dimensão das regiões dadas, considerando casos aplicáveis que abarquem todas as sub-regiões 
e, assim, contribuir para o campo do regionalismo comparado, fornecendo generalizações e 
aprendizagens institucionais que não são derivadas de um dado modelo de regionalismo, mas, 
baseadas em uma abordagem regional cruzada. Os dados são processados através da análise 
de documentos e posteriormente sistematizados através da construção de exercícios de 
presença e ausência, consistindo no teste de hipóteses e relações diádicas. 
 
 
Palavras-chave: regionalismo; organizações sobrepostas; integração regional; América do 





La presente investigación tiene como objeto la superposición de regionalismos como su 
objetivo, con un corte comparativo para América del Sur y África. El objetivo de esta tesis es 
estudiar los tipos de interacción institucional y analizar los efectos de la superposición en la 
coexistencia entre procesos regionales para comprender su dinámica en las regiones 
mencionadas. El objetivo de esta tesis es estudiar los tipos de interacción institucional y 
analizar los efectos de la superposición en la coexistencia entre procesos regionales para 
comprender su dinámica en las regiones mencionadas. La observación de los 
comportamientos e interacciones organizacionales se realiza a través de casos de crisis 
políticas en las regiones seleccionadas, ya que suponemos que las interacciones entre las 
organizaciones regionales superpuestas en esas situaciones tenderían a ser más fragmentarias 
que complementarias, ya que van más allá de la relación tradicional de membresía-mandato. 
Por lo tanto, también analizamos desempeños superpuestos y buscamos comprender cómo se 
comportarán e interactuarán las organizaciones regionales al enfrentar crisis políticas, que 
constituyen coyunturas críticas, de acuerdo con el marco teórico y metodológico de la tesis. 
La tesis tiene como objetivo producir un análisis cualitativo amplio de las regiones dadas al 
considerar los casos aplicables que cubren todas las subregiones y, por lo tanto, contribuir al 
campo del regionalismo comparativo al proporcionar generalizaciones y aprendizajes 
institucionales que no se derivan de un determinado modelo de regionalismo, pero basado en 
un enfoque regional cruzado. Los datos se procesan a través del análisis de documentos y se 
sistematizan aún más mediante la construcción de ejercicios de presencia y ausencia, que 
consisten en la prueba de hipótesis y relaciones diádicas. 
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“The world of regions is also a world of regionalisms” (BACH, 2016). By adapting 
Katzenstein’s (2005) comprehension of contemporary world dynamics, Bach affirms the 
essentiality of understanding the particularities of regional logics in order to navigate the 
international system. Even though the concept of region is susceptible to interpretation and 
can change over time, what is interesting to this research is the formal relationship between 
the stablished regional organizations within those given spaces, as we understand regions as 
political constructions (POWERS; GOERTZ, 2011). 
Bach’s words are particularly relevant when we consider that in the last few decades, 
different kinds of regional projects have been developed in all different regions of the world, 
creating multilayered interactions within projects, and an “alphabet soup” of acronyms. 
Therefore, the understanding of the multiplicity, allied to the simultaneity in the coexistence 
of regional institutions, which many times are overlapping, generates questions about the 
effects of this coexistence for the functioning of the regions, as well as regarding their 
cohesion or fragmentation. 
The comprehension of a segmented proliferation of institutions in South America and 
its different orientations and purposes guided the author’s master's studies, in which we 
institutionally analyzed the fragmentation of integration at the regional organizations that 
Brazil participated, namely the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), the Union of 
South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean 
States (CELAC), departing from their policy agendas. The studies carried out demonstrated 
the existence not only of an institutional overlap between different blocs, that is, of multiple 
regional initiatives, but also that the different moments of regionalism, also known as waves, 
had produced an intra-bloc sectorial segmentation derived from the institutional broadening of 
existing initiatives and the expansion of mandates (RIBEIRO, 2016) 1.  
Consequently, the understanding of simultaneity in regional overlaps in other areas of 
the world raised questions about how organizations behave and interplay in a complex 
regional scenario, and their role in generating complementarity or fragmentation. The present 
study proposes, therefore, to discuss how regional organizations will act and interact, 
 
1 In some cases, discussed in the master's dissertation, it was even perceived that the intra-bloc 
proliferation of institutions causes effects such as the multiplication of instances with the same 





considering the effects of the multiplicity and overlap of organizational initiatives in the 
selected regions of the world. 
For this doctoral thesis, the choice of cases to be analyzed was given in a way to cover 
two different regions of the world, Africa and South America, in order to enable 
generalizations and comparisons. The choice was made to avoid the dilemma of treating a 
single experience as a reference (n = 1) (DE LOMBAERDE et al., 2010), valuing the 
individual experiences of each region, following the methodology of comparative 
regionalism, as we will further discuss. Accordingly, we proposed to continue the studies 
initiated in the master's degree regarding South America, and to add another region in the 
Global South to the analysis as it also avoids an asymmetric comparison with the European 
experience, by representing the developing world as a fruitful area for the development of 
regional blocs. Therefore, considering the expansion of the object of analysis, with the 
addition of another region and the previous inexperience with different conjunctures, we 
departed from an inductive research to understand regional scenarios and to choose the scope 
of analysis.  
 
1.1 Research question and central argument 
 
The studied phenomena of overlapping regionalisms result from the fact that multiple 
regional organizations (ROs) coexist in the same space and it occurs when states are affiliated 
with several of these initiatives (overlap of memberships), which in turn have similar 
objectives in their policies (overlapping mandates). While in the African case there is a 
shortage of literature on the term, with more attention given to regime complexity (BROSIG, 
2011), in Latin America’s case, overlapping regionalism has been widely discussed by experts 
in recent years (RIGGIROZZI; TUSSIE, 2012; MALAMUD; GARDINI, 2012; MALAMUD, 
2013; WEIFFEN; WEHNER; NOLTE, 2013; GÓMEZ-MERA, 2015; WEIFFEN, 2017; 
NOLTE, 2014, 2016, 2018). In general, the impressions tend to imply that the existing 
organizational overlap would be less negative than expected, or more of a “theoretical 
problem than a practical challenge” (NOLTE, 2018, p.129). 
More recently, however, the literature has also admitted the possibility of overlapping 




explicit to their obvious mandate2 (NOLTE; WEIFFEN 2018). This was also one of the 
conclusions obtained during the master's studies concerning the de facto overlapping, not just 
de jure. Even though results also showed initially greater opportunities of cooperation than of 
competition between ROs in the cases analyzed, they have also raised concerns about their 
segmentation and friction.  
On this point, the literature has been quite fruitful in recent years in providing possible 
effects caused by overlapping organizations, but there are still scarce empirical analyses of its 
actual effects (PANKE, STAPEL, 2016), mainly if we consider that throughout their 
existence, these organizations usually go through a process of expanding and refining its 
action in order to achieve the goals of its member states and remain significant for the region 
they belong. The effects produced by institutional enlargements on the broadening of the 
scope of action of an organization results then on its original mandate not always comprising 
the totality of its sectoral performance. Thus, the idea that the plurality of blocs with 
overlapping mandates and members would already have potential for fragmentation is then 
reinforced by the realization that, through overlapping in action, regional policy coherence 
could be further reduced.  
It should be noted, nonetheless, that when selecting and analyzing the cases, the 
coexistence of multiple overlapping projects per se is not considered as negative but as an 
element for the discussion the effects caused by the interplay between these institutions for 
the coexistence and the construction of regional cohesion. In fact, according to Nolte (2014; 
2016; 2018), a scenario of overlap could potentially generate effects for regional governance 
that would range from indifference and non-interaction to increased friction, competition and 
consequent regional fragmentation, to potential strengthening and cooperation between 
projects. These could also be comprehended into four main possibilities: synergy, cooperation, 
conflict and segmentation, which provide a framework to further elaborate on expected 
patterns of interaction between ROs. More interestingly, by borrowing from the experience of 
the European integration project, the author exemplifies the positive potential of institutional 
plurality, referring to studies by Hoffmann and Mérand (2012) who argue that regional 
negotiations are less likely to fail when states have the possibility to opt-out of policies that do 
not correspond with their interests; thus establishing the concepts of regional integration at 
different velocities and agreements with “varied geometries” (HOFFMANN, MÉRAND, 
 
2 A good example of this statement would be the case of Mercosur. Even though the original or explic-
it mandate of the bloc was centered on trade, it has since evolved to include sectoral themes such as 





However, the type of institutions may constitute an important factor when analyzing 
the potential of the institutional plurality as the theoretical discussion does not dedicate 
special attention to the fact that the organizational logic of a region may be composed of 
informal or limited institutionalized systems with scarce capabilities, which could hamper the 
positive effects of the multeity of ROs. Therefore, some authors diverge from these 
perspectives, as we have previously discussed3. Malamud and Giardini (2012) argue that 
overlapping doesn't necessarily produce a competitive regionalism, but rather segments it, 
facilitating decentralization at the sub-regional level. 
Another author who has reflected on the effects caused by the complexity of the 
international regime for regional governance is Laura Gómez-Mera (2015). In her analysis, 
Gómez-Mera does not disregard the possibilities for synergy and cooperation between 
organizations. However, she identifies three main mechanisms that sabotage the proliferation 
of international agreements and the effectivity of cooperation: legal fragmentation; the use of 
institutional strategies; and constant competition that causes the regional unity to unravel. 
These challenges proposed by Gómez-Mera also add interesting features to the perception of 
what regional behaviors could look like, considering the tactics behind the use of such 
mechanisms. 
This could contribute to states losing confidence in, or even abandoning regional 
integration altogether in favor of uni-or multilateral initiatives. The absence of direct conflict 
between institutions, which might be considered an opportunity for synergy and cooperation, 
should not be promptly interpreted as a positive effect; often, regional blocs experience 
serious difficulties in meeting their objectives, while states often opt to negotiate directly 
rather than in the regional context.  
In addition, we consider that institutional overlapping can produce outcomes that 
might not be regarded monolithically. For instance, the same action can be positive for crises’ 
resolution and at the same time generate friction within actors, such as when two ROs have 
the same position, thus generating positive reinforcement, but simultaneously, they compete 
for the leadership on the conflict resolution. This friction generates ambiguity, hijacks 
institutional legitimacy and therefore can delay or bypass the results.  
In this way, given the questions and arguments raised, and, as previously discussed, we 
broadened the research regions to evaluate the interplay of overlapping institutions around the 
 




world, and to propose generalizations about the effects of the phenomenon. As Nolte (2014, 
p.9) recalls the statements by Brosig (2010, p.37), “competition between organizations is most 
likely if there is significant overlap in core competence fields or if one core area of one 
organization threatens to dominate a peripheral policy area of another organization”, whereas 
overlapping in policy areas of secondary importance has a greater chance of generating 
cooperation, we have chosen to analyze a particularly sensitive issue to ROs, that would 
therefore demand more institutional action and provide more data to the research. In fact, we 
continued the policy agenda analysis used in the previous research stage (RIBEIRO, 2016)4, 
in order to advance in the studies beyond the member/mandate relationship, but we singled 
out a specific subject to be studied cross-regionally, one of the most sensitive issues to the 
blocs as they would be related to their cores of power: political crises. 
By political crises, we intend to bring together the different terms used in the two 
regions to refer to the incidents such as coups d’état; attempted coups; undemocratic seizing 
or maintenance of power; and violations of the constitutional order; which are known as 
democratic ruptures or attempted ruptures, and invoke the use of mechanisms for democracy 
protection (MDPs) in South American Regionalism; and as Unconstitutional Changes of 
Government, by African regulations. This definition is derived from the normative context of 
democratic clauses, democracy protection and good governance, as specifically described by 
each ROs’ legal instruments. Those terms will be further addressed as we analyze the 
normative provisions in both regions throughout the case studies. 
The choice for political crises is also in accordance with the theoretical framework of 
the thesis, which departs from the institutionalist perspective, particularly its historical strand 
(KEOHANE, 1989; PIERSON, 2004). Accordingly, as we study regional organizations, their 
contextual background, design and moment in time will have key roles in providing 
explanations on the effects of overlappings to ROs. The theory further stresses that there are 
moments which are propitious to conduct these analyses, namely critical junctures, or “a 
relatively short period in time during which an event or a set of events occurs that has a large 
and enduring subsequent impact” (MAHONEY; MOHAMEDALI; NGUYEN, 2016). 
Ikenberry (1994) explicitly cites political crises as critical junctures, therefore allowing their 
choice as object of analysis in an institutionalist framework, as they provide change to the 
scenarios. 
 
4  The author’s master dissertation was entitled “Overlapping regionalism and institutional prolifera-
tion in Latin America: complementarity and fragmentation in regional agendas”. It is available, in 




Moments of political crises are also specially interesting in the light of current world 
events, which are giving rise to nationalist claims in opposition to communitarian approaches, 
as shown by the recent episode of the United Kingdom demand to leave the European Union, 
which became known as Brexit. As globalization advanced and has transformed international 
relations into a more porous set of interactions, regions still have central roles on conflict 
resolution and governance, as crises have also evolved to be regional in their nature, once they 
hardly stay confined to a country’s national border. Another good example to this last 
statement would be how the economic and political crises in Venezuela have led to a refugee 
crisis on neighboring countries. 
Overlapping regionalisms do not depend on political crises but will have effects more 
prominently seen on those moments, serving to the testing of our hypothesis on the 
potentialities of overlappings to generate conflict. The relevance of critical moments is also 
found on the literature on regime complexity, which has also served to base early approaches 
on overlapping regionalism and has been specifically used to understand African institutions. 
The core concept here is related to institutional interplay as stated by Brosig (2011; 2013): 
interaction between institutions would be triggered by two reasons: diverging norms; and the 
obligations derived from the institutional competence. Hence, both cases confirm the 
relevance of moments of crisis as relevant to measure since they foment the need of 
interaction, as they generate pression on normative fields for the interplay. On its turn, the 
interplay itself can generate two effects: empowering and integrative actions, or 
disruptive/conflictive action. 
The literature has since stated that in matters of political and security cooperation, 
which include therefore our understanding of political crises, a mixed picture tends to emerge 
when looking at interactions in instances where several ROs have become involved in 
managing crises or conflicts considering that cross institutional action has either led to 
advancing cooperation or to blockades (WEIFFEN 2017; NOLTE; WEIFFEN 2018).  
Thus, considering all the above-mentioned arguments, some questions could be 
proposed. According to the institutionalist theory (KEOHANE, 1989), institutions are 
instruments that would facilitate the trust of neighbors through the sharing of information and 
increase predictability. However, considering the coexistence of several institutions, how do 
we predict behavior or consolidate practices? What are the effects of segmented regionalism? 
Those questions serve as auxiliary as they have helped shaping what would become 





• How do overlapping ROs behave when they have shared competence over an issue 
and how can they influence regional cohesion or fragmentation? 
 
The underlying motivation behind the questioning would then be the concern that 
institutional overlap would be a generator of regional fragmentation through the friction in the 
coexistence of different organizations. The aim is to conduct not an outcome-driven research, 
but a process-driven one, as we are not specifically looking at conflict resolution is reached 
but rather at the strategies adopted by ROs throughout critical events in order to interact in a 
complex system. 
This goal can be further illustrated by Figure 1 below on the consequences of 
institutional overlap. As the redundancy of ROs will ultimately lead to policy outcomes, our 
focus rests on the two previous stages, namely the actor strategies and inter-organizational 
dynamics, to which we seek to perceive the presence or absence of interaction patterns in 
overlapping situation.  
Ultimately, when we question the effects to regional governance, what we mean to 
analyze are the outcomes of these organizational behaviors and interactions to regional 
cohesion, not necessarily in terms of policy outcomes, but in terms of coexistence. Under 
what conditions interactions generate complementarity between regional blocs or provide 
friction and fragmentation? 
 
Figure 1- Consequences of institutional overlap 
 






1.2 Theoretical and methodological framework 
  
Considered the proposed questions and object, the methodological background 
adopted relies on Comparative Regionalism in order to understand the common conjuncture 
presented in the analyzed regions. This field has been subject to dubious assessments in the 
past, as European integration was put into perspective as a model experience and there was no 
consensual clarity in the definition of its elementary concepts. Thus, area specialists have also 
strongly criticized the cultural relativism employed in these studies and stressed the need for a 
deep multidisciplinary knowledge of complex contexts and peoples (SÖDERBAUM, 2008).  
However, as the studies developed, a consensus in the field of study concerning the 
practice of regionalism was reached and as Acharya (2012) points out, regionalism is a 
socially constructed political movement whose form depends directly on the domestic and 
transnational interests involved in the process, allowing therefore the comprehension that it 
encompasses not only state actors but also non-governmental actors within a given region.  
Considering the social aspect of the construction of regional initiatives, the need for 
field studies to be conducted from non-European perspectives in order to avoid Euro-
Standardization of regional processes conducted in different contexts,  is derived as Sbragia 
(2008), Söderbaum (2008), De Lombaerde et al (2010) and Acharya (2012) further point out. 
The idea of comparison helps in the prevention of ethnocentric and cultural interpretations, 
but in order to make it feasible, it is necessary to create new generalizations or invalidate 
previously established generalizations (AXLINE, 1994). This is why we have chosen to work 
with two cases, two regions that offer the perspective of the global South to provide a solid 
basis for analysis. 
The comparison in studies of comparative regionalism offers the opportunity of 
avoiding the narrowness of a single experience, or parochialism, while testing the validity of 
assumptions externally. It allows reflections on the meanings of concepts such as “regional 
integration” and “regionalism” from non-Eurocentric perspectives and enables the accounting 
of common challenges and perspectives. Therefore, comparison on the field does not mean 
the valuative action of determining which region has “the best” approach to regionalism, but it 
relies on the possibility of enhancing the understanding of regional dynamics on the basis of 
commonalities among them. 
Thus, given the conjunctural similarity of the Global South on the studied regions, the 
analysis of the institutional framework’s evolution could enable the debate on resources to 




arguably be considered as global peripheries provides for the analysis of the relationship 
between colonialism, integration and the development of autonomy in those regions. 
In order to provide the study of patterns of organizational behavior or response to be 
compared, in addition to the political and historical contexts, the analysis should focus on the 
formal institutional structures that make up the regional processes to perceive their dynamics 
and scope of action, without disregarding the regional organization’s performances that are 
developed ad hoc or informally. According to Acharya (2012), in this sense, we once again 
highlight the institutionalist theory of international relations, which starts to question not the 
validity of regional institutions, but the how they matter. Therefore, as we have previously 
stated, we intend to analyze the documents and actions from an institutionalist point of view 
(KEOHANE, 1989). 
As regarding the how they matter propositions, through the use of the two-level game 
dynamics (PUTNAM, 1988) also comes a response to the comprehension of the 
organizational behaviors, as it considers the spheres in which institutional actions are inserted. 
In this sense, we adapt the author’s propositions, which have been previously used on Foreign 
Policy analysis5, to reflect on ROs’ behavior as a result of a binomial game. Putnam’s 
contribution, which states that the position of a State at the international level would be the 
result of the intersection of the interests of governmental and non-governmental actors is 
therefore adapted to understand the position of a regional organization. Thus, regional 
interplay would be the result of the game between the sub-regional and the regional, or the 
international level, whose common positions and conflicts would lead to the formation of a 
given region’s interests and would thus shape these actors’ behaviors.  
These types of interaction would fit then into a model to study strategic choices on 
given situations of imperfect competition, specifically contributing to the understanding of 
how actions can affect different actors, making the outcomes of a situation the results of the 
actors’ performances choices, as we preliminarily draw on table 1 (p.31), and further develop 
on chapter 5, after the empirical analysis. 
The types of behavior on the table are scaled from the most cooperative or synergic, 
which produces as a response a scenario of regional complementarity, through the most 
conflictive or clashing, that leads to a result of a fragmented regional cohesion. Some 
indicators of behavioral type that could be fitted into the table involve: the agreement between 
two ROs and the positive reinforcement of an action, which generates cooperation or a 
 
5 Cf. DA CONCEIÇÃO-HELDT, E.; MELLO, P. Two-Level Games in Foreign Policy Analysis, Ox-




synergic regional governance; the agreement between two ROs without clear role definition 
on action generating competition for regional leadership (even if it results in positive 
reinforcement), which creates a cooperative but competitive scenario; the decision or 
incapacity by one of the involved ROs not to act, either in a situation of agreement or 
disagreement, which generates a regional silence or indifference that neither advances nor 
hampers regional actions; the disagreement of a RO with a given measure and its decision not 
to act or to blockade the action, which generates a situation of institutional deadlock, and the 
veto behavior among players; and lastly, the most conflicting scenario which occurs when two 
ROs have clashing interpretations on how to act on a given situation, and aim to delegitimize 
other actor’s performances, generating fragmentation of regional cohesion. 
 
Table 1- Types organizational behavior and corresponding regional results 
Type of organizational behavior Behavior outcome 
Cooperative-synergic Coordination or complementarity 
Cooperative-competitive Agreement with competition for leadership 
Conflictive-passive or cooperative-passive Silence or indifference 
Conflictive-blockade Deadlock/veto 
Conflictive-clashing Fragmentation 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
It is imperative to stress that case studies and institutional responses are not presented 
monolithically, as ROs can have different positionings over time. The indicators and the 
actors’ performances choices described above and fitted into table 1 should be further 
developed in the case analysis’ chapter.  
On another note, even though the proposition of a behavioral typology exerts the 
actor’s underlying rational choice, which could contradict the affirmations of the need of 
context from historical institutionalism, the combination between both strands of thought is 
made possible by the comprehension of bounded rationality (JONES, 1999). As statements 
from historical institutionalism and its perception of path dependency could not directly be 
framed as rational, this does not mean that organizational politics are irrational. As Jones 
(1999) affirms, bounded rationality asserts that decision makers are intendedly rational, or 
goal-oriented and adaptive, but their preexisting underlying features, such as their human 
cognitive architecture can partly compromise its rationality, creating a deviation. Therefore, 




by historical features of ROs, allowing the understanding of path dependence and particular 
features of institutional trajectory, such as critical junctures as a rationality that results from 
processing behavioral limits. 
Lastly, even though we recognize the challenges and the untraditional approach, we 
rely on a broader perspective comprehension of multiple cases through qualitative testing to 
address the inquiries of this thesis, since it can help tackle the “how general?” question about 
institutional interplay, analogously to Gary Goertz’ (2017) proposition of a large-N qualitative 
analysis. Seeking to produce generalizations and generalizability on the study of ROs patterns 
of action in overlapping scenarios, we meet Goertz’ requirements by examining a selection of 
all of the relevant sub-regions for concrete, empirical evidence, as we discuss in the following 
section. 
 
1.3 Case selection and thesis’ scope 
 
Considering the preeminence of multilayered regional relationships in the different 
regions of the world and the need to develop empirical studies on overlappings in order to 
consider its effects, the present thesis also aims to contribute to comparative regionalism 
studies by considering each region individually and valuing the Global South as a producer of 
regional dynamics. 
The initial idea was to cover cases on three regions, avoiding Euro-standardizations by 
considering besides south America and Africa, the Asian continent, to be studied from the 
perspective of Southeast Asian overlapping organizations. However, as the inductive research 
was developed on political crises, the central focus of case analysis, Asia, in its particularity, 
presented a situation of indifference and non-action within ROs, which can therefore be 
perceived as a non-negative but also as a non-existent effect. As we center the attention of this 
research on institutional interactions and the form they can present themselves, in the absence 
of actions and, consequently, interactions, we decided to focus the research on the regions that 
provide richer material for the analysis. 
Thus, we proposed to resume and deepen studies on the effects of overlapping 
organizations in South America, with the intention of providing elements that could contribute 
to the development of a positive regional dynamic. The choice for South America instead of 
Latin America derives from the perspective that the disaggregation of the American continent 
into sub-regions has given birth to such different regional logics within the Caribbean, North 




presenting themselves more attractively and intensely within the sub-regions. Hence, we 
continue the analysis of the experiences of MERCOSUR, UNASUR and CELAC started at 
the master’s studies adding regards to the other regional projects with competences on the 
sub-region, such as the Andean Community (CAN) and the Organization of American States 
(OAS), in the sectoral cases where they are pertinent. 
In the African case, however, the preeminence of the continental logic proposed by the 
African Union (AU) provides an interesting opportunity to analyze the relationship between 
the pan-African organization, as a continental organization with some of the sub-regional 
experiences, the so-called Regional Economic Communities (RECs). This study also can 
contribute to the empirical testing of propositions on overlapping regionalism. For instance, 
according to Nolte (2014), the presence of more comprehensive central ROs that articulate the 
multiple sub-regional platforms and build bridges between the different mechanisms while 
using institutional overlapping to their advantage, could represent a positive aspect for 
regional governance and cohesion. 
Therefore, when we look at specific sectoral cases, it will be interesting to see how the 
interplay between the overlapping organizations work in a situation where a continental 
mechanism that intends to organize the relationship with sub-regional blocs exists. In this 
case, following the African Union’s interpretation, eight of the existing sub-regional 
organizations are categorized as RECs and understood as building blocs, or pillars for the 
development of continental regionalism. They are the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU); the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); the Community of Sahel–
Saharan States (CEN–SAD); the East African Community (EAC); the Economic Community 
of Central African States (ECCAS); the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS); the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); and the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC). The plurality of African institutions also 
functions as way of granting the study with a large enough universe of cases, as we can 
further develop analysis on dyadic relationships between the AU and each one of the 
particular RECs, to perceive their behavior and interaction. 
As we have already justified the choice of political crises as the sectoral cut and scope 
condition, we move through the geographical selection, and regard the temporal framework. 
The timeline of analysis was established from normative milestones in the different regions 
concerning democratic violations and unconstitutional changes of government. In the African 
case, for instance, we depart from the institutionalization of the Peace and Security Council of 




on unconstitutional changes of government (UCGs). Considering the high number of cases 
through the years, this selection also makes the research more feasible.  
However, in the South American case, the same institutional design cannot be 
perceived, as democratic provisions and interventions are based on charters and normative 
acts known as democratic clauses or mechanisms for democratic protection. Therefore, the 
point of departure is the moment when the overlapping competences regarding democratic 
abuses began in the sub-continent in 1996, as Mercosur signed its first commitment on the 
subject, hence sharing the competence on the subject with the OAS, which had previously 
signed a similar resolution in 1991, and a protocol in 1992. Over the following years, other 
ROs in the continent have come to sign provisions on the subject, thus becoming co-
responsible for the democratic stability on the region. 
Departing from an earlier period is also a research choice based on the literature, as in 
the case of South America, the recent secondary data has already attempted to systematize the 
cases of political crises that occurred in recent years, through two main works by Weiffen 
(2017) and Nolte (2018). The authors also affirmed (2018) that there is a different dynamic on 
overlapping actions overtime in the region: while in the 1990s the coordinative logic would be 
preeminent, from the years 2000, a competitive logic has been installed. This perception could 
therefore provide interesting data for the analysis, allowing the comparison of patterns of 
interaction over time. 
Among the two regional cases, we have been able to map multiple within cases that 
meet the scope conditions of organizational overlap interaction in a situation of political crises 
in the relevant years. From the mapping we established the following criteria for the case 
selection and analysis: first all of the continents’ sub-regions organizations should be 
represented. Therefore, the choice for case-countries considers that all ROs in the region are 
entitled to debate a scenario of political crisis at least once, even if they choose not to act. The 
second relevant criterium was the availability of data, which also considers the impact of the 
crisis on the region and on the literature production. A complete list of the compiled cases can 
be seen in each regional chapter (chapters 3 and 4). 
Lastly, due to the advances of academic production on the topic, we were able to work 
with all of the mapped ruptures to the democratic order in South America that fit the scope 
conditions and were negotiated with overlapping mandates: 2010 Ecuador; 2012 Paraguay; 
and 2013-onwards Venezuela. As for Africa, since the number of cases is very high, more 
selection criteria had to be employed. They are further described on chapter 3, but, for 




providing generalizations, we analyze within cases in all five African sub-regions and its 
relationship with the AU. They are: 2009 Madagascar representing Southern Africa; 2012 
Mali and 2017 Gambia, representing West Africa; 2013 Central African Republic for Central 
Africa; 2013 Egypt for Northern Africa; and 2015 Burundi for Eastern Africa.  
 
1.4 Research procedures 
 
The research has three main stages of analysis: mapping the regional organizations 
that compose scenario of overlapping in Africa and South America for political and historical 
contextualization which will be further used to understand organizational behavior; Case 
study scrutiny comprising the selection of cases that meet the research conditions in order to 
capture patterns of organizational behavior; Comparative systemization of convergences and 
divergences between regional processes to signify ROs behavior accordingly to the process of 
regional overlap. 
Thus, in the first stage, we seek to present the general political and historical panorama 
of regionalism in the two regions and the prominent institutional overlaps, in order to make 
known the overlapping scenario to be analyzed and allow discussion of the drivers of 
regionalism, which led to this conformation, allowing its comparison. Next, as we depart from 
historical institutionalism, we analyze ROs and their action when confronted with critical 
junctures (political crises), in order to provide evidence about the effects of overlapping on 
the interaction between ROs and its consequences for regional governance. To do so, we use 
primary and secondary data to trace institutional patterns of action, throughout the selected 
cases that meet preliminarily stablished conditions in both continents. The data is then 
processed through presence and absence to reflect on influent regional conditions and 
outcomes. 
Data systematization will also serve to highlight the specificities of each region or 
process and to enable the listing of variables that might influence the results of both the 
organizational behaviors and interplays, and their consequences to the concretization of the 
possible scenarios of  regional fragmentation or complementarity, as indicated in the research 
question. Thus, the study of the processes is done individually, but simultaneously with both 
regions through the production of correlations between the presence and absence of patterns 
of organizational behavior, which are studied both in a broad regional perspective, and in a 
sub-regional dyadic one. 




interactions in overlapping regionalisms, analyzing the implications of segmented institutional 
proliferation for the development of regionalism in the global South, considering the different 
contributions of the regions in which they are inserted.  
 
1.5 Summing up: contributions of the cross regional organizational behavior analysis  
  
In conclusion, considering the different theoretical, conceptual and methodological 
perspectives combined in this chapter, together with the thesis overview provided by the 
research procedures, we could single out contributions to be achieved by the present doctoral 
thesis.  
Firstly, overlapping regionalism is still a relatively new field, whose studies have been 
developing in the last decade, but still demand empirical exploration. This affirmation is also 
supported by the fact that most of the works of the literature are focused on a single region. 
Thus, the research here presented also offers a contribution as it values the cross-regional 
approach of comparative regionalism, not only by not studying a mainstream region, but by 
combining the analysis of two of them.  
Secondly, in this research we are focusing on the process of interactions generated by 
overlapping competences, not on policy outcomes, as does most of the existing literature. This 
differentiation allows observation on organizational behavior and institutional learning, which 
by its turn can provide reflections on how the plurality of ROs affects regional power 
dynamics from the dyadic interplays between the sub-regional and regional levels. Moreover, 
when we consider the African continent, the innovation relies primarily on associating studies 
on regionalism to overlappings as such conceptual problems, since the literature on regime 
complexity is more preeminent. 
Finally, regarding the unusual methodological choice of a broad spectrum, the 
horizontal selection of multiple cases to cover different sub-regions  can also provide further 
developments to the field, as we test approaches to political crises by applying qualitative 
analysis to institutional interplays at the regional level, enabling not only methodological 





2 REGIONALISM IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH: INSTITUTIONAL MAPPING OF THE 
SCENARIOS OF OVERLAPPING 
 
In order to advance questioning the phenomena of overlapping ROs and to provide a 
contextual framework to the research, a set of preliminary inquiries must be addressed, such 
as: how are regional scenarios composed in Africa and Latin America? What types of 
institutions are present, what is their context of creation? What are the factors that lead states 
to associate around ROs? Does the presence of said factors in the beginning of the processes 
translate into influence in the results of the interactions of the coexistence of blocs in a 
complex regional scenario? Are there characteristics common to these regions?  
The justification for proposing such contextual questions lies in the theoretical 
framework that underlies the thesis, institutionalism (KEOHANE, 1989), and which, 
therefore, is centered on the formal and institutional structures that make up the regional 
processes to perceive their dynamics and scope of action. As we have stated before, according 
to Acharya (2012), in this sense, we highlight that this framework starts to question not the 
validity of regional institutions, but how they matter. 
 By associating the motivation behind the conformation of scenarios with the literature 
of drivers of regionalism, we aim to provide not causal but analytical elements that allow 
future reflection in the thesis about the participation of the elements that make up the history 
of regional processes in their later functioning and behavior, in cases of overlapping 
institutions. In this sense, therefore, we deal with the concept of path dependence, prevenient 
from historical institutionalism, which perceives the sequences in which events unfold as 
elementary to understand later consequences (PIERSON, 2004).   
 Thus, the so-called drivers are the factors that motivate and initiate the development of 
regional processes and they can assume the most varied characteristics, from the interests of 
national elites and their ability to press governments for integration, to the presence of threats 
that can be better faced together. The present work does not intend to simplify said drivers, 
because it is understood that these should not be analyzed in a monolithic way, but as a 
complex set that influences the formation of preferences for the institutional establishment. 
Notwithstanding, the intention that underlies the study of drivers is, in accordance with the 
aforementioned path dependence perspective, to be able to reflect on how its influences might 
be determining on the shaping of regional relationships between overlapping organizations. 
Therefore, in this first moment we present the problem through a panorama of the 




display of organizational settings in Africa and South America before proceeding to the case-
specific analysis on the next chapters of the doctoral thesis. Consequently, the aim of this 
chapter is to reflect on possible commonalities between the regions, and to provide future 
material for analyzing the organizational behavior, through the knowledge and 
problematization of the scenarios of overlapping regionalisms, their conformation and the 
drivers that drove the establishment of their institutions. 
Yet, before moving on to the individual study of each region, we address on the next 
two sections two fundamental topics for this research. We further develop the theoretical 
background on overlapping regionalisms and why it is so relevant for this study; and then we 
enter the discussion on drivers of regionalism, which encourages the discussion of 
development and trajectory in the regional processes. 
 
2.1 Overlapping regional organizations and regional interplays 
 
As we have introduced on the previous chapter, overlapping regionalism has been con-
ceived as instances in which states are affiliated with several regional organizations (ROs), 
which are autonomous and independent of each other, creating an overlap of memberships; 
and share similar objectives in their scope and policies, thus producing overlapping mandates. 
The term has been consolidated by the literature (MALAMUD, 2013; WEIFFEN; WEHNER; 
NOLTE, 2013; WEIFFEN, 2017; NOLTE, 2014, 2016, 2018; PANKE STAPEL, 2016) mostly 
on studies of the profusion and coexistence of regional processes in Latin America6.  
We underscore, however, that for this study, we also consider the overlapping actions 
propelled by the ROs on a complex scenario, as previous researches (RIBEIRO, 2016) have 
demonstrated that with institutional enlargements, the mandates not always cover for the entire 
scope of action of a regional bloc. We further develop the conceptualization and characteris-
tics of overlapping in action on chapter 5, after the enlistment of the contributions of the em-
pirical analysis, but the prescriptions for the formulation of the dyadic overlapping in action 
relationship are similar to those concerning overlapping mandates. In short, a situation with 
two or more ROs that share member states and policy areas constitute a scenario of overlap-
 
6 A few studies have addressed overlapping regionalisms in Europe and Asia. For Europe, cf. PANKE, 
D., & STAPEL, S. Overlapping regionalism in Europe: Patterns and effects. The British Journal of 
Politics and International Relations, 20(1), 239–258, 2018; and on Asia, see YEO, A. Overlapping 
regionalism in East Asia: determinants and potential effects, International Relations of the Asia-




ping organizations. If the shared policy areas are ruled by a formal mandate, there is a de jure 
overlapping, while a de facto overlap is formed through the actions of the involved ROs. 
The research and conceptualization on overlapping regionalisms are derived from the 
regime complexity literature (BROSIG, 2011; WEIFFEN, WEHNER; NOLTE, 2013), which 
produced important insights on how the multiplicity of institutions affects the way they will 
interact at the international level (BROSIG, 2011; 2013).  
Orsini, Morin and Young (2013, p.29) define regime complexes “as a network of three 
or more international regimes that relate to a common subject matter; exhibit overlapping 
membership; and generate substantive, normative, or operative interactions”. The authors rec-
ognize that those interactions are perceived as potentially problematic to the environment they 
are inserted to independently of if they are managed effectively, or not. 
Weiffen (2017) clarifies that even if regime complexity studies are focused on interna-
tional treaties and conventions, rather than on formal organizations, there are some similari-
ties among the two fields of institutional interplay, as they share “the theoretical specification 
of causal mechanisms underlying the consequences of overlap”. Brosig’s work (2011, p. 150) 
agrees on the commonalities and states that “the most significant difference between treaty 
regimes and international organizations is the difference in the degree of agency”. Thus, the 
author affirms that this divergency between the two regimes would be the organizations’ abil-
ity to manage their interactions on the complex scenario, by formulating their external rela-
tions pro-actively (BROSIG, 2011, p.150). 
Brosig’s contributions also provide a theoretical basis for our proposal of studying how 
ROs behave on overlapping settings, as the author further enunciates that overlaps will gener-
ate a normative pressure for the organizations to react to common issues through the actors’ 
behavior, and thus trigger interaction among them. Those forces for interplay may lead to 
empowering as well as disruptive effects and the author (BROSIG, 2011, p.152) has catego-
rized them under two main factors: the existence of diverging norms and behavior; and the 
impact of the obligations that an international organization imposes on itself and its members. 
Consequently, overlaps change the strategies open to national and international actors to 
achieve their preferences through regionalism (WEIFFEN, 2017), and understanding these 
settings and organizational behavior thus becomes relevant, considering the outcomes they can 







2.1.1 Configuration types of overlap 
 
  Weiffen, Wehner and Nolte (2013) have presented one of the first conceptualizations 
of overlapping organizations, and the possible configuration the phenomenon might assume. 
Considering the relationship between mandates and memberships, the authors present two 
variants of overlap, which can be seen on Figure 2 below. In the first constellation, (a) Inter-
section, the two circles represent two regional organizations with common mandates and an 
intersection of states to both organizations. The second diagram, (b) Subset, presents “an over-
lapping mandate with nested membership, where all members of a smaller organization are 
part of a larger organization, but both organizations are autonomous and independent of each 
other” (WEIFFEN; WHENER; NOLTE, 2013, p.374).  
 
Figure 2- Variants of overlap 
 
Source: WEIFFEN; WHENER; NOLTE, 2013, p.375 
	
 In order to provide further specialization to categories of overlap, we draw on Young’s 
(2002, apud BROSIG, 2011) formulations about organizational interplay and clarify that we 
understand as horizontal overlappings the sharing of mandates/actions or memberships 
between two ROs at the same level (regional or sub-regional), while we refer to vertical 
overlap when considering the relationship between an organization at the sub-regional and the 
other at the regional - or continental level as seen in figure 3, on the next page. The sets 
covered by the concept of vertical overlappings therefore address the levels of interaction 
between sub-regional and regional; sub-regional and continental; regional and continental 
organizations; while horizontal overlappings cover organizations at the same level: sub-
regional - sub-regional, or regional - regional, and so forth. 




international organizations as pictured by the literature on regime complexity (WEIFFEN; 
WEHNER; NOLTE, 2013). However, we choose to present it differently as we also consider 
the possibility of finding ROs in a vertical overlapping situation where they are not fully 
nested due to not sharing the totality of member states, only coexisting at different levels. A 
good example would be the situation between the African Union and the Arab Maghreb Union 
(AMU) with Morocco until 2017: the country was a member of the sub-regional organization, 
but not of the continental one, thus making the nesting between organizations imperfect. Also, 
another possibility would be the existence of nested settings at the same level, meaning, two 
sub-regional nested organizations that do not represent a vertical overlap, as considered by 
our definition, as for example ECOWAS and WAEMU. 
 
Figure 3 – Explaining ROs horizontal and vertical overlappings 
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
2.1.2 Potential outcomes’ scenarios: why overlappings matter 
 
 The existence of overlapping regional organizations is not intrinsically good or bad for 
regional development, as both outcomes can prevail from the interaction between regional 
organizations. The specific literature on the subject has presented divided impressions of what 
the real consequences of the complexity of regional scenarios would be, as we discuss below. 
 Among the positive potential of institutional plurality’s arguments, Hoffmann and 
Mérand (2012) argue, that regional negotiations are less likely to fail when states have the 
possibility to opt-out of arrangements that do not meet their interests. Based on the European 
experience, the authors have proposed the concepts of regional integration at different veloci-
ties and agreements with varied geometries (HOFFMANN, MÉRAND, 2012). 
 Nolte (2014) also contributes to this view by stating that combining the flexibility with 
which states can choose the processes in line with their interests while keeping their loyalty to 
other regional partnerships could contribute to the articulation of regional governance while 








jects. According to the author, one factor that could help the articulation of the multiple sub-
regional platforms and build bridges between the different mechanisms would the presence of 
comprehensive central institutions that could use institutional overlapping to their advantage 
and foster regional governance. 
Other positive views on overlapping scenarios would be that a diverse scenario and its 
competitive pressures could stimulate development and innovation, cause the reinforcement 
of regional positions, and foster the division of labor and specialization among ROs. 
 Nonetheless, some points of view diverge from the perspectives outlined before and 
enlist possible consequences of the organizational plurality. Malamud and Giardini (2012) 
affirm that overlappings could lead to competitive regionalism, to the appearance or deepen-
ing of the divisions between countries, to increased tension and disagreements, and eventually 
to a hemispheric disintegration based on emerging sub-regionalism.  
  Laura Gómez-Mera (2015) does not disregard the possibilities for synergy and coop-
eration between institutions but identifies three mechanisms that sabotage the effectivity of 
cooperation on overlapping situations: legal fragmentation; the use of inter-institutional strat-
egies; and constant competition that causes the regional unity to be segmented.  
 The first mechanism refers to the normative ambiguity generated by institutional over-
lapping, which increases the difficulties in complying with regional initiatives, is costly for 
both the public and private sectors, and demands a considerable legal and technical know-
how. The second mechanism is the formulation of inter-institutional political strategies 
through which negotiations can be shifted from one bloc to the other with the objective to 
benefit by influencing the nature of their regimes. And the third mechanism is the erosion of 
regional cohesion and unity through constant competition (GÓMEZ-MERA, 2015). 
 The author’s proposed mechanisms would generate conflict and segmentation as they 
enable actors to switch between different legal frameworks, effectively forum 'shopping' for 
most attractive or favorable set of rules to deal with a particular situation; allow actors to de-
velop a strategic inconsistency in dealing with regional blocs with the purpose of undermining 
the legitimacy of one organization;  and create inefficiencies and even undermine the effectiv-
ity of common efforts in the resolution of international conflicts (GÓMEZ-MERA, 2015, p. 
23). Gómez-Mera further stresses that the constant competition among organizations could 
contribute to states losing confidence in, or even abandoning regional integration altogether in 
favor of other initiatives.  
Considered the characteristics and consequences of overlapping regional 




and their influence on the processes of regionalism, and consequently on the formation of the 
complex regional scenarios. We depart from the theoretical framework proposed by Louise 
Fawcett and Philomena Murray (2015), whose constructivist perspective, combined with the 
institutionalist logic, encourages discussion of development and trajectory in the regional 
processes. In addition, we considered specific factors to each region in order to value diversity 
and comply with the methodological framework of Comparative Regionalism, as we 
mentioned on the previous chapter. 
 Thus, some additional questions that could be raised after scrutinizing the concept of 
overlapping regionalisms would be: can drivers be understood as important factors not only 
for understanding the composition of regional organizations but also to comprehend 
overlapping scenarios? Is there a driver that tends to produce more overlaps? Beyond that: are 




Before addressing the theoretical predictions for regional drivers, a conceptual 
elucidation must be made. “Regional integration” and “regionalism” are two expressions that 
have been used indistinctively by authors and politicians over the years to address the political 
movements that brought states together. However, even though all “regional integration” 
processes are also part of a “regionalism” process, the reciprocal is not true, as currently some 
consensus has been achieved among specialists (BÖRZEL; RISSE, 2016) that “integration” 
presupposes autonomy delegation in favor of creating supranational instances. On its turn 
“regionalism” also comprehends state-led cooperation projects, with intergovernmental 
characteristics that are created among countries of a common regional space. This 
clarification was needed in order to avoid conceptual ambiguity, since parts of the guiding 
literature on regional drivers’ development have concentrated the conceptualization either on 
“regional integration” or “regionalism”, and yet research has demonstrated that the factors 
that influence the approximation of regional interests are common to both processes, and thus 
both contributions are combined on the debate. 
 Louise Fawcett (2015) defines the drivers as “that collective of factors that, 
historically and at present, may contribute to the process of integration” (FAWCETT, 2015, p. 
35, emphasis added). Therefore, the drivers do not only explain the beginning of the 
processes, but also their changes, and three would be the main elements that serve for the 




states; ideas about the region; and institutional environment.  
 According to the author, the first factor would be linked to the exercise of leadership 
by key countries in the promotion and development of ROs. As an example, one could cite 
Brazil's role in shaping the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), or the leading role 
that rising countries like Nigeria, South Africa and India assume in their own sub-regions. On 
the other hand, the factor related to ideas about the region addresses how States and the 
individuals and groups that promote them act in order to establish parameters for what is 
acceptable and possible. Finally, the factor that considers institutional environments relates 
the presence of existing international institutions that act to shape regionalisms. As an 
example, there is the UN and the proposal of conformation of sub-regional organizations in 
the sphere of security in various parts of the world (FAWCETT, 2015, p.50). 
Philomena Murray (2015), in turn, considers that the factors that lead to regionalism 
are directly linked to two elements: trust and reconciliation between countries. Therefore, 
region building depends on community building, which can only be done through these two 
main factors. In turn, community building generates region building and therefore configures 
the regional scenarios as known. 
The author lists endogenous and exogenous factors that can be considered as drivers 
influencing regional integration. In the list of endogenous, elements are described such as how 
perceptions about sovereignty may function as drivers or inhibitors; commitment and state 
leadership / capacity; economic interests; business interests; personalist leaderships. The 
exogenous ones, for example, would be the presence of an external hegemon - notably the US 
- or the need to compete or cooperate with a regional power – which is the case of China in 
Asia-; perceptions of threats or conflicts; diffusion of norms; or a regional bloc acting as a 
driver. Finally, Tanja Börzel summarizes by stating: “The main drivers for regionalism are the 
(material) gains states expect to reap from trading with each other” (BÖRZEL, 2016). 
 In this way, by delimiting possible factors for the promotion of ROs, it is possible to 
proceed with the questioning about the relationship between the elements that influence the 
conformation of the institutions and the way in which they will relate to each other when the 
regional situations cause their interaction. Moreover, although drivers of regionalism are not 
always the drivers of overlapping, one can discuss their role in shaping complex regional 
scenarios. Finally, one can still question the existence and influence of path dependence from 






2.3 Latin America: Scenarios of overlapping, South American Studies 
 
 In Latin America, the roots of the influences of regional integration processes date 
back to the independence period of the former, especially Iberian, colonies. Since then, 
according to Bianculli (2016), two main trends have guided the proposal of competing 
projects in the region. The first one is based on the ideals of Simon Bolívar, which, from the 
end of the nineteenth century, proposed the making of political articulations for the union of 
the neighboring nations, seeking to affirm the non-alignment of the new states not only to the 
colonial metropolises through their own concertation, but also to distance themselves from the 
expansion of the United States. Although unsuccessful in institution building in this period, 
this trend leaves marks for the continuity of processes in subsequent periods. 
 In its turn, the second trend would be aligned with the ideas proposed by the United 
States itself for the region and goes beyond the Latin understanding of the region to comprise 
the neighbors of the North. Between the years of 1889 and 1930, the Pan American 
Conferences, organized by the United States, had the objective of promoting a hemispheric 
regionalism, with roots in the Monroe Doctrine and the ideal of “America for the Americans”. 
Pan-Americanism inaugurates the construction of institutions in the region, but its importance 
is also due to its consequent contestation, as we will discuss later. 
 The two trends for regional approximation have been described by the literature as 
waves of regionalism, an illustrative expression to address the moments in history where 
conditions have made the development of regional processes more propitious. The initial 
classification of the waves’ periods was much based on the European experience, but these 
moments have also contributed to the understanding of the historical conformation of the 
Latin American blocs, since the waves presented themselves to the countries as means in the 
constant search for overcoming the condition of underdevelopment, and even an exclusive 
wave of regionalism is created in Latin American in the 2000’s. Therefore, it is clarified for 
the purposes of comparison, that in the Latin American case, where the waves and the phases 
of creation of ROs are coherent, they will be used for periodization and the perception of the 
drivers. In the case of Africa, periodization follows its own criteria, as we argue on section 
2.4.  
 Something to emphasize, however, is that the understanding of Latin America as a 
whole, as an area of integration, goes through adaptations. Although the regional blocs 
proliferated at such moments, initiatives that comprised the entire subcontinent could not 




America in interconnected sub-regions (Andean America, the Caribbean, Central America, 
Southern Cone, Northern America) was a solution for the creation of processes in the face of 
the waves of regionalism and its understanding is essential for understanding the pursuit of 
integrated development in the region (PHILLIPS, 2005). 
 Thus, in addition to comprehensive projects such as the Latin American Free Trade 
Association – LAFTA or in its Portuguese acronym ALALC - (1960), which later gave way to 
the Latin American Integration Association – LAIA or ALADI - (1980) and the Community of 
Latin American and Caribbean States - CELAC - (2011), there are initiatives in the region that 
propose different ways of thinking about relationships with neighbors, whether through a 
redetermination of space or through sub-regions, as will be discussed below. 
 
2.3.1 Closed Regionalism 
 
 The first cycle of regionalism emerged after World War II, strongly inspired by the 
successes of the integration process developed on the European continent and was termed 
closed regionalism (SARAIVA, 1999; HERZ, HOFFMAN, 2004). It was characterized by a 
concern centered on trade logic and economic protectionism, with a strong institutional 
framework - including a high degree of autonomy vis-à-vis national governments - and the 
pursuit of development through the stimulation of greater economic interdependence through 
trade. 
 It was at this moment that the first regional initiatives of Latin America appeared. 
While the Pan-American ideal embodied the formation of the Organization of American 
States (OAS or OEA) in 1948, motivated by the post-conflict world and regional security, 
other sub-regional initiatives were developed. 
 Reflecting on drivers, it is important to highlight the role played by the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC or CEPAL) in promoting ideas 
about how development would be achieved by the countries of the region and fostering 
regional integration as solution. It was through ideas like the structuralism of Raúl Prebisch in 
the years 1959-60 that the first regional projects as known today took shape. In reference to 
Prebisch (1959), Söderbaum (2016) explains that the ideal presented was that “liberalized 
intra-regional trade in combination with regional protectionism seemed to offer large 
economies of scale and wider markets, which could serve as a stimulus to industrialization, 
economic growth, and investment”. 




to foster productive integration and imports substitution, such as LAFTA in 1960 and, sub-
regionally, the Andean Pact in 1969, which developed an institutional framework inspired on 
the European model. 
 
2.3.2 Open Regionalism 
 
 Closed regionalism presented limitations and was replaced by a new regionalist 
impulse in the 1980s and 1990s, in the context of the intensification of globalization and the 
“new world order”, which mainly met neoliberal norms - such as free trade and opening 
markets. Hence, this new moment was called open regionalism and its main provisions 
suggested the interdependence between neighboring countries should be promoted by the 
liberalization of economies, in order to strengthen the region's competitiveness and the 
interaction between nations. 
 One particularity of this moment is the intergovernmental character of the 
institutionalization adopted, in contrast to the aspirations for supranationalism from the 
previous period. In the context of open regionalism, one can also see the influence of 
ECLAC's proposals on institutional formation7, since countries saw in regional integration the 
opportunity to overcome the peripheral situation through an international competitive 
insertion. While the opening of economies was considered strategic, the state was no longer 
the only actor in the process, giving the private sector the opportunity to replace it in the 
promotion of regional integration. During this period many of the regional agreements still in 
force proliferate, as well as the re-launching of some existing mechanisms. 
 This is how the failed ALALC or LAFTA is relaunched in 1980 as ALADI (or LAIA) 
and the Andean Pact becomes the Andean Community (CAN) in 1996. As for the new sub-
regional initiatives, proposals such as the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) in 1991, 
and the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. With regard to the United 
States' proposals for the region, in 1994 a project for the establishment of a Free Trade Area of 
the Americas (FTAA or ALCA) also emerged. 
 
2.3.3 Post-hegemonic regionalism 
 
 With the advent of the 2000s, the momentum developed for Latin American 
 




regionalism is unique in relation to other regions of the world. Initially, with the rise of leftist 
governments in the countries of the region, it was believed that the neoliberal model of open 
regionalism had been overcome, since political and social issues gained more space in the 
debate. Based on the ideal that trade liberalization alone is not capable of promoting 
development, nor is it an integrated agenda for the construction of social equity 
(CIENFUEGOS; SANAHUJA, 2010), it was initially called post-liberal (VEIGA; RIOS, 
2007).  
With such strong political influences, the institutionality of the blocs created on this 
moment is more fluid in comparison to the previous waves, functioning as tools for 
concertation among member states and focusing more in strengthening cooperation than 
integration. Thus, the projects that emerged at that time are also created in order to achieve 
this new understanding of development. 
 It is at this moment, for example, that Latin American countries reject the FTAA 
project and the intentions of the United States, to propose new local interactions, for example, 
with the proposal of the concept of South America. Boosted especially by the Brazilian 
foreign policy, some positions of the academy, exemplified by Monica Hirst and Letícia 
Pinheiro (1995) and Henrique Altemani Oliveira (2005), affirm that from the government of 
Itamar Franco (1992-1994) the concept of South America gained a more strategic bias, 
endorsing the idea of the valorization by the foreign policy of the immediate neighbors. The 
perception of a new space and the regime shifting can therefore be considered as drivers in 
this period. 
 This positioning can be exemplified by the proposals that emerged at that time, such as 
the creation of a South American Free Trade Area (SAFTA or ALCSA) and the emergence of 
the Amazon Initiative, in addition to the aforementioned rejection of the FTAA and a relaunch 
of Mercosur in 2003, with its institutional expansion to cover new issues. The idea of forming 
institutions through the contestation of external elements also explains the creation of the 
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), in 2004. 
In addition, another driver to be considered is the presence of a regional leader, a role 
played by Brazil at that moment. In both terms of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1994-2002) 
and Luís Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) as presidents, it was maintained that South 
America would be the key to Brazil's international insertion, as well as the strengthening of 
ideas for building an autonomous South American space in front of the developed powers, 
especially the United States, with the launching of the South American Community of Nations 





 The Brazilian initiative for regional valorization has also worked in a hemispheric 
sense by proposing a project to aggregate the Latin American countries, excluding the United 
States and Canada, through the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States 
(CELAC), in 2011. The bloc constituted a concertation forum with a political and social 
character, as demanded by the post-liberal wave of regionalism, and without any 
institutionalization.  
 
Figure 4: Overlapping regional mechanisms in South America (with external members) 
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
However, the moment was not marked only by the overcoming of liberalism and the 
resumption of the same presented by the Pacific Alliance, created in 2011, causes this wave to 
be called post-hegemonic regionalism (SERBIN, 2011; TUSSIE; RIGIROZZI, 2012), since 
there is not a unique model of integration to be followed, but the coexistence of multiple 




regionalism in Latin America have led to the creation of various institutional forms, 
hemispheric or sub-regional, that allowed countries to develop their own idea of regionalism, 




 Still little explored by much of the non-Africanist literature (BACH, 2016), African 
regionalism is rich and shows a great density of overlapping ROs. With roots dating back to 
colonial periods and the oldest RO in the world, Africa offers important material for the 
present study, whose contributions differ greatly from the other regions. 
 To understand the dynamism of African relations, it is necessary to go back to 
historical moments prior to the so-called waves of regionalism and to leave aside the 
categorical notions of historical inscription in order to perceive the legacies of the colonial 
period in the development of the current regional configuration. In fact, some authors like 
Bach (2016) argue that the very thought about regional “wave” development or the binarity 
between “old” and “new” regionalism, as discussed earlier, would be counterproductive in 
Africa, since the logic developed there would not follow trends in the rest of the world. 
Therefore, from the combination of elements of the literature, we propose the understanding 
of African regionalism and its drivers in four periods: colonial arrangements; postcolonial 
pan-Africanism; not so new “New Regionalism”; and the African Union era; to be addressed 
below. 
 
2.4.1 Colonial Arrangements  
  
The importance of going back in time in African studies lies in the legacies left by the 
form of relationship established between the metropolises, European powers, and the colonies 
at the time of the scramble for Africa, which took place at the Berlin Conference at the end of 
the twenty-first century (1884-1885). Moreover, such legacies are also apparent in the 
functioning, even today, of institutions created during the colonial period. 
The occasion of the Berlin Conference is considered a milestone because the division 
of states was carried out at a time when the African territory was scarcely explored, with only 
isolated colonies, located mainly on the continent's coast. In this way, the division of the 
colonies between the European powers took place deliberately, disregarding often the ethnic 




From the division of the colonies and their common past, one goes to the forms 
adopted for the administration of the territories for the understanding of regional inheritances. 
In his book, Daniel Bach (2016) describes different ways in which the metropolises chose to 
administer the colonies, which directly impacted the genealogy of the African regional 
institutions, being able to be listed among the mentioned drivers for the future institutions, or 
even serve as an explanation for future approximation among neighbors. Among them, we can 
highlight the option for federalism and the processes of amalgamation, a term used by the 
British to regroup administrative and financially distinct territories - without popular 
consultation. 
It is important to consider amalgamation in the processes of regionalism due to the 
cross-border dimension of peoples, ethnicities and identities, which were separated and 
grouped during the colonial periods. On the other hand, federalism or the conformation of 
almost federal entities (BACH, 2016), an option adopted mainly by England and France as a 
form of colonial organization, gave rise to regional groupings in the East (East Africa High 
Commission Territory), Central (Central African Federation, French Equatorial Africa 
Federation), and West Africa (French West African Federation and the Federation of Nigeria). 
As a consequence of such arrangements, the basis for regional projects is fostered. The 
southern grouping gives rise to the oldest economic integration process in the world, the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU), established in 1910 and renewed in 1969, after the 
independence of Botswana, South Africa, Swaziland, Lesotho and Namibia (added in 1990).  
On the other hand, the federated territories that belonged to France had their own 
currency, which established the basis for the formation, after decolonization, of two 
independent monetary unions that have the CFA Franc as their currency: the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) 1975 and the Central African Economic and 
Monetary Community (CEMAC), which started as the Central African Customs and 
Economic Union (UDEAC) in 1964. 
Such organizational choices are also important for the present study because of 
different influences transmitted to the existing blocs in the current scenario of African 
regionalism. First, the federal option favored interaction and interdependence in the 
sustenance of the colonies, from the time when the richer territories took on the costs of the 
poorest by building links between them that are not easily abandoned after decolonization. 
Thus, federalism also presented itself as an alternative form to the total independence of some 
colonies (BACH, 2016), fomenting future connections. In this way, ways are paved for the 




Figure 5 - Scramble for Africa 
 
 
Source: WARD, A.; PROTHERO, G. W.; LEATHES, S.; BENIANS, E., 1912. 
 
Secondly, in addition to the linkages created between countries and metropolises, it 




cross-border, facilitating integration from the values of elites, as neo-functionalists as Haas 
(1958) have proposed. As a consequence of these interdependence factors, since 
decolonization, what used to be common intra-colonial services have been transformed into 
ROs for the coordination and maintenance of specific functional tasks. However, the new 
independent states longing for greater autonomy weakened the available institutions. 
 
2.4.2 Pan-Africanism versus post-colonial sub-regionalism 
 
 After the independence of the African nations, visions coexisted as to how the 
continent should be organized, with divisions ranging from sub-Saharan “Black Africa” and 
the Arab “White Africa” of the North; post-colonial subcontinental Africa; to the organic 
proposal of the United Nations; to continental pan-Africanism. The various divisions are 
usually accompanied by regional processes that follow them, and which often do not consider 
the pre-existing dynamics, competing directly with the proposals of regionalism in force, 
encouraging the construction of the overlapping scenarios. 
 Post-World War II, the ideal of Pan-Africanism was of essential importance, since it 
preached the construction of a continental identity in opposition to colonialism. It was a 
movement initiated in the diaspora, mainly among black Americans and minorities in Europe, 
as a resource against colonial power and its legacy of slavery, alienation and domination 
(apartheid) (HARTMANN, 2016a). 
 In view of these propositions, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was created in 
1963, and in 2002 became the African Union (AU), the most comprehensive of the regional 
processes, currently composed of all 55 countries in the continent. The creation of the bloc 
affirmed the African solidarity and the liberation of African states from colonialism. 
 At that time, ideas co-existed that discussed the maintenance of borders or the creation 
of a federal entity, the United States of Africa, which was widely propagated by Ghana's first 
President, Kwame Nkrumah, and later served as inspiration for other generations 
(HARTMANN, 2016a). However, in view of the fragility of post-independence states, as 
Bach (2016) points out, Pan-African unity was relegated to a distant and indefinite future, 
stating: “the path towards African unity was, in essence, about an imagined region where 
regionalism was allowed to prosper provided it would not translate into effective integration”.  
 Hartmann (2016a) further emphasizes that the main objectives of the OAU were 
political, considering the fragility of the borders, acting in a way to avoid violent conflicts 




sub-regional vision, also influenced by the aforementioned postcolonial interdependence, 
gained space to thrive in the 1960s and 1970s by proposing various projects for the region's 
economic development. 
 Another factor that contributed to the different interpretations of the African continent 
was the creation, during the 1960s, of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
(UNECA), which proposed dividing the continent into five regions: North, South, East, West 
and Central, in order to promote the development of countries. 
 Thus, some ROs are created, such as the aforementioned UDEAC in 1964, the East 
African Community (EAC) in 1967, the Mano River Union (MRU) in 1971, the also 
mentioned WAEMU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 
1975 and the Economic Community of Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL) in 1976. 
 
2.4.3 The not-so-new “New regionalism” 
  
While the literature agreed to affirm the existence of a new wave of regionalism, 
influenced by the neo-liberal ideas of the advent of globalization, from the 1980s and 1990s, 
African behavior in institution-building differed. According to Bach (2016) there would be no 
such new aspects because “as neoliberal integration gained traction in the Americas, the EU 
featured instead as an attractive substitute to the then discredited capitalist model in Latin 
America”. 
 In addition, the author highlights the influence of developmentalist thinking and Latin 
American cepalism of the previous period, in the proposals for Africa in this period. For 
example, in 1980, the Lagos Action Plan was launched, which proposed internal development, 
industrialization and import substitution, with a more protectionist proposal, as did the 
developmental regionalism. 
 The Lagos Action Plan is a milestone in the creation of institutions and a continental 
strategy, as it enables the cooperation and coexistence of the sub-regional blocs, by proposing 
their strengthening and the coordination and harmonization of strategies. Bach also points out 
that during this period political factors influenced the formation of institutions, such as the 
need to consolidate regimes; the use of regional forums such as diplomatic clubs; and 
patronage, or the inspired creation for fundraising from external donors. 
 In this period, regional agreements are reached such as the Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), in 1980, which in 1992 became the 




Preferential Trade Agreement, the predecessor of the 1993 became the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); the Economic Community of Central African States 
(ECCAS), of 1983, which sought to bring together UDEAC and CEPGL in central Africa; the 
Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), 1982; the 1986 Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD), whose initial objectives were to overcome drought and desertification 
in East Africa; and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) in 1989. 
 
2.4.4 African Union Era  
  
In the 1990s, pan-Africanism was renewed and revived, much from the successes of 
the OAU in establishing itself as a voice in the region. However, it innovates by proposing in 
1991 the Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) to be completed 
by 2028 and stresses the need to promote the interactions of sub-regional blocs for the 
promotion of the continental purpose. The convergence between the OAU and AEC gives rise 
to the African Union (AU), in 2002, based on European experience, with competences that 
extend to various spheres of African politics, as well as providing bases for sub-regional 
mechanisms and pan-Africanism. 
 The new Pan-African proposal strengthened gradual sub-regional integration and 
encouraged the creation of new blocs where such sub-regional mechanisms did not exist so 
that all sub-regions were represented and integrated. Thus, the Community of Sahel-Saharan 
States is created in 1998 (CEN-SAD); and the EAC, established in 1967 and extinguished in 
1977, is relaunched in 2000 to represent East Africa. 
 Thus, the various sub-regional projects were developed individually, with different 
purposes and structures, forming the so-called Regional Economic Communities (RECs). 
Given the multiplicity of regional agreements, in July 2006, the Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government of the African Union, meeting at its seventh Ordinary Session, agreed to 
abide by the recommendation of the first Conference of African Ministers of Integration and 
rationalize the number of RECs. 
Rationalization meant the recognition by the African Union of a number of sub-
regional blocs whose policies should be worked in a harmonious way that would form part of 
its strategy for the consolidation of AEC. These selected ROs are now understood as building 
blocs, or pillars for the AU, and its selection criteria was given to cover the largest number of 





Figure 6 - Overlapping regional mechanisms in Africa 
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
The relationship between the RECs and the AU is governed by the Abuja Treaty, by 
the AU Constitutive Act and is guided by the Protocol of Relations between the RECs and the 
AU of 2008. As we have mentioned on the previous chapter, 8 are the RECs recognized by 
the AU, namely: 
• Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) 
• Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) 
• Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 




• Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) 
• Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
• Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 
• Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
 
Of the 55 countries on the African continent, 40 are members of more than one REC, 8 
countries are members of 3, 14 are members of one and only the Sahrawi Arab Democratic 
Republic (a partially recognized state) is not a member of any REC, as shown in the figures 
above. It should be noted however that the recognition of RECs did not mean the extinction of 
other regional initiatives in Africa nor the impossibility of creating new projects. It also does 
not mean that among the RECs themselves there are no conflicts of interest or overlappings. 
Nonetheless, the continent's efforts to articulate its relations is visible, using the AU as 
comprehensive “umbrella” organization. Such efforts are reflected in the growing 
coordination among AU members on issues that extrapolate to the economic ones of their 
RECs, such as peace, security, development, and therefore the joint pursuit of regional 
governance. 
 
2.5 Analysis and mapping of organizations: partial considerations 
 
 The mapping of the institutional development of the two regions allows the 
elaboration of considerations about the drivers, periods of regionalism, and overlapping 
scenarios.  In Latin America (or South America for its effects), it is possible to perceive the 
presence of an external hegemon as driver, considering the participation of the United States 
by inclusion, or exclusion. This consideration is important when we consider how countries 
will choose to instrumentalize ROs, explaining organizational behaviors including or 
excluding a hegemon. In addition, it can be said that the proposal to achieve development and 
overcome the conditions of underdevelopment act as strong motivators for institution 
building, as well as the presence of leaderships, such as the Brazilian in UNASUR or the 
Venezuelan in ALBA. 
 Another important consideration is the impact of the “waves of regionalism” as 
motivating moments for the creation and re-launching of blocs. Moreover, the region develops 
an exclusive period with the categorization of post-hegemonic regionalism and the 
effervescence of projects. 




American. In contemporary regionalism, however, unlike the case found in Latin America, 
several of its processes have had as drivers the existence of previous colonial arrangements 
and integrative associations initiated since the beginning of the twentieth century. Thus, in 
addition to the economic drivers for integration and overcoming the poverty condition, 
political and cultural identity factors arising from colonization are added to the development 
of regional mechanisms. 
 Another interesting driver on the African continent is the perception about the region. 
Pan-Africanism has guided the creation of institutions in two different moments, in the 1960s 
and in the 2000s, and still exerts a pressure for the continuity and enhancement of integration. 
As Fioramonti and Mattheis (2016, p. 684) underscore Pan-Africanism defines the African 
region as geographically consistent as, “possibly no other region in the world shows such a 
deep-rooted continental identity as Africa. Common languages, cross-border connections 
make the continent’s national delineations extremely porous”. 
 When we consider the ROs that are currently in force, what should be highlighted is 
the discontinuity in the proliferation of African organizations. Thus, to think of a moment of 
post-hegemonic regionalism, as a moment of institutional effervescence in Africa would not 
be correct, especially considering that institution-building stabilizes with the promotion and 
organization of RECs from the 1980s. What happens then is the restructuring and re-launch of 
these RECs, mostly in the 1990s, to meet the objectives proposed by the Lagos Plan and the 
Abuja Treaty. 
 In the African case, one can also perceive the participation of existing organizations in 
the creation of new ones as a driver, a factor that proposes the consideration of a greater 
possibility of cooperation between them. In all cases, it is also noticeable that the ideologies 
present in the region helped to shape the design and objectives of the organizations created, 
regarding their mandates and institutionality. 
 With regard to the theoretical contributions of drivers, therefore, they help on the 
understanding of the existing configurations, starting from the factors that influenced the 
region-building. As a part of the global South, the creation of ROs was understood in both 
regions as an alternative to the pursuit of development, which presents results when we 
consider the difficulty or the no-interest of regional configurations in sharing sovereignty, but 
rather to reinforce the sovereignty of national states. 
 As for the waves of regionalism and traditional theories of integration that are often 
derived from European studies and applied to other regions, the development of the regions 




regional settings and its overlappings. The demonstrated overlapping scenarios are complex 
with interesting and particular features for consideration of their effects. This is because in the 
case of Africa, for example, the AU is an “umbrella” organization, which intends to organize 
sub-regions for integrated development and which could therefore act in the cohesion and 
cooperation between processes, top-down. In the case of Latin America, UNASUR, although 
it encompasses sub-regional processes in South America, was created posteriorly to those and 
did not have the umbrella or connector characteristics, considering its interactions with the 
processes that occur and compete outside of the sub-region. 
 Finally, regarding the tendency of one or other driver to produce more overlaps, 
although we do not intend to quantify them (and it would not be a simple task), something 
that can be perceived is the influence of the actions of states, ROs and even international 
organizations such as the ECLAC or UNECA, in the promotion of the institutionalization of 
solutions for regional needs, and the diversification of possibilities, through the creation of 
new arrangements or enlargements/updates of existing ones. Thus, it becomes clear the 
importance of understanding history as a determining factor to the configuration of 
overlapping scenarios and its’ influences on how actors will choose to perform (or not), 




3 OVERLAPPING ORGANIZATIONS AND POLITICAL CRISES IN AFRICA 
 
On the last chapter, we have presented the evolution of the creation of ROs in Africa 
and South America. This was a relevant step to enhance comprehension on intervening factors 
that affect the relationship between regional overlapping institutions. It not only presented a 
complex scenario that needs to be kept in mind when dealing with these organizations, but 
also helps to understand limitations in scope and action that might be derived from their his-
torical composition.  
On this chapter, we start to introduce the cases to be analyzed, focusing on the African 
continent. As previously stated on the first chapter, we chose as relevant cases of analysis the 
response of regional organizations when dealing with the occurrence of political crises, con-
sidering that it fills the scope conditions of propelling an interaction between institutions, both 
theoretically as it generates pressure on normative fields and invokes obligations; and empiri-
cally as those situations suggest divergent interpretations. 
Differently from the South American case, where works by Nolte, Weiffen and Closa, 
Palestini and Ortiz (CLOSA; PALESTINI; ORTIZ, 2016; WEIFFEN, 2017; NOLTE, 2018) 
have compiled the democratic breaches and presented the different ROs’ responses, there is 
not yet in the literature a systematization of cases of interplay between institutions in the face 
of political crises of Africa. Notedly, there is a scarcity of discussions of the concept of 
“overlapping regionalism” in the African continent, since it has been studied under different 
regional angles. Nonetheless, literature has been very fruitful in the past years analyzing 
African ROs, especially on case specific production, as we present below.  
In order to select the cases presented in this thesis, we conducted a survey of political 
crises and coups in the 55 AU member states. As the results provided a large number of 
incidents, a cut was made to expose the ones that occurred since the establishment of the 
African Union’s normative provisions that created the institutional mandate to intervene on 
such crises. Therefore, we singled the framework on Unconstitutional Changes of 
Government (UCGs) as a mandate departing point due to its crescent relevance both to the 
AU’s action and to the case specific literature. 
Not all crisis and conflicts on the African continent have corresponded to UCGs but 
most importantly, not all incidents passible of this categorization have been interpreted or 
labeled as UCGs by the competent ROs, as we will further analyze, and to which we draw a 
line. Due to the mentioned lack of systemization of said cases and of the ROs responses on 




specific literature and reports from think tanks and research institutions such as the Institute 
for Security Studies (ISSAfrica) and the International Crisis Group, ROs’ document analysis, 
discussions with researchers of the field, interviews with AU officials, and research of 
journalistic material about the events. 
The period and scope of analysis were then chosen in order to enable the analysis of 
how the AU and RECs respond to political crises and whether there would be differences 
between RECs in their regional role. Therefore, on scope, we focus only on the cases treated 
as UCGs that have evoked the regional formal instruments on the matter. Regarding the 
African region, the period thus comprehends the years from the establishment of the African 
Union policy on UCGs’ instruments from 2004, the year the Peace and Security Council 
enters into force, until 2017, the final year of data collection for this research.  
As this delimitation has also presented a high number of cases as seen on table 2 
below (p.62), the analysis was once again limited to address such situations that have 
reportedly produced more regional responses, with the objective to have all subregions and 
RECs represented. The delimitation of cases that produced more responses was made through 
interviews with African Union employees and academic experts, besides through the use of 
secondary materials. 
In addition, research demonstrated that some RECs either behave more actively than 
others in general or have a better developed normative framework to treat political crises and 
therefore have been more distinguished. A good example would be the greater availability of 
information about the performance of ECOWAS in West Africa, which serves as evidence of 
its prominent role as a sub-regional actor. As a result, when addressing cases, even if we chose 
a number of countries that covered memberships for all of the RECs, considering overlapping 
memberships, we could not guarantee the analysis of performance of these ROs, since either 
the more prominent ones would take the lead negotiating the conflict, or the cases would 
present silent or passive RECs.  
All of the mentioned practical constraints have thus had implications on case selection, 
which was finally limited to: cover different African sub-regional organizations’ relationship 
with the AU, through relevant sample cases that fit the scope conditions. More active RECs 
and subregions are given special attention, as their analysis is more fruitful to the research’s 




thereof is pertinent8. 
 
Table 2- Compilation of events treated by the AU and the RECs as UCGs after the establishment of the 













Source: author’s compilation 
 
In this chapter, as well as in the next South American chapter, the first step taken in 
order to understand how the ROs deal with political crises and what their reactions and inter-
actions could be, is to cover different aspects of what shapes a case in this region. Thus, to 
stablish the framework, in the next section we start by addressing what are the norms devel-
oped in the African country, regarding political crises and UCGs. This section is focused on 
the continental norms of the AU and aims to answer a few questions before case analysis:  
1- What are the norms that define the need of action in the case of a political crisis?  
2- In what context were these norms created?  
3- What are the procedures that follow once a case is identified?  
Considering that each REC might as well have established norms, the chapter advanc-
es into the following sessions, that aim to cover different sub-regions. To each sub-region 
addressed, we consider the normative provisions stablished by the RECs, and then advance to 
 
8 The list provided on Table 2 may be non-exhaustive as some sources also consider as political crises 
a range of events such as attempted coups or other types of security crises, as peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding operations. However, the focus given on this elaboration were the cases directly ad-
dressed by the AU as UCGs through mediation, sanction, and/or intervention. Even some coups 
d’état, such as the crisis in Lesotho in 2017, were not targeted as UCGs and therefore are not part 
of the list. Cases solved internally or passed with warnings were thus also not considered as they 
are more frequent and do not contribute for research delimitation. 
Year Country Sub-region 
2005 Togo West 
2005 Mauritania West/North 
2008 Mauritania West/North 
2008 Guinea Bissau West 
2008 Guinea Conakry West 
2009 Madagascar South 
2010 Niger West 
2010 Côte d’Ivoire West 
2012 Guinea Bissau West 
2012 Mali West 
2013 Central African Republic Central 
2013 Egypt North 
2014 Burkina Faso West 




empirical data provided by the cases. The UCGs events are addressed not in an in-depth form 
of country study, but as instruments to exemplify and study sub-regionally the reactions of the 
involved international structures on the cases, focusing on the organizational behaviors as a 
result of the overlapping competencies. 
 
3.1 The African Union and Unconstitutional Changes of Government 
 
As we have previously mentioned, the African continent has developed a normative 
framework of its own to address political crises, but more than that, has practically coined the 
term “unconstitutional changes of government” on its legal documents. The need to label such 
phenomenon reflects the underlying conditions of the region which has greatly suffered 
through its democratization process. 
On the last chapter, we presented the creation of the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) in 1963 as a result of the continent’s independence process. While in many aspects, 
the OAU represented a voice for liberation and anticolonialism in the region, differently from 
other processes in the world9, it was not built as a voice for democracy promotion and protec-
tion in its beginnings. As Souaré (2009, p.8) points out, “the only condition for membership 
was to be African and committed to African liberation and independence”, and, the principles 
of multiparty democracy “were therefore formulated when the group had already been consti-
tuted”. In fact, the literature has often referred to the OAU on its initial stages as a “dictators’ 
club” 10.  
The democratic concern gained awareness in Africa towards the end of the 1980s, with 
the culmination of the Cold War and the advent of globalization. The so-called “victory of the 
west” increased the relevance of international institutions and the diffusion of standards such 
as the idea that democracy would foment the peace, which gave way to what Huntington 
called “third wave of democratization” (HUNTINGTON, 1991 apud DERSSO, 2017). As 
Dersso (2017, p. 641) states, from this moment on, the promotion and defense of the demo-
cratic system of government became for multiple western countries a foreign policy compo-
nent and an important area of engagement of international organizations. The  author also 
 
9 As an example, the European Union’s Maastricht Treaty stablishes democracy as a pre-condition for 
membership, which was not the case in the African continent. 
10 The designation of a dictator’s club appeared on several documents and academic articles over the 
years as a reference to the undemocratic founding fathers of the OUA. Upon the relaunch of the 
AU, on July 8, 2002, BBC’s headline for the news also stated, “African Union replaces dictators' 





presents data based on Bratton and van de Walle (1997), affirming that “while in 1989 ‘29 
African countries were governed under some kind of single-party constitution, and one party-
rule seemed entrenched as the modal form of governance’, by 1994 ‘not a single de jure one-
party state remained’”.  
The understanding of this context is very relevant as we consider the situation of the 
African continent’s democracy and political transitions up until this period. According to the 
data gathered by the African Leadership Transitions Tracker (SONGWE, 2019), since the 
creation of the OAU in 1963, the continent has witnessed at least one hundred successful 
coups d’état in almost six decades (see appendix A for detail). The graph below shows that 
even if the highest number of coups occurred in the 1960s, that can be explained by the fact 
that most of the countries were gaining their independence. However, in the 1980s and 1990s, 
the continent goes through a high number of coups again, reflecting the pressure of democra-
tization and multiparty elections in Africa and affirming that even if the implementation of 
democracy in the continent was happening fast paced, it was not without occurrences. 
 
Figure 7 - Successful Coups d'État in Africa 1963-2018 
 
Source: author’s compilation based on SONGWE, 2019. 
 
It should be noted that the data presented above, which is already alarming, is consid-
ering only successful coups. Other incidents such as attempted coups, civil wars, conflict and 
electoral or corruption related violence have also marked the African history, and those, com-
bined with the international conjuncture and the mentioned high number of coups, have gen-




against such violations and provide measures to prevent and deal with them. In fact, Souaré 
(2009, p.4) points out that prior to 1990, “most African rulers left office through a military 
coup, political assassination, or some other forms of violent overthrow” and “virtually none 
left power after losing elections, although some retired voluntarily”. 
Therefore, the positioning of regional organizations towards the end of the 1990s on is 
especially interesting as it marks a gradual shift that the literature has marked as from “non-
intervention to non-indifference” (ENGEL, 2012), and the strengthening of the ideal of “Afri-
can solutions for African problems”11. The 1997 coup d’état in Sierra Leone and its repercus-
sions after a long process of peacebuilding in the country prompted the first milestone12 on 
the OAU positioning against democratic violations, (SOUARÉ, 2009; ENGEL, 2012). Just 
days after the coup occurred, African leaders were reunited in Harare, Zimbabwe, for 33rd 
summit of the OAU, and jointly rejected and condemned any form of unconstitutional change 
of government (OUA, 1997; SOUARÉ, 2009), starting then to pave the legal framework for 
UCGs. 
 
3.1.1 Normative Provisions on UCGs 
 
The commitment reached in 1997 and the fear that coups were “resurging” in Africa13 
led the Council of Ministers of the OAU to deliver a Decision on UCGs in 1999 
(CM/Dec.483 LXX, 1999), whose developments led to the adoption of the “Declaration on 
the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government” by the 
 
11 ISS (2008) clarifies that “The catchall phrase “African solutions to African problems” was coined 
by the eminent political economist George Ayittey in response to the behavior of the international 
community in the crisis in Somalia. Since then the phrase acquired a degree of autonomy. The au-
thor advocates what he calls ownership of solutions i.e. if you formulate your own solutions to your 
problems, you would have every reason and incentive to see them work.  External or foreign solu-
tions were not viable in Africa since they were either “imported” or “dictated” to Africans. There-
fore, Africans would not own those solutions.  In a nutshell the notion of “African solutions to Af-
rican problems” implies that this is the time for Africans to take things into their own hands and 
make use of their resources to solve Africa’s troubles”. ISS. African Solutions to African Problems. 
18 September 2008. Available at: <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/african-solutions-to-african-
problems>. 
12 Related measures started being adopted in the 1980s and early 1990s as the OAU Charter on Human 
and People’s Rights in 1981; and the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and 
Resolution, in 1993, but it was the end of the decade that established a firm position specifically on 
UCGs. 
13 The word “resurgence” of coup d’états can be seen in different official documents of the AU from 
the late 1990s on, but in 2009 an official “Decision on the Resurgence of the Scourge of Coups 
d’état in Africa” was adopted by the Commission, taking a stand against the issue. Cf. Assem-




Assembly on the 36th Ordinary Session of the OAU in July, 2000 (AHG/Decl.5 XXXVI). 
This document became known as the Lomé Declaration, the first firm legal instrument posed 
by the bloc on the matter. The African leaders at the occasion affirmed: 
We express our grave concern about the resurgence of coup d'état in Africa. 
We recognize that these developments are a threat to peace and security of 
the Continent, and they constitute a very disturbing trend and serious setback 
to the ongoing process of democratization in the Continent. 
We reaffirm that coups are sad and unacceptable developments in our Conti-
nent, coming at a time when our people have committed themselves to re-
spect of the rule of law based on peoples will expressed through the ballot 
and not the bullet (OAU, Lomé Declaration, 2000). 
 
The Lomé Declarations is very important as it defines what will be considered as an 
unconstitutional change of government, details what are the measures that should be taken in 
order to respond to these occasions and outlines an implementation mechanism (ENGEL, 
2010). According to the Declaration, should be considered as UCGs: 
• military coup d’état against a democratically elected Government; 
• intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically elected Govern-
ment; 
• replacement of democratically elected Governments by armed dissident 
groups and rebel movements; 
• the refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning 
party after free, fair and regular elections (OAU, 2000). 
 
The normative framework goes on to indicate that once an UCG was identified, the 
Chairman of the OAU and its Secretary General should immediately and publicly condemn 
the occurrence and convey a warning to the perpetrators that their illegal action will not be 
tolerated or recognized by the OAU, under any circumstance. Following the condemnation, 
the perpetrators of the UCG should be given a period of six months to restore the constitu-
tional order, a period in which the member state concerned should be suspended from partici-
pating in the Policy Organs, but not have their memberships suspended (therefore being still 
obligated to keep their financial contributions to the bloc’s budget).  
Throughout this period, the Secretary-General should compile facts and establish a di-
alogue with the perpetrators in order to ascertain “their intentions regarding the restoration of 
constitutional order in the country”, (OAU, 2000) while seeking the contribution of other Af-
rican leaders to pressure the perpetrators to get them to cooperate with the OAU and to restore 
the constitutional order. The sanctions could include, besides the mentioned suspensions, “vi-




government contacts, trade restrictions, etc.” (OAU, 2000), with the concern that the ordinary 
citizens of the conflictive country did not suffer disproportionately after the punishments. 
Engel (2012, p.9) traces other relevant instruments that guided the understanding of 
UCGs in Africa: the AU Constitutive Act (2000); the Protocol Relating to the Establishment 
of the Peace and Security Council (2002); and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections 
and Governance (2007).  
The “Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional 
Changes of Government” was not the only relevant document signed at the Lomé Summit in 
2000. At the same meeting, the Constitutive Act of the African Union was adopted, enhancing 
the comprehension that the concern about democracy protection and promotion was also pre-
sent on the transition of the OAU to the African Union.  
The Constitutive Act followed the renewal of the Pan-Africanist aspirations in the 
1990s that led to the adoption of the 1999 Sirte Declaration, which called for the establish-
ment of the Union, and preceded the launch of the AU in Durban in 2002. The normative is 
relevant for this study as it endorses the developments against UCGs while it prescribes the 
principles to guide the Union in its article 4, supporting the “condemnation and rejection of 
unconstitutional changes of governments”, and in its article 30 proposes the sanctioning of 
member states: “Governments which shall come to power through unconstitutional means 
shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of the Union” (AU, 2000).  
In 2002, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union was created, fol-
lowing a decision to incorporate to the structure of the newly founded AU the Central Organ 
of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR), 
created in 1993. The PSC founding document established that it would stand as a “decision-
making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts” through a “collec-
tive security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to con-
flict and crisis situations in Africa” (AU, 2002). 
Throughout the document, the Protocol details how, in conjunction with the AU 
Commission and Chairperson, the PSC is entitled to then “institute sanctions whenever an 
unconstitutional change of Government takes place in a Member State, as provided for in the 
Lomé Declaration” (AU, 2002, art.7 g). And it once again reinforces the mentioned Declara-
tion as it poses as a condition for participation as a member in the activities of the Council the 
“respect for constitutional governance, in accordance with the Lomé Declaration, as well as 




The adoption of not only a legal framework, but of a regional consensus against the 
disruption of constitutional order is likely to have produced effects on African transitions, as 
figure 7 (p.64), demonstrates that after the implementation of policies there was a drastic re-
duction on the number of coups. As Souaré affirms, ‘of the 25 cases of military coups that 
occurred between 1990 and 2012, 15 happened before the adoption of the Lomé Declaration 
of July 2000, two between this date and the inauguration of the PSC in May 2004, and a fur-
ther eight cases from June 2004 and December 2012’. (SOUARÉ, 2014; DERSSO, 2017). 
However, Engel (2012, p.10) points out that even if the legal instruments to respond to 
UCGs were already in place by mid-2002, they were not initially fully implemented. As the 
author states, not only the 2003 crises in the Central Africa Republic, São Tome and Principe 
and Guinea Bissau, that happened before the implementation of the PSC “hardly prompted 
any actions”, but also the 2005 crises in Togo and Mauritania had limited actions, and data on 
these cases was indeed scarce throughout this research.  
Thus, Engel (2012, p.10) then affirms that the AU had a learning curve dealing with 
UCGs that resulted in the adoption of the “African Charter on Democracy, Elections and 
Governance” at the 8th Ordinary Summit of the Assembly on 30 January 2007. The Charter 
expresses as its objective in Chapter II to “prohibit, reject and condemn unconstitutional 
change of government in any Member State as a serious threat to stability, peace, security and 
development” (AU, 2007a, art. 2, 4) and dedicates Chapter VIII to specifically address sanc-
tions on UCGs. Furthermore, Chapter III lists the principles that should govern the implemen-
tation of norm, which provide for a robust set of actions for the execution of representative 
democracy.  
Besides reinforcing the provisions of the Lomé Declaration, one of the main character-
istics of the Charter is that it also presents a fifth clause in addition to four available at the 
definition of UCG affirming that: “any amendment or revision of the constitution or legal 
instruments which is an infringement on the principles of democratic change of government” 
(AU 2007a, chapter 8, art.23, 5) will also be considered as an infringement. Through the 
Charter, the previous normative instruments are polished and adapted to the new set of institu-
tions in place, as the AU replaced the OAU and the PSC also had competencies in conflict 
management. Declaring the occurrence of an UCG is, according to the Charter, a responsibil-
ity of the PSC (art. 25, 1), while the imposition of sanctions would derive from the AU As-
sembly (art. 25, 6) and their revocation would be concreted by the PSC (art. 26). 
As Engel (2009) singles out, the adoption of the charter strengthens the penalties to be 




• non-participation of the perpetrators of the unconstitutional change in the 
elections held for the return to the constitutional order and the ban on them 
from occupying senior positions in the political institutions of their state,  
• their trial by the competent bodies of the AU,  
• and the possibility for the AU Assembly to apply other forms of sanctions, 
including economic sanctions (ENGEL, 2010, p.9).  
 
The charter also has an important role on the calling action from other member states 
of the AU, as four out of ten paragraphs of article 25 deal with the expected behavior of the 
neighbors (ENGEL, 2012). Moreover, it considers applying sanctions to states that have fo-
mented or supported an UCG in other states (art. 25, 6), and guides the members of the Union 
to refuse granting asylum to the perpetrators of an UCG, and to cooperate to grant that the 
legal instruments and procedures will be applied accordingly (art. 25, 8, 9, 10). 
Nonetheless, a very slow process of ratification followed the adoption of the Charter, 
which demonstrates the reticent understanding of the African leaders regarding its very direct 
provisions on democracy promotion and protection. It only entered into force on February 
15th, 2012, five years after its signature14, a period that was not free of UCGs. While the Char-
ter was not ratified, the AU Commission managed to adopt two decisions that kept the theme 
in discussion, both in 2009: the “Decision on the Resurgence of the Scourge of Coups d’état 
in Africa”, from 12th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly; and the “Decision on the Preven-
tion on Unconstitutional Changes of Government and Strengthening the Capacity of the Afri-
can Union to Manage Such Situations”, from the 13th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly 
(ENGEL, 2012, p.13). 
One last normative provision is worth mentioning on this section, despite its non-
coercibility. In 2014, the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the Afri-
can Court of Justice and Human Rights was adopted, and its statements criminalize the occur-
rence of an unconstitutional change of government, giving powers to the Court to try persons 
for perpetrating an UCG, under art. 28 A and E. The Protocol, that came to be known as the 
Malabo Protocol follows the creation of the Statute of  African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights in 2008, and when in force, could add a sixth definition to UCG as it also defines as an 
infringement “any substantial modification to the electoral laws in the last six (6) months be-
fore the elections without the consent of the majority of the political actors”. Still, as of Sep-
 
14 As of September 2019, 46 out of the 55 countries have signed the charter and 34 have deposited it, 




tember 2019, not even the African Court has managed to receive the minimum number of 15 
deposits of the legal instrument by its member states for it to enter into force15.  
 
3.1.2 Provisions on the relationship between the AU and sub-regional groupings 
 
The normative framework provided above brings very important contributions to this 
study not only on the domains of standards against UCGs, but also on matters of overlapping 
competencies. Differently from the South American case, where currently no RO has the 
same prerogative, in Africa the AU intends to function as an umbrella organization at the con-
tinental level and calls upon itself the responsibility to coordinate the actions on the region. 
This particularity is thus also reflected on the legal provisions of the organization, as we dis-
cuss below, focusing on the scope of political crises covered by this thesis. 
When the 2000 Lomé Declaration defined the regional stand against unconstitutional 
changes of government, it started envisioning the roles that regional actors should play by 
affirming that the OAU should “urge for consistency of action at the bilateral, inter-state, 
sub-regional and international levels” (OAU, 2000, emphasis added), and convene, as a mat-
ter of urgency to discuss the crisis. More interestingly, it already proposed the cooperation 
between the continental bloc and the sub-regional groupings, stating that the Secretary Gen-
eral should “enlist the collaboration of the Regional Grouping to which the "country in crisis" 
belongs” (OAU, 2000). This provision is also strengthened by the following paragraphs of the 
Declaration, that deal with measures to be taken if the situation is not resolved within the six 
months period. In this case, to implement a sanction regime, the OAU “should enlist the co-
operation of Member States, Regional Groupings and the wider International/Donor Commu-
nities” (OAU, 2000). 
In its turn, while the 2000 Constitutive Act of the African Union did not regulate the 
relationship of the AU and other regional sub-groupings in the specific case of UCGs, it in-
cluded it as a broad objective, in article 3 (l), through the goal to “coordinate and harmonize 
the policies between the existing and future Regional Economic Communities for the gradual 
attainment of the objectives of the Union” (AU, 2000). 
 
15 As of December 2019, 32 out of 55 countries have signed the Protocol on the Statute of the African 
Court of Justice and Human Rights, but only 7 have deposited it, the last one in February 2019. 
Regarding the Malabo Protocol, 15 countries have signed it, but none has deposited the instrument, 




Regarding the Peace and Security Council, as we have mentioned before, its creation 
updates and incorporates the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and 
Resolution (MCPMR), which was not indifferent to the existence of other regional associa-
tions in Africa. Its provisions already cited the need to cooperate and coordinate activities 
with the sub-regional groupings in the occasion of conflicts, and the PSC acknowledged on its 
creation “the contribution of African Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Man-
agement and Resolution” and reinforced “the need to develop formal coordination and coop-
eration arrangements between these Regional Mechanisms and the African Union” (AU, 
2002).  
But the provisions presented are also specially interesting to this study because of their 
will to regulate the relationship of the PSC with other actors, including the RECs and other 
sub-regional groupings. These external actors appear while describing the powers of the PSC 
(art. 7 j) to “promote close harmonization, co-ordination and co-operation between Regional 
Mechanisms and the Union in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability 
in Africa”; the procedures on consultations and open meetings (art. 8); the role of the Chair-
person, who can call for their action (art.10); modalities for action and entry points into the 
conflict (art.9); and the functioning of the Early Warning System (art.12). However, it is arti-
cle 16 that calls attention to the acknowledged multiplicity of actors and of mandates and 
clearly tries to organize it, as it is titled “Relationship with Regional Mechanisms for Conflict 
Prevention, Management and Resolution”. 
Article 16 declares that the Regional Mechanisms are a part of the security architec-
ture of the Union, but states that the primary responsibility for promoting peace, security and 
stability in Africa lies in the Union (AU, 2002). The description of activities that follow cen-
ter the PSC actions under the lead of the AU Commission, asserting that the regional mecha-
nisms will work in close partnership with the Council, but not defining what is the form that 
such partnerships will take. Even if the intention of the legislator by leaving the provision 
open ended to provide that the modalities of partnership were “determined by the comparative 
advantage of each and the prevailing circumstances” (art 16, 1 b), the division of labor re-
mains unclear as procedures are adaptable. 
It is worth mentioning the form chosen by the legislator to refer to the sub-regional 
groupings as “Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution”, 
and not the established pillars of the Union, the “Regional Economic Communities”, and what 
this choice entails. Firstly, for clarity, we should recall that on the last chapter we described 




terests through the years. A major milestone on the organization of these relationships was the 
proposition of the Abuja Treaty in 1991, which by creating the African Economic Communi-
ty, proposed that regional sub-groupings should be considered as building blocs or pillars to 
what became the AU. But not only the economic communities had a regional role on the his-
tory of African integration, as some groupings had specific roles on crises management in the 
past16.  
This recognition is important because it should be noted that at the time the PSC was 
created in 2002, its prescriptions followed the acknowledgement given by the 1993 MCPMR 
to the work done by “regional mechanisms”, but they did not directly addressed the 8 accred-
ited RECs of the AU that we have mentioned before, as their formal and final rationalization 
is only done in 200617, and many of them only had economic mandates. Conversely, given 
that some them did have mandates on security issues, or developed their capabilities ad hoc 
the mentioned “regional mechanisms” sometimes overlap with the RECs, as is the case of 
ECOWAS, and therefore it can be understood that the PSC addresses the RECs as well as 
other sub-regional groupings in those provisions.  
The following AU provisions on the development of coordination with the regional 
mechanisms also confirm this understanding. For instance, the creation of the PSC was suc-
ceeded with the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in 2003 and the establish-
ment of the African Standby Force, by which five sub-regional brigades were proposed or 
recognized18, increasing the number of groupings that should be coordinated both at the polit-
ical and operational levels, depending of the crises concern. Brigades were then recognized 
under the coordination of ECOWAS in the West; SADC in the South; and ECCAS in Central 
Africa (Force Multinationale de l‟Afrique Centrale - FOMAC); and two other brigades, which 
are not managed by the RECs were created: the East Africa Brigade Coordination Mechanism 
(EASBRICOM)19 and the North Africa Regional Capability (NARC). 
Furthermore, following the provision of article 16 [9] of the PSC Protocol, a “Memo-
randum of Understanding on Cooperation in the area of Peace and Security between the Afri-
 
16 For instance, ECOWAS members first established a collective armed force in 1990, the Economic 
Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which had a very important 
role at the civil war in Liberia (1989-1996), the crisis in Sierra Leone, 1997, and the Guinea Bissau 
civil war in 1999. SADC also played a mediator role in 1994 at the Lesotho military coup. For 
more information on the MCPMR work in the 1990s (MUYANGWA, M.; VOGT, M., 2000). 
17 Cf. Decision on the moratorium on the Recognition of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) 
DOC. EX.CL/278 (IX). Assembly/AU/Dec.111 – 133 (VII) Assembly/AU/Decl.1 – 4 (VII) 
18 Cf. AU Maputo Report, July 2003. 
19 Current AU documents name the oriental African brigade as East African Standby Force (EASF), as 




can Union, the Regional Economic Communities and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the 
Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa” (MoU) was signed in 
2008 (AU, 2008a), thus supporting the idea that the RECs should too be understood as the 
Regional Mechanisms mentioned by the PSC Protocol20. 
The MoU is one of the most important milestones after the 2006 decision to rationalize 
the RECs, together with the “Protocol on Relations between the AU and the RECs” (AU, 
2007b), signed at the same year21. Both 2008 documents reinforce the need to harmonize and 
coordinate efforts between all regional groups in different policy areas and reinforce the im-
portance of the AU and the continental goals, but the MoU introduces an interesting develop-
ment as it stresses the principle of subsidiarity. 
Article IV stresses that the implementation of the MoU should be guided by the “prin-
ciples of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage, in order to optimize the 
partnership between the Union, the RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms” (AU, 2008). 
The idea behind subsidiarity is that power is decentralized in different spheres of governance 
between the national level, sub-regional and continental, favoring the lowest instance practi-
cable as a first resort, except when other spheres show a better advantage22. Therefore, it calls 
on the member states, the RECs and RMs to act upon the arising of a crisis. 
However, it still brings upon the Union the primary responsibility, when article XX 
stresses, on its “Modalities for interaction” section, that the encouragement for the RECs and 
RMs to act should be made “[w]ithout prejudice to the primary role of the Union in the pro-
motion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa” (AU 2008, art. XX [1]); 
and that “[n]othing in this Memorandum shall prevent the Union from taking measures neces-
sary to maintain or restore peace and security anywhere in the continent” (art. XX [5]). It also 
urges the RECs and RMs to maintain the Commision fully and continuously informed of their 
actions in order to guarantee the conformity with the interests of the Union (art. XX [2]). 
 
20 It should be noted that accordingly with the broadness of the concept, ever since the adoption of 
such resolutions, the PSC has enlarged its understanding of “regional mechanisms” to include to 
the list coordinating mechanisms of other regional brigades, such as the G5-Sahel and Lake Chad 
Basin Commission in order to suit its necessities. No formal recognition of the new mechanisms 
was found, nor even a list of what are the regional groupings recognized by the PSC, but the inclu-
sion can be seen through the official documents as the coordinating mechanisms are added and 
identified as parts of the PSC over the years. See also the joint communiqué of the Inaugural Meet-
ing (I) PSC/REC/RMS (AU, 2019). 
21 AMU is the only REC that is not a signatory to the Protocol on Relations between the RECs and the 
AU, cf. <https://au.int/en/organs/recs>. All RECs have signed the MoU. 
22 The use of the principle of subsidiarity is not an exclusivity of the AU as Møller (2009) highlights 
that the European Union’s Treaty of Rome; and the United Nations Charter also use of this princi-




Thus, as Striebinger (2016, p.12) points out, the ambiguity of the combination of the subsidi-
arity principle and the Union’s centralization  provisions result that “[i]n a conflict situation, 
both the AU and the involved REC can therefore legitimately claim to be the focal point in 
any democracy-creation, protection or promotion activity”.  
Investigating specifically how the AU PSC actually develops the coordination efforts 
among the RECs, RMs, and even other international actors, such as the United Nations23, is 
not the focus of this thesis, but studying the normative provisions for those interactions brings 
interesting contributions for the study of expected regional organization’s reactions in an 
overlapping scenario. Conclusively, it can be said that pragmatically, the legal framework and 
its combination of centralization of powers at the Union with the principle of subsidiarity still 
leaves the division of labor between the continental and sub-regional levels unclear. Further-
more, it also demonstrates the complexity of interactions as coordination in matters of UCGs 
often deals directly with two levels of harmonization, both political, as the RECs are sought 
for support in the directly affected sub-region; and operational, as security threats may also 
result in the deployment of forces to the field. 
Finally, the discussions over harmonization between the AU and the RECs are still a 
very current issue, as in May 2019 the PSC held the “1st Joint Consultative Meeting Between 
the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the Regional Economic Communi-
ties/Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution 
(RECS/RMS)”, as a “first ever opportunity for the PSC and the RECs/RMs Policy Organs to 
reflect on issues relating to the harmonization/division of labor on their decision-making pro-
cesses, enhancement of coordination and strengthening of synergy”24 (AU, 2019b); and in 
July 2019 the AU held its first coordination meeting on the pursuit of the African Integration 
Agenda with the recognized regional sub-groupings in Niamey, Niger, with three focus areas: 
the division of labor between the AU, RECs and AU member states; the first African Region-
al Integration Report; and the draft protocol amending the 2008 protocol on AU–REC rela-
tions (ISS, 2019a). Understanding the timeliness of such matters is extremely pertinent, as we 




23 The PSC Protocol dedicates article 17 specifically to the coordination of efforts with the UN and 
other international organizations. 
24 In accordance with the PSC Protocol, the RECs and RMs have been meeting periodically to main-
tain communication and coordination, but the 2019 meeting had the specific task to address the 




3.2 Regional and sub-regional responses to UCGs 
 
 The decision to treat the African sub-regions separately is derived from the conscious-
ness of their differences in term of presence and absence of strong regional groupings, their 
normative developments on political crisis and their contexts. Considering its particularities, 
in order to analyze the effects of overlapping institutions on the RO’s behavior, or even how 
the African Union deals with the multiplicity of organizations, the representation of cases had 
to be enlarged to avoid the risk of obtaining conclusions from a single sub-region or country. 
 As we mentioned before, this decision is also derived from the fact that not all Re-
gional Economic Communities have had a leading role on the condemnation of unconstitu-
tional changes of government since the establishment of the normative provisions. This 
statement would be less a result of the non-existence of crises on these locations and more a 
reflection of the involved RECs, countries and the AU’s actions, as the next sections will 
demonstrate. Likewise, the different roles played by the political actors have also interfered 
on data collection, as an asymmetry can be perceived on data access and existence throughout 
the cases. 
An important piece of information was left out of the normative documents when we 
regard the overlapping RO’s at the horizontal level. The analyzed documents presented no 
specification on how the AU delegates the competence of leading a mediation following an 
UCG, under the principle of subsidiarity. Thus, if a conflictive country is a member to more 
than REC, the AU provisions are limited to call the action of all relevant stakeholders in order 
to restore constitutional conditions. 
Interviews with AU officials therefore confirmed that among RECs, at the sub-
regional level, is up to the ROs to decide who takes the “driving seat” of the mediation. While 
some cases could be simpler, with manifestations of support and the use of envoys to accom-
pany missions, this could also lead to competition or the instrumentalization of the multiple 
regional spaces. These possibilities are highlighted as we move to the next sections to deal 
with the different African sub-regions, as we identify divergences on results produced at the 
vertical and horizontal levels of overlapping. 
 
3.2.1 East Africa 
 
 Eastern Africa as defined by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 




Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Madagascar, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania 
and Uganda (UNECA, 2019a). In terms of regional organizations, the countries of the region 
are members of different sub-groupings, such as the East African Community (EAC), the In-
tergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Economic Community of Great Lakes 
Countries (CEPGL) and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), 
the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Af-
rica (COMESA). 
 Even though some very violent long-lasting conflicts and political crises, i.e. the So-
mali Civil War (ca. 1980-ongoing); the Rwandan Genocide (1994); and the Eritrean-
Ethiopian war (1998-2000, which has since then turned into a border conflict); have devastat-
ed the sub-region, following the contents of table 2, p. 62, Eastern Africa has never had a case 
of Unconstitutional Change of Government treated as so by the African Union since the estab-
lishment of the normative provisions. This does not mean, however, that no cases have de-
manded the AU and the RECs to take a stand and directly deal with the issues contained on 
the UCGs’ provisions. 
 Thus, two main reasons have led us to include the analysis of the Eastern African re-
gion, even if not complying de jure with the scope conditions. First, to maintain the criteria of 
representation, and to cover a different REC’s legal framework and composition. But most 
importantly, because during the interviews conducted with African officials at the AU’s head-
quarters, when dealing with questions such as “do you recall a case situation where there was 
a clear divergence between the AU and the RECs on an UCG intervention?”, the Burundian 
crisis initiated in 2015 was invariably one top of mind answer. 
 The case in Burundi is especially interesting because the results demonstrate how the 
lack of consensus at the sub-regional level can doom the action at the continental level in a 
long term, even in terms of labeling if a case consisted or not in an unconstitutional change of 
government. It also represented the East African Community’s first opportunity to take the 
lead at a mediation (NINDORERA, 2016), and showcases interesting opportunities to look at 
overlapping institutions as it involved the AU, three out of the eight recognized RECs (EAC, 
ECCAS and COMESA), plus the ICGLR and the UN.  
 Before dealing with the specifics of the political situation it is important to understand 
some contextual aspects of the sub-region’s lead mediation organization and of the involved 
country. As we mentioned in the previous chapter, the East African Community was revived 
in 2000 in order to provide representation to the eastern subregion. It was initially founded by 




2007 and South Sudan in 2016. Its main objective was to achieve a customs union and a 
common market to provide economic development to the region. However, as stated by the 
Crisis Group Africa Report N°278 (2019, p.10), “its economic dynamism starkly contrasts 
with, and often suffers from, the political turmoil and electoral disputes to which its states 
regularly fall prey”. Political tensions have also been seen between member states over the 
past decades, occasioning divisions in two groups and hampering the efficiency of the bloc’s 
actions (CRISIS…, 2019). 
Considering its primarily economic engagement, regarding the normative framework 
on unconstitutional changes of government, the EAC has no specific provisions on the issue. 
Its founding Treaty, signed in 2000, and amended in 2006 and 2007, limits itself to address 
good governance and democracy in its principles (art.6) and to refer to the development and 
consolidation of democracy and the rule of law as general objectives of the common foreign 
and security policies (EAC, 2000, art. 123 [3], c). No further legal instruments on the issue 
were found25. Therefore, the Burundian crisis in 2015 not only presented an unprecedented 
challenge to the Community, but also one without clear guidelines. 
As for Burundi, the country has had constant internal ethnic tensions since its inde-
pendence from Belgium in 1962 (COCODIA, 2018, p.57), but in 1993 a civil war broke out 
and lasted until 2005, after successful military interventions from the AU (African Union 
Mission in Burundi – AMIB), and the UN, which replaced the African coordinated efforts 
until the end of the conflict. President Pierre Nkuruzinza of the Conseil National pour la Dé-
fense de la Démocratie et Forces de Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD) was the first 
president appointed after the war in 2005, and he had a main role at the 2015 crisis, as we 
discuss below. 
 
3.2.1.1 The Burundian crisis, 2015: UCG or not UCG? 
 
In April 2015, President Pierre Nkuruzinza decided to run for a third term, which 
resulted in great public dissatisfaction, followed by violence and civil instability, multiple 
protests and armed attacks from both sides. The proposal of running for a third term, besides 
directly infringing the AU Charter, was considered unconstitutional by the national 
 
25 Hartmann (2016b, p.89), presents similar findings and a hypothesis that “perhaps due to the small 
size of the organization, the EAC has not developed any policy instruments to actively promote 
democratization of member states”. The author also supposes the absence of a regional hegemon 




opposition, which further argued that it violated the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation 
Agreement of 2000. This former agreement, which ended the 10 year-long Burundian civil 
war, considered the country's conflicting past, and contained provisions on power sharing that 
could be harmed by a third term pursuit (CRISIS, …2019, p.2). 
However, there were divergent interpretations, even on the constitutionality of the 
proposition, as the government argued that Nkuruzinza had been appointed, not elected, and 
therefore he could run again for the office (CRISIS…, 2016, p.4). On May 5, the issue was 
brought before the Constitutional Court and deemed valid, albeit in the midst of a scandal 
involving the escape of the country from one of the magistrates, who alleged to the French 
press that the Court had been pressured by the government to approve reelection 
(NINDORERA, 2016, p.5). The court's decision ignited new protests and led to an attempted 
coup on the 13th of the same month, which although being dissolved by the government the 
next day, represented a turning moment on the conflict. 
The reason why the coup attempt gained relevance is because it happened while 
Nkuruzinza was out of the country, to participate in an EAC summit, where leaders were 
discussing the political unrest in Burundi. Notwithstanding political differences among its 
members at first, up until the attempted coup, EAC’s secretariat position was that Nkuruzinza 
should not run for a third term in order to protect the stability of the country. This view was 
also backed by the AU, which manifested a strong opinion against the constitution’s change26. 
However, after the Burundian Constitutional Court’s favorable vote and the coup 
attempt, the EAC found itself in a delicate situation by not being able to delegitimize a 
decision of the judiciary of one of its members, and to have to stand against the political 
violence there occurred. This situation also affected the bloc’s political balance, as internal 
divisions between Tanzania and Rwanda27 surfaced on how to proceed (NINDORERA, 2016), 
which ended up dooming EAC’s action. 
The disagreements among the member countries of the bloc thus made it difficult to 
implement the decisions for the Burundian problem. With regard to the involvement of ROs, 
 
26 On the PSC’s issued Communiqués and Press Releases of the time, there is a constant call to respect 
the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, in a clear reference to the conduct 
of the polls in Burundi. See also AU PSC Communiqué, PSC/PR/COMM (DI), 28 April 2015. 
27 EAC has had internal divisions on economic issues for a couple years. In 2013, disagreements over 
regional integration issues cleaved the organization, with Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda siding on the 
progressive side against Tanzania. Burundi was very dependent of Tanzania as a landlocked coun-
try and ended up siding with Dar es Salaam. These divisions were sparked again on the Burundian 





following the principle of subsidiarity of RECs, the AU delegated mediation of conflict 
competence to EAC, which, together with COMESA delegates, had accompanied the 
developments of the case since the beginning of the discussions on the possibility of re-
election, still in 2014. The AU then followed the meetings of the EAC on the subject and the 
PSC had the mission to endorse the actions of the sub-regional bloc (CRISIS…,2016, p.5).  
After divisions eroded EAC’s consensus following the Constitutional Court’s rule, the 
AU saw itself constrained to claim that the constitution alteration would consist in an UCG 
without the support of the involved sub-regional blocs, and member states. Since Tanzania 
was firm in its stand that the EAC “did not have the latitude to act counter to a ruling handed 
down by the Burundi Constitutional Court, the only body empowered to pass judgment on the 
question by the basic texts of Burundi” (NINDORERA, 2016, p.6), the Summit held on May 
was limited to discuss the favorable conditions for the convening of elections. The 
recommendations made included the postponement of the elections, and were backed up by 
the UN, the AU, and ICGLR, who had representatives accompanying the EAC Summit 
(NINDORERA, 2016, p.7). 
Despite the AU and the EAC's recommendations to postpone the polls, the elections 
were then held in June. The AU was very clear on its stand, as it refused to send an 
observation mission to Burundi, an unprecedented decision, affirming that conditions for free 
and fair elections were absent28. Notwithstanding, Nkuruzinza won for his third term, and the 
conflicts continued to demand the attention of the regional blocs due to the installed political 
and humanitarian crisis29.  
As a response and following EAC’s gained legitimacy as the subsidiary REC 
responsible for mediating the conflict with special envoys from other regional organizations, 
the sub-regional bloc established in July 2015 the Inter-Burundi Dialogue, with Uganda’s 
president Museveni as mediator, and later former Tanzanian president Mkapa as facilitator. 
The International Crisis Group 2019 Report stresses that “[t]he EAC was not equipped for the 
task, however. It is first and foremost a forum for economic integration, and as such had no 
 
28 See AU Communiqué of the Chairperson of the Commission, “The African Union reiterates the 
imperative need for dialogue and consensus for a lasting solution to the crisis in Burundi and an-
nounces that it will not observe the elections scheduled for 29 June 2015”. Addis Ababa, 28 June 
2015. 
29 2019 data affirms that since 2015, the political unrest in Burundi has led to a refugee crisis, which 
peaked with around 430.000 nationals in exile: “2017 End of Year Report, Operation: Burundi”, 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 4 July 2018 (CRISIS…,2019, p.1). This situation is a result 





experience or expertise in complex political mediation”. (INTERNATIONAL…, 2019, p.I).  
The absence of a clear labor division between the AU and the EAC corroborated the 
scenario where the continental organization had its actions tied, also because of the 
differences of opinion among the member states of the African continental bloc, which 
allowed the Burundi government to instrumentalize the blocs (INTERNATIONAL…, 2016, 
p.10). Thus, when the EAC mediation was running slow the AU was limited to express 
concern and endorse the sub-continental grouping’s initiatives. 
Nevertheless, in December 2015, the violence in Burundi intensified and the AU’s 
PSC decided to issue “a communiqué authorizing a 5,000-strong African Prevention and 
Protection Mission (MAPROBU) to prevent deterioration of security, protect civilians and 
help create conditions needed for a credible Inter-Burundian dialogue”30 
(INTERNATIONAL…, 2016, p.6). The PSC gave Burundi 96 hours to accept, and if the 
country did not, the council would recommend that the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government invoked Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act, which allows intervention in grave 
cases, such as war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
The PSC move was immediately rejected by Burundi, which refused to receive the 
peace mission and gained support from several countries. The measure was also not approved 
at the AU Summit, showcasing differences between the PSC and the AU Assembly. 
Consequently, the ultimatum of the bloc failed, and negotiations continued under the EAC’s 
capabilities, which were already limited, but became compromised when, in 2016, a 
Nkurunziza loyalist Libérat Mfumukeko was chosen as the bloc’s secretary general (CRISIS 
..., 2016, p.I). 
Results: 
The political unrest in Burundi has not yet ceased as of 2019. Negotiations lost force 
over the years, with the country refusing to fully participate in the Inter-Burundi Dialogue 
(INTERNATIONAL…, 2019, p.19). More importantly, as the political scenario progressed, 
with a weakened international mediation, the Nkuruzinza government was able to alter the 
constitution once again in 2018 through a referendum31 without suffering due sanctions from 
the AU or the EAC. 
The reason why we present these further developments is because the case of Burundi 
 
30 Cf. AU PSC communiqué, PSC/PR/COMM.(DLVX), 17 December 2015. 
31 The new amendments were very polemic as they could enable Nkurunziza to stay in power after the 
2020 elections and affected the ethnical representation quotas. See also ANI, N. C. The AU should 





demonstrates long term impacts derived from the conflictive regional intervention, which 
limited by the overlapping mandates and the absence of a labor division. Finally, the lack of 
consensus between member states in both continental and sub-regional organizations ended 
up hampering the performance of the AU.  
As a result, when faced with the gaps caused by the different opinions, the Nkuruzinza 
government gained the support of the EAC by choosing a new general secretary for the bloc 
close to the president, and undermined the AU's role by securing substantial support, such as 
that of the President of South Africa, advocating EAC's right to continue mediation (CRISIS 
..., 2016). 
Something interesting in this case is the fact that the EAC is not the only sub-regional 
organization of which Burundi is a part of. Therefore, regarding horizontal overlapping 
institutions, both the reports prepared by the research institutions and the PSC Reports 
mention that during the mediation process, the COMESA the UN and the ICGLR sent 
delegates to observe negotiations. As for the ECCAS’ action during the conflict, only the 
PSC’s Reports affirm that the bloc’s May 2015 Summit has condemned the attempted coup 
d’état and urged the parties to dialogue, besides deciding to appoint a Special Envoy to 
support the sub-regional and international initiatives32. 
Hence, we perceived no major divergences at the horizontal sub-regional level, 
reinforcing the fact that the legitimacy of the intervention was under the responsibility of the 
EAC. The conflicts of action were then concentrated between the AU and the EAC, since the 
sub-regional bloc acted as a veto player and its lack of consensus was also used to erode the 
cohesion of the continental bloc. Crisis Group Africa Briefing nº 122, of 2016 also stated that 
“[e]arly attempts at collective action, such as initial cooperation between the AU and EAC 
[…] were short lived, leaving each appearing to defend its own role or trying to carve out 
space at the expense of a competitor (INTERNATIONAL…, 2019, p. 13). In addition, the 
member states divergent opinions made possible the strategic positioning of the conflicted 
country before the regional mechanisms, which alluded to forum shopping by favoring the 
EAC’s action in order to prevent the intervention of the AU. 
 
3.2.2 West Africa  
 
 





  The Western part of the African continent presents some of the most interesting cases 
on this thesis, not only because of the particularities of the events of unconstitutional change 
of government, but because of the sub-regional provisions and activities on the issue. Moreo-
ver, the combination of the strong regional presence of ECOWAS and a regional context with 
a high number of political crises, brings together interesting opportunities for the analysis. 
 Sixteen countries are geographically a part West Africa: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape 
Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, the 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. Of all the countries, only Mauritania is not a 
member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), as it left the organ-
ization in 1999 to become more involved in the northern region, as a member of the Arab 
League and the Arab Maghreb Union (HARTMANN, 2013, p.9).  
Out of the five African sub-regions, and thanks to ECOWAS, the West is the one with 
the better developed regional normative framework on democracy promotion and protection, 
with provisions on UCGs created contemporarily to the ratification of the Lomé Declaration. 
As stated by Hartmann (2013) and later endorsed by Stoddard (2017, p.474), ECOWAS “was 
the first RO on the African continent to institutionalize an agenda on democracy and good 
governance”, which linked the democratization of its member states to the democratization of 
regionalism, in the 1990s. 
As we mentioned before, the Lomé Declaration was developed after the violent con-
flict in Sierra Leone, an ECOWAS member state, in 1997. Conversely, the scenario in the 
sub-region has been undermined with multiple military coups, attempted coups and civil wars 
since its independence, which created disturbing security conditions, and prompted the need 
for a regional stand. 
Even so, the strong regional stand is not so obvious as a response, since all African 
sub-regions have suffered with democratic imbalances and violent conflicts. This choice is 
thus what makes ECOWAS so interesting as a regional organization, and it produces effects 
even on the presentation of cases of this thesis. For instance, if we take a second look at table 
3 below, which reproduces table 2’s findings highlighting the number of cases treated by the 
African Union as UCGs that happened within the western African region, the result would be 
that only three out of the fourteen cases occurred between 2004-2017 were not located in this 
sub-region: the ones in Madagascar 2009; and in the Central African Republic in Egypt 2013. 
The results do not mean, nevertheless, that western Africa is the most conflictive sub-
region in the continent, but it indicates that it is one with strong provisions and consistent in 




attempts against democracy, it presents itself as the one more willing to condemn such faults. 
Other sub-regions can present more coups, but less strong regional mechanisms to enforce the 
rules, or have other types of political manifestations or violent conflicts associated with UCGs 
that produce different regional responses, such as military interventions, or even have coups 
that are overlooked by the regional mechanisms, as we will discuss throughout this chapter. 
 
Table 3- Compilation of events treated by the AU and the RECs as UCGs after the establishment of 
the legal instruments 2004-2017, with West Africa in highlights: 
 
Source: author’s compilation 
 
ECOWAS was created in 1975 as an economic integration mechanism and has since 
produced important developments on trade issues, but also on the security and social fields33. 
An interesting data on the ECOWAS normative framework regarding the overlapping scenar-
io is that its Cotonou Treaty in 1993 already envisioned the bloc’s relationship with the 
(O)AU on article 78, and other RECs (79), and international actors, 83-86, providing for co-
operation and policy harmonization (ECOWAS, 1993). 
Regarding the normative provisions on UCGs, Hartmann (2013; 2016b) and 
Stoddardd (2017) trace the norm development within the RO, starting with the 1991 Declara-
tion of Political Principles and the 1993 Cotonou Treaty, the Revised ECOWAS Treaty, that 
first affirmed the desire to promote democracy in the sub-region. However, the two major 
 
33 The first protocol to introduce security issues was signed in 1978, considering international aggres-
sion and conflicts. But it is interesting to note that ECOWAS also developed a protocol on the “free 
movement of persons, residence and establishment” in 1979, with a common passport (HART-
MANN, 2013, p.8,13). 
Year Country Sub-region 
2005 Togo West 
2005 Mauritania West/North 
2008 Mauritania West/North 
2008 Guinea Bissau West 
2008 Guinea Conakry West 
2009 Madagascar South 
2010 Niger West 
2010 Côte d’Ivoire West 
2012 Guinea Bissau West 
2012 Mali West 
2013 Central African Republic Central 
2013 Egypt North 
2014 Burkina Faso West 




milestones against UCGs are the 1999 Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, 
Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, and the 2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy 
and Good Governance. 
The 1999 document enhanced ECOWAS’ commitment to democracy and for the first 
time, created a Mediation and Security Council responsible to decide on political and military 
interventions in member states in cases of “an overthrow or attempted overthrow of a demo-
cratically elected government” (ECOWAS, 1999, art. 25; HARTMANN, 2013). On its turn, 
the 2001 Protocol contain the bloc’s direct legal provisions against UCGs, including as a 
common principle for all member states a “zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained 
by unconstitutional means” (ECOWAS, 2001, art. 1, c). Article 45 regards sanctions against 
member states, that may include: 
• Refusal to support the candidates presented by the Member State con-
cerned for elective posts in international organizations;  
• Refusal to organize ECOWAS meetings in the Member State con-
cerned;  
• Suspension of the Member State concerned from all ECOWAS deci-
sion- making bodies. During the period of the suspension the Member State 
concerned shall be obliged to pay its dues for the period. (ECOWAS, 2001, 
art.45 [2]). 
 
The Protocol, as Stoddard (2017) in a reference to Hartmann (2013) affirms, outlines “an 
agreed set of convergence criteria that states should aim to meet” in terms of democracy. 
These standards included “inter alia, stipulations on elections, separation of powers, changes 
to constitutions, the apolitical role of the military, etc.” (STODDARD, 2017, p. 474). 
In comparison with the detailed provisions on UCGs presented by the AU, ECOWAS’ 
normative framework appears to be more open ended in terms of forms that the regional ac-
tion may assume while promoting democracy. However, its “zero tolerance” policy have been 
consistent on the condemnation of infractions and the promotion of stability in West Africa. 
In fact, ECOWAS’s presence on the sub-region is so strong that Engel (2009, p.11) affirms 
that it was chosen as a mediator even on the 2008 coup in Mauritania, a country that is not a 
member of the bloc. 
 Since ECOWAS presented multiple cases for analysis, the employed criteria of 
selection were based on two aspects: availability of primary, but also secondary data from 
field investigators; and the results from two questions presented to AU officials in Addis 
Ababa on examples of positive and conflictive examples of interaction between the AU and 




mentioned as an example of conflictive interpretations34, and the 2017 Gambian case, which 
was many times regarded as a positive intervention throughout the interviews. The results 
indicate that the time-lapse between cases and the accumulated experiences through the 
multiple cases involving both ROs could be an indicative that ECOWAS and the AU have had 
a learning process on how to navigate the overlapping scenarios, as we discuss below. 
 
3.2.2.1 Mali 2012: ECOWAS, CEN-SAD, African Union 
 
The conflict in Mali in 2012 has on its background the Tuareg secessionist movement, 
which in 2011 formed the Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad (MNLA) 
(DÖRING; HERPOLSHEIMER, 2018), demanding greater political and economic 
participation of the Tuareg people. Armed collisions between the MNLA and the government 
unfolded in early 2012, weakening the power of the latter. 
In addition, other armed groups, notably Ansar Dine (advocates of faith), al-Qaeda in 
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the Mouvement pour l'Unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de 
l'Ouest (MUJAO) raised the pressure on the national government (DÖRING; 
HERPOLSHEIMER, 2018, p. 64), until March 22, 2012 when a military coup against the 
democratically elected President Amadou Toumani Touré took place, claiming that he was 
unable to govern the country. Concomitantly, on April 6, the secessionist movement declared 
independence and Azawad in northern Mali, Tuareg territory (DERSSO, 2013, p.31). 
Thus, the occurrence of twin crises encouraged the regional blocs to restore order in 
the country. Both ECOWAS and AU had been following the crisis that had formed in the 
territory of the African Sahel following a conflict in Libya in 2011, with northern Mali being 
one of the hardest hit regions35. Even before the military coup and the secessionist 
declaration, ECOWAS and the PSC of the AU were accompanying the developments of the 
 
34 On Appendix B, two other cases, Cote d’Ivoire 2010-2011 and Guinea Bissau 2012 are presented as 
examples of conflictive or competitive interactions between ROs. They are showcased as drafts, as 
they were previously presented to the board of advisors, but since their results were very similar to 
those presented on the Malian 2012 case, they were cut out the text analysis in order to prioritize 
other cases in all African sub-regions. 
35 The crisis in Mali is directly linked to the crisis in Libya that saw the overthrow of president 
Muammar Gadhafi in 2011. The power change left the country vulnerable to the rise of armed 
groups and the emergence of existing tribal and regional divisions (DERSSO, 2013, p.18), which 
included the territory of Northern Mali, in the Sahel. Döring and Herpolsheimer explain that the 
Tuareg people are spread through parts of Mali, Algeria, Niger, Burkina Faso and Libya (2018, p. 
65), and also affirm that because of that, among the groupings that formed the MNLA were “well-
trained and well-equipped fighters who had fought in Muammar al-Gaddafi’s armies before the 




Sahel crisis and decided that the neighboring countries should act in the mediation of the 
conflict. Derrso (2013, p. 99), however states that 
 
The mediation process that the PSC proposed clearly diverged from the one 
that ECOWAS envisaged in its statement of 19 March 2012. While the PSC 
expressed preference for a mediation process led by ‘the core countries and 
especially Algeria’, the 19 March ECOWAS statement arrogated that role to 
ECOWAS. 
 
Both the AU36 and ECOWAS37 then suspended Mali until the order was restored, 
rejected the declaration of independence of the northern territory by imposing diplomatic 
restrictions on circulation to supporters of the revolutions in the country and by freezing their 
assets. ECOWAS also instrumentalized the West African Economic and Monetary Union 
(WAEMU), a sub-regional integration bloc in which ECOWAS members participate, to 
restrict access to financial resources while the suspension lasted (DERSSO, 2013, p.66).  
Initially, therefore, the positions taken by both mechanisms are complementary and 
coherent. However, with the coup and the concomitant crises, the situation deteriorated, and 
two-level crises were identified: one in the political mediation process with the transition of 
power in the country’s capital, and the other regarding the armed groups in northern Mali. 
ECOWAS called the lead upon itself on the mediation process, and the divergences between 
blocs emerged from their implementation of the intervention: following its normative 
prerogative of military intervention, in April, ECOWAS sought to legitimize its mandate and 
to acquire financial support to intermediate the Mali conflict through force38.  
More than that, Döring and Herpolsheimer (2018, p.68) affirm that ECOWAS 
“initially tried to bypass the AU with a direct approach to the UN” for support on the military 
intervention. And without the AU support, the UN Security council did not grant ECOWAS 
the mandate to intervene. 
But the frictions and delays were not only caused by the divergence on issues of 
military intervention in the north, as the AU PSC and ECOWAS also disagreed on the terms 
of mediation, and when the sanctions could be lifted. This is exemplified by the fact that the 
ECOWAS-coordinated mediation group organized an agreement with the Comité National 
pour le Redressement de la Démocratie et de la Restauration de l’État (CNRDRE) for the 
 
36 See PSC Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM(CCCXV), 23 March 2012. 
37 Dersso (2013) traces the ECOWAS decisions to the extraordinary summit of the bloc on March 27th 
and the 29th March Mini-Summit held after a high-level mission to Bamako. 
38 Cf. ECOWAS Final Communique. Extraordinary Summit of ECOWAS Heads of State and Gov-




establishment of a transitional government in Mali in a period of 40 days and immediately 
abolished sanctions on the country (DERSSO, 2013, p.66). Although AU acknowledged the 
ECOWAS efforts, it maintained the sanctions applied39. 
The fact that ECOWAS signed the agreement with CNRDRE legitimized the 
overthrow of President Touré and the military junta, which was also a signatory of the 
document (DERSSO, 2013, p.66). Thus, the military had the opportunity to establish 
conditions for the reappointment of civilians and to interfere in transitional political affairs. In 
this way, ECOWAS’ understanding showed fragility and diverged from the PSC, which 
maintained the sanctions of the AU and demanded the dissolution of the junta for the 
restoration of the constitutional order40. 
As for the crisis that was still unfolding in northern Mali, the difficult consensus 
between military intervention and political negotiation, was not limited to the regional blocs 
but also between the neighboring countries41. Finally, the decision to intervene militarily was 
backed up by the AU in June42. Even with the AU support the UN Security Council delayed 
the grant of its mandate until December43, after months of negotiation, but then in a form of a 
joint action between both blocs, the AU–ECOWAS joint operation - AFISMA (DÖRING; 
HERPOLSHEIMER, 2018, p. 68). 
Results: 
The rejection of the UCG was the common ground between the two blocs. Following 
their normative provisions, both ECOWAS and the AU condemned the coup and applied 
sanctions on Mali. However, the intervention itself generated conflicts, as the blocs had 
competing views on how to handle the crisis. 
Although the decision was finally a joint action, the difficulty of converging between 
the two blocs made the process of restoration of the constitutional order slow, with more than 
eight months elapsing before a consensus was reached on the grounds of conflict resolution 
 
39 The AU lifted Mali suspensions in the end of October 2012, six months after ECOWAS. The criteria 
for the lifting of the suspension was the formation of an expanded national unity government, 
which was achieved on August 20th, 2012. See PSC Communiqué PSC/MIN/COMM. 
(CCCXXXIX), 24 October 2012. 
40 Cf. PSC Communiqué PSC/PR/ COMM(CCCXXII), 12 June 2012. 
41 Dersso (2013, p. 68), affirms that between the neighboring countries there were also divergent opin-
ions on how to deal with the conflict in Mali, as some countries, like Algeria, were against the use 
of military intervention; and when the decisions to intervene were taken, there were also conflictive 
positions on how to engage. 
42 Cf. PSC Communiqué PSC/PR/ COMM(CCCXXII), 12 June 2012. 
43 Cf. UNSC, Resolution 2085. Adopted by the Security Council at its 6898th Meeting (S/RES/2085). 




through military intervention (DERSSO, 2013). The hierarchical overlapping with the 
mandate of the UN Security Council also delayed operations, even when consensus was 
regionally achieved. In addition, the junta’s recognition / non-recognition crisis made the 
central power in Mali unstable as an agent of order restoration, and the country underwent a 
continued political unrest. 
Regarding horizontal overlaps among RECs, we found no evidence of CEN-SAD 
acting, but ECOWAS’ instrumentation of its sub-regional bloc WAEMU is especially 
interesting as the overlapping was used in order to enforce a position. 
 
3.2.2.2 The Gambia, 2017: ECOWAS, African Union 
 
The crisis in the Gambia started in December 2016 with the presidential elections. The 
sitting president Yahya Jammeh had been in power for over 20 years, after he seized power on 
a military coup in 1994, and was elected and re-elected president in 1996, 2001 and 2016. 
Hartmann (2017, p.86) affirms that Jammeh did not seem likely to lose the 2016 polls, as the 
government held the position with a firm grip, international election observations were lim-
ited, there was a general atmosphere of intimidation and the opposition had suffered great 
persecutions in the country. 
However, the results from the ballots gave the win to the oppositional candidate, 
Adama Barrow, on December 2nd. President Jammeh affirmed at first that he was willing to 
respect the electoral process and recognized the defeat on a television speech, congratulating 
Barrow. The government’s initial reaction was therefore surprising and Jammeh reiterated he 
would not contest the results (HARTMANN, 2017, p.86). 
Nonetheless, a couple days after, on December 9th, Jammeh started questioning the 
procedures and refused to relinquish power, as he allegedly did not trust the electoral process, 
and, given the irregularities, a new election should be held, under a different Electoral Council 
organization44. ECOWAS, the AU45, and the UN strictly condemned Jammeh’s public pro-
nunciations with a joint communiqué released on December 10th 46, and ECOWAS decided to 
 
44 Cf. Al Jazeera. Gambia's Jammeh rejects result of presidential election. 10 December 2016. 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/gambia-jammeh-rejects-result-presidential-election-
161210034606068.html 
45 On PSC Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM. (DCXLIV) 12 December 2016, the AU recalled the princi-
ples of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Good Governance and urged the facilita-
tion of a peaceful transition of power. 




deploy a high-level mediation mission to Banjul on December 13th, calling the lead upon itself 
and receiving support from the AU (ECOWAS, 2016). 
The delegation sent to the Gambia was very high-ranked and comprised the Heads of 
State of Liberia, Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone. In Banjul, they held consultations with 
Jammeh and Barrow, insisting on the importance of the peaceful democratic transition and 
still, the efforts produced no visible results. At the ordinary ECOWAS Summit on December 
17, it was decided that the mediation efforts would continue under ECOWAS’ auspices with 
the president of Nigeria officially being appointed as mediator, with the Ghanaian president as 
his co-chair, and the sub-regional bloc called for AU and UN support as it decided to “take all 
necessary measures to strictly enforce the results of the 1st December 2016 elections” 
(ECOWAS, 2016). “All necessary measures” meant the possibility of military intervention. 
As Hartmann (2017, p.89) points out “ECOWAS placed standby forces on alert and formally 
authorized them to intervene militarily if Jammeh did not step down”. 
ECOWAS’ position was fully backed by the AU, that emphasized Jammeh’s deadline 
to relinquish power was January 19, Gambian inauguration day, when Barrow would be rec-
ognized as ruling president by the African leaders.47 As negotiations did not seem to progress 
and the time limit approached, ECOWAS gathered in preparation for the establishment of the 
ECOWAS Military Intervention in The Gambia (ECOMIG), whose troops started to position 
on Gambian borders on January 18. 
On January 19, the ECOMIG troops started to invade Gambian territory, but were 
quickly stopped by last minute negotiations: with the country under the imminent threat of 
invasion, with Barrow being sworn in and recognized as rightful president at the Gambian 
Embassy in Senegal, and with the army chief pleading allegiance to Barrow, Jammeh agreed 
to step down and go into exile (HARTMANN, 2017, p.90). The mediation then avoided phys-
ical confrontation and ECOWAS by only using the threat to use force was able to restore the 
rule of law in Gambia. 
Results: 
Considering the mediation efforts, as ECOWAS mostly led the process, the AU took a 
back seat but provided institutional support. The firm position held by ECOWAS’ high-level 
delegation with the threat of the use of force, combined with AU and UN’s support made 
Jammeh’s situation very delicate. Therefore, the Gambian case showcased a quick response 
and an emphatic stand that was translated into an interesting synergy on cooperation. 
 




Many reasons could be conjectured on the domestic scenario in order to understand 
why the Gambian case worked so well in comparison with other cases in other sub-regions. 
Our interest in this thesis lies, nevertheless, on the forms of behavior adopted by the ROs, and 
the situation seems to demonstrate that the AU and ECOWAS have adapted and learned 
through previous experiences in joint interventions, since the AU recognized ECOWAS’ me-
diation prerogative and backed the efforts, with no competition shown, but rather support and 
joint action. 
The Gambian case has as a particularity the fact that the type of UCG practiced was 
neither a direct coup, nor a constitution amendment in order to stay in power, but rather a fail-
ure to admit defeat on elections and relinquish power. Both ECOWAS and the AU recalled 
their instruments against UCGs and even prepared for the use of force, but the sanctions were 
as limited as the effects of such type of infringement: neither of the mechanisms suspended 
the Gambia48. At the same time, this move was coherent as it was taken by both organizations 
and it was justified since the mediation efforts managed to restore the power to the constitu-
tionally elect president Barrow on the deadline of January 19th. 
 
3.2.3 Southern Africa  
 
As with other regions, the definition of which countries compose the Southern part of 
the continent is oftentimes regarded differently. The UNECA definition49 encompasses Ango-
la, Botswana, Eswatini (formerly known as Swaziland), Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozam-
bique, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. However, the Southern African Devel-
opment Community (SADC), the region’s main REC englobes, besides those countries, Com-
oros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Madagascar, Seychelles and Tanzania. 
Accordingly, these last countries are also included on Eastern and Central Africa definitions50. 
Apart from SADC, the sub-region also hosts the oldest running RO, the Southern Af-
rican Customs Union (SACU), an economic integration project between SADC members Bot-
swana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Eswatini; and one more Regional Economic 
 
48 See also: BALOGUN, E.; MWABA, A. How will the African Union respond to the military over-
throw in Sudan? The Washington Post, April 24, 2019. Available on 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/24/how-will-african-union-respond-military-
overthrow-sudan/?noredirect=on> 
49 As seen on UNECA reports for the sub-region (UNECA, 2019). See also the specific Southern Afri-
ca webpage on : <https://www.uneca.org/publications/southern-africa> 
50 Comoros, the DRC, Madagascar, Seychelles and Tanzania are covered the UNECA Office for East-




Community: the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), to which five 
of the UNECA’s Southern African countries are also members (Eswatini, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Zimbabwe and Zambia). In contrast with sub-regions as Eastern Africa, that presented multi-
ple sub-regional organizations, the southern part of the continent does not count on as many 
institutions. In fact, the case presented is more similar to West Africa, where there are less 
overlappings but one strong sub-regional organization: SADC. 
Nevertheless, regarding the established normative framework, ECOWAS and SADC 
are very different, since the Southern bloc did not engage in directly addressing unconstitu-
tional changes of government on its documents. In fact, Girardeau (2012, p.54) affirms that 
SADC does not have an explicit framework on UCGs, but rather bases its position on the is-
sue on the African Union’s documents and policies. 
Van der Vleuten and Hulse (2013) and Girardeau (2012) have traced the main legal 
SADC documents that address the issue of democracy protection and promotion and its in-
struction against UCGs, even if indirectly. However, the most relevant one for this research is 
the 2001 Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation, as we understand that it 
further formulates the foundations for the bloc’s mandate on the matter, since it also regulates 
the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security, an institutional source of legitimacy for the dem-
ocratic mandate, created in 199651.  
In contrast with the ECOWAS and the AU policies, the SADC documents present 
what could be considered as a less clear approach to democracy enforcement, as it is not al-
ways as clear which measures should be taken and in which situations those measures are 
required. For instance, considering the SADC Treaty, the democratic concern is only ad-
dressed twice: as a principle of the organization (article 4, c) and as an objective (article 5). 
Article 5 (1, b) affirms the goal to “promote common political values, systems and other 
shared values which are transmitted through institutions which are democratic, legitimate and 
 
51 It is worth mentioning other documents that could have been added to this list, such as the SADC 
Mutual Defense Pact. As stated by Girardeau (2012, p.55), it “touches upon the issue of unconsti-
tutional changes of government, when it specifies that destabilising acts include “any act or activi-
ty aimed at changing the constitutional order of a State Party through unconstitutional means” 
(SADC, 2003). However, the focus here is upon assuring that member states do not undertake such 
acts against other member states. As Article 8 of the Pact states, “state parties undertake not to nur-
ture, harbour or support any person, group of persons or institutions whose aim is to destabilise the 
political, military, territorial and economic or social security of a State Party” (SADC, 2003)”. 
Other relevant documents that could be added to the list, such as the 2003 Regional Indicative 
Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), the 2004 SADC Election Guideline,s and the 2004 Strategic 
Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO), but their provisions are more relevant to the understanding 
of what is expected from standard democratic behaviors than to establishing a mandate over the is-




effective”; while (1,c) states that the RO shall “consolidate, defend and maintain democracy, 
peace, security and stability”. (SADC, 2015, p.6).  However, as Van der Vleuten and Hulse 
(2013, p.28) highlight, “the document does not specify what it means by “democracy” or how 
SADC will defend it”. It also does not directly address the issue of coups d’état or UCGs in 
its text (GIRARDEAU, 2012, p.52). 
This can also be explained by the context of some of its member states, which only as 
recently as the 1990s have confronted democratic values, with the consolidation the end of the 
South African apartheid in 1994, and the ongoing problems and democratic violations in the 
DRC. In fact, Van der Vleuten and Hulse (2013, p.14) affirm that a 1995 document added to 
the SADC Treaty signed in 1992, a membership accession criterium, which was “must be a 
democracy”; however, the consolidated version is more broad on its affirmation, currently not 
posing any criteria related to democracy on its Article 8, regarding the admission of new 
members. 
Moreover, something interesting about the SADC provisions is how close the idea of 
democracy and good governance is linked to the goals of maintenance of peace and security, 
which have been an important issue on the agenda of the sub-regional organization. This un-
derstanding also clarifies why we highlight the relevance of the 2001 Protocol on Politics, 
Defense and Security Cooperation, for this study. It is its Article 11(2, b, ii) that states that in 
the events of a “military coup or other threat to a legitimate authority of a State”, the Organ on 
Politics, Defense and Security should seek to resolve the conflicts. The forms of action are 
identified by article 11 (3, a) for conflict resolution: “preventive diplomacy, negotiations, 
conciliation, mediation, good offices, arbitration and adjudication by an international tribunal” 
(SADC 2001). 
The Protocol even goes on to state that “where peaceful means of resolving a conflict 
are unsuccessful, the Chairperson acting on the advice of the Ministerial Committee may rec-
ommend to the Summit that enforcement action be taken” (SADC, 2001, article 11, 3, c); but 
only as a “last resort and, in accordance with article 53 of the UN Charter, only with the au-
thorization of the UN Security Council” (article 11, 3, d), thus materializing the RO’s man-
date. 
Other provisions worth citing from the 2001 Protocol are the affirmation of the objec-
tives of the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security, which include: “to “protect the people 
and safeguard the development of the Region against instability arising from the breakdown 
of law and order, intra-state conflict- inter-state conflict and aggression”; (article 2, 2, a); to 




e); to “consider enforcement action in accordance with international law and as a matter of 
last resort where peaceful means have failed” (article 2, 2, f); and to “promote the develop-
ment of democratic institutions and practices within the territories of State Parties and encour-
age the observance of universal human rights as provided for in the Charters and Conventions 
of the Organization of African Unity and United Nations respectively” (article 2, 2, g) 
(SADC, 2001, p.3-4). Regarding the last point, article 15, which addresses the Relationship 
with other international agreements affirms that the Protocol does not detract member states 
from rights and obligations the AU and UN member states but does not go further. 
Considering the occurrences of UCGs, table 2 (p.62) only presents one case of inter-
vention in Southern Africa: Madagascar, 2009. Arguably, at least two other notorious recent 
events have occurred during this research time lapse that could have been added to the list: the 
coups d’état in Lesotho, 2014 and Zimbabwe, 2017. However, neither case has invoked the 
normative framework and procedures against unconstitutional changes of government and are 
therefore not included52. 
Even so, the case selection for the Southern sub-region was endorsed by the fact that 
during the interview process held with AU officials and expert researchers, the Malagasy case 
of 2009 was one of the most appointed situations with reference to conflicting experiences 
dealing with UCGs. The complexity of the case is also underscored by the time lapse involved 
on conflict mediation and restoration of the constitutional order, which took almost five years, 
and consequently the suspension applied to Madagascar was only lifted in 201453, as we dis-
cuss below. 
 
3.2.3.1 Madagascar, 2009: SADC, COMESA, AU 
  
 
52 Regarding Lesotho, SADC did intervene, but not invoking the normative framework on UCGs, opt-
ing for an approach of dialogue and engagement (RUPIA, M. Regional Intervention in Fragile Af-
rican States: Comparative Case Studies of South Sudan and Lesotho: Any Lessons Learnt? AfSol 
Journal Volume 1, Issue 1. Addis Ababa, August 2016). This case could be similar to the Burundi-
an where the sub-regional RO not treating a crisis as an UCG blocks the AU’s action based on the 
subsidiarity between organizations. As for Zimbabwe, neither the AU nor SADC condemned the 
removal of long-lasting dictator Mugabe from power. As ROESSLER (2017) points out, by not 
enforcing the normative framework, both organizations “tacitly supported the forcible removal of 
Mugabe”. (ROESSLER, P. How the African Union got it wrong on Zimbabwe. Opinion, Al 
Jazeera, 5 December 2017. Available at <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/african-
union-wrong-zimbabwe-171204125847859.html>) 





The political crisis in Madagascar has been studied in depth by different scholars and 
research institutions, due to its long mediation period and its impacts for resolution. Consider-
ing the many particularities of the negotiations in the span of five years, in this section we 
focus on the overlapping regional organizations’ positions and behavior during the events.  
The political instability emerged in Madagascar on January 2009 and peaked in March 
of the same year when President Marc Ravalomanana was ousted after months of civil vio-
lence and public demonstrations in the country’s capital, Antananarivo. Upon Ravaloma-
nana’s forced resignation on March 17th, he handed the power to a military committee that 
then proceeded to install Andry Rajoelina, the mayor of Antananarivo, who had proclaimed 
himself president of the High Authority of the Transition (HAT), the new leader of govern-
ment, while Ravalomanana was forced into exile (INTERNATIONAL…, 2014, p.1). 
Girardeau (2012, p.63-65) highlights that during this troubled period in early 2009, in 
the months preceding the UCG, the AU, SADC and the UN had missions deployed to the 
country in order to investigate the country’s conditions and talk to stakeholders. However, the 
efforts produced very little effect and the government was still ousted in March. 
SADC member states reunited in Eswatini on March 30th, 2009, after an Extraordinary 
Summit of the Organ Troika on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation was held on 19 
March and converged to condemn the events in Madagascar and to call for the restoration of 
the constitutional order. The country was then suspended from all of the bloc’s institutions 
and organs, while the Rajoelina government was not recognized and deemed unconstitutional 
(SADC, 2009). 
The AU Peace and Security Council also immediately acted upon the matter, reuniting 
on March 16, before Ravalomanana’s resignation, on the day he left the office, March 17th, 
and on March 20th when the Council condemned the UCG and called upon SADC and all oth-
er AU partners to back the rejection of the political situation.54 As Girardeau (2012, p. 69) 
affirms, the AU recognized the need to coordinate efforts to push the return to the constitu-
tional order in Madagascar, which could be perceived as an attempt to lead the mediation. 
As a result, an International Contact Group for Madagascar (ICG-M), was then estab-
lished in order to facilitate coordination on April 2009 (WITT, 2017). It was composed by 
members of the AU, and the RECs, SADC and COMESA, as well as other ROs, such as the 
Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) and the International Organization of Francophonie (OIF), 
and external actors as the European Union (EU) and the UN, represented by African and per-
 
54 Cf.: PSC Communiqués PSC/PR/BR(CLXXIX) 16 March 2009; PSC/PR/COMM.(CLXXX) 17 




manent members of the UN Security Council (Rwanda, Togo, China, France, Russia, the UK 
and U.S.), Mozambique, Tanzania, South Africa, Germany and Japan (INTERNATIONAL…, 
2014)55. 
However, the opinions among the ICG-M members on what to expect from Madagas-
car were not unanimous: while all the actors demanded a return to the constitutional order, it 
was not clear what it actually meant (WITT, 2017, p.3). As the author states, though SADC’s 
and COMESA’s decisions were perceived as a threat to use military force in order to reinstall 
Ravalomanana, the other international actors involved had different approaches: the AU, for 
instance, urged for a joint work with SADC, preferring a meditation approach, whereas the 
USA and France pressured for the organization of transitional elections (WITT, 2017, p.3-4). 
In the end, the immediate result approach from the combination of perspectives of the ICG-M 
members was the convergence of a mediated solution in order to organize elections to resolve 
the crisis. 
 However, as the months went by with no significant results achieved (WITT, 2017, 
p.4), SADC decided to step in and to appoint, in June 2009, Mozambique’s former President, 
Joaquim Chissano as lead mediator for the conflict, in accordance with the mandate originated 
by the article 11 of the 2001 Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation, which 
we mentioned above. Girardeau (2012, p.71) affirms that SADC’s initial hard-line response to 
the UCG had weakened its leadership on the mediation at first, since it separated its approach 
from the stance posed by the AU and the UN, but, as the AU led ICG-M could not resolve the 
impasse, the sub-regional bloc had an opportunity to step ahead again, backing off the osten-
sive position and offering a mediated approach. 
 The AU backed Chissano’s mandate and continued to work through the ICG-M 
through the organization of a Joint Mediation Team (JMT-M) to coordinate the different 
members of the ICG-M under the Chissano (AU, 2009; GIRARDEAU, 2012, p.73-74). 
Rounds of negotiation followed in August 2009. Even though a power-sharing deal that pro-
vided the opportunity for the consolidation of a transition was proposed, through the signed 
Maputo Agreements, it generated no consensus, since Rajoelina was willing to take unilateral 
positions (GIRARDEAU, 2012, p.75), blocking the implementation of the accords, reserving 
core government positions in the transitional authority for his own supporters and threating to 
organize elections (CRISIS…, 2010).  
 




 Several rounds of negotiation followed with conflicts happening not at the sub-
regional or regional level, who were cooperating through the JMT-M, but among the Mala-
gasy stakeholders who could not reach an agreement due to the lack of political which stalled 
any transitional progress (GIRARDEAU, 2012, p. 78). On December 2009, Rajoelina decided 
not to negotiate anymore (WITT, 2017, p.5)56, which generated a serious deadlock and 
prompted action by the ROs. 
 The AU sought to take the lead again through the expedition of the creation of a Moni-
toring Mechanism57, which had been agreed on the continuity of the Maputo Agreements, 
taking a step ahead on ending the negotiations phase (GIRARDEAU, 2017, p.79). As 
Girardeau’s research points out, the choice could have been perceived as a source of contesta-
tion between the AU and SADC who was then leading the mediating process and had a dif-
ferent approach to crisis resolution, willing to continue the mediation. The source of contesta-
tion was also related to disagreements on the character of the ICG-M: SADC reinforced the 
idea that the ICG-M was a consulting stance, not a mediating body contained on the African 
Peace and Security Architecture58, and valued its own efforts on the mediation, which were 
recognized by the AU Assembly (GIRARDEAU, 2012, p.80). 
 As the situation progressed with no achievements due to the deadlock created by Ra-
joelina, the AU and SADC proceeded to jointly impose new sanctions against the perpetrators 
of the UCG, the members of the HAT, which included travel bans, freezing of funds and dip-
lomatic isolation59 (GIRARDEAU, 2012; WITT, 2017). Even though the combined regional 
position was strong, different mediation efforts followed through the year of 2010, but with 
no significant progress. 
  In September 2011, two and a half years after the UCG, SADC managed to present a 
fruit of its mediation efforts, the “Roadmap for Ending the Crisis in Madagascar” (SADC, 
2011), a commitment between Malagasy stakeholders which established the basis for the con-
 
56 Cf.: “Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Madagascar”, 216th Meeting 
of the AU Peace and Security Council, PSC/PR/2(CCXVI), 19 February 2010, Addis Ababa, Ethi-
opia. 
57 Cf.: Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Madagascar, 
PSC/PR/2(CCXVI), 19 February 2010, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
58 Cf.: Statement by H.E. Mr. Hifikepunye Pohamba, President of the Republic of Namibia and Depu-
ty Chairperson of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), to the 14th Ordinary 
Session of the African Union Assembly of Heads of State and Government”, 1 February 2010, 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. SADC, 2010 apud GIRARDEAU, 2012, p. 80. 




clusion of negotiations. However, some questions were not clear as pointed by Witt (2017, 
p.15)60 
 
the unresolved issues were the circumstances under which Ravalomanana 
would be allowed to return to Madagascar and the question of who was eli-
gible to run in presidential elections. The mediators were faced with a di-
lemma: letting Rajoelina contest the elections would violate the prescriptions 
of the African Charter on Elections, Democracy and Governance, yet the 
rapid restoration of constitutional order was only possible with Rajoelina’s 
support, and this in turn was based on the precondition that Ravalomanana 
would not return to Madagascar (WITT, 2017). 
 
 The mentioned questions generated continued conflicts of interpretation between 
stakeholders, though the AU and SADC kept their joint position on sustaining the need of free 
and fair democratic elections. In the end, the Madagascar HAT was very pressured interna-
tionally, with lack of money and recognition, and with targeted sanctions (WITT, 2017, p. 
16), which finally led to the realization of a first round of presidential elections on October 
25, 2013, and the second run and parliamentary elections on December 20, 2013. The polls’ 
results were announced on January 7, 2014 and deemed satisfactory, which finally occasioned 
the end of the suspension sanctions by the AU, SADC, and other international partners, as 
well as the transformation of the ICG-M on a Support mission (ICG-M, 2014). 
Results: 
 The conflict in Madagascar allows different reflections on the issue of overlapping 
mandates and UCGs. Generally speaking, the overlapping mandates of the AU and SADC 
were not a great source of conflict, as the combined joint efforts with the recognition of 
Chissano’s mediation resulted mostly in positive enforcement of a common will to end the 
political instability. Consequently, the conflict on organizational behavior on the Malagasy 
case is less generated by who has the mandate to mediate, and more related to frictions be-
tween the ROs trying to take the lead in different moments due to the non-resolution of the 
impasse.  
 At the very first moment, all international players condemned the political crisis in 
Madagascar. SADC and COMESA, the regional sub-groupings, considered using a military 
intervention to solve the conflicts, a position that was not backed up neither by the AU, nor 
the UN, and therefore was not applied. Considering that the source of SADC’s mandate on 
 
60 On the subject, see also: WITT, A. Where Regional Norms Matter: Contestation and the Do-
mestic Impact of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. Africa Spec-




the matter emanates from the Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation, it is a 
coherent approach, but one that does not necessarily match the AU’s expectations on the mat-
ter. In order to take the lead, SADC then takes a step back and appoints Chissano as the front 
man for a mediated solution. This second position was supported by other international actors, 
and generated cooperation. 
 The combined efforts, both on mediation and on sanctioning were extremely important 
for the turnouts of the conflict, even with the long process involved, since it was the interna-
tional pressure exerted by both the AU and SADC that finally managed to force Rajoelina to 
back off and conduct the elections. Throughout the whole process it can be seen that both ROs 
decided to remain seized of the matter, even when cooperating, and competition for leadership 
presented itself in moments of deadlock on conflict resolution, as a way of pressuring a way 
forward. Nonetheless, SADC’s position on the mediation was very strongly declared during 
its 5 years, not allowing to be bypassed by AU’s policies, such as the Monitoring Mechanism. 
 In fact, as we have previously stated, this thesis does not focus on the actions extra-
regional actors, even if we take into consideration the role played by the UN when it interferes 
on the ROs’ behavior. Notwithstanding if on the first steps of negotiation, not having the UN 
nor the AU’s support blocks SADC’s intention of using force, towards the end of the media-
tion the UN’s positioning did not play such an important role, as SADC and the AU remained 
firm on their stand against UCGs and on their sanctions, while the UN seemed to take a light-
er approach, allowing Rajoelina to address the UN Assembly and granting funds to Madagas-
car (GIRARDEAU, 2012, p. 84-85). 
 Two points should be highlighted. First, Witt (2017) argues that the problems with the 
Malagasy mediation originated from the fact that even though the ROs had a mandate to per-
form in a case of UCG, there were actually contradictions between the reality on the field, 
where the Malagasy parties did not invite any international mediation, and the regional poli-
cies that imposed the rules of negotiations. This fact would then contradict the idea that the 
political process should be locally owned. 
  Thus, the greatest source of competition between overlapping ROs was generated by 
the need to take the lead, arising from the difficulty of applying regional provisions at the do-
mestic level, which on its turn was endorsed by the lack of clarity/ completeness of the nor-
mative, and led the policies open to interpretation and bending, bringing about the possibility 
of disagreement and permitting the Malagasy stakeholders to delay negotiations. These affir-
mations can be exemplified by the fact that the AU Charter on Elections, Democracy and 




UCG, but not only Rajoelina was an important actor at the table, together with the ousted 
president Ravalomanana, he was actually recognized as the president of the transition by the 
Roadmap. The scenario was so complex that the 2013 elections only happened after both for-
mer presidents agreed not to run. 
 Conclusively, considering the ROs’ behavior, it could be said that more than a compe-
tition for regional relevance or leadership, the Malagasy case presented a common determina-
tion to force the domestic conflict in Madagascar to cease, even without the accordance of the 
main domestic stakeholders. While the joint action was important, the solutions were ex-
tremely delayed, and even considered “cosmetic” (INTERNATIONAL…, 2014), as in the 
long run political divisions remained, with the 2018 presidential elections being disputed by 
Ravalomanana and Rajoelina again. 
 
3.2.4 Central Africa 
 
Similarly to the other subregions, the Central part of the continent has faced multiple 
conflicts and crises over the years since its independence, but the struggles of this particular 
geographical part are very preeminent due to the presence of continued armed clashes and 
civil wars which have occurred very recently, through the 1990’s until the present moment. 
As a result, as Meyer (2011) affirms “a high number of ECCAS member states are currently 
still in a post-conflict state”. Additionally, the ratio of undemocratic governments is very 
high, with virtually all Central African countries being currently listed as authoritarian, ac-
cording to The Economist’s Democracy Index 2018 (THE ECONOMIST, 2018)61. 
As we have previously mentioned, the sub-region shares some of its member states 
with Eastern and Southern Africa62, but the UNECA offices for Central Africa officially serve 
the countries of Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Congo, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and São Tomé and Príncipe63. 
Regarding the presence of ROs, the most representative REC of the sub-region is the Eco-
nomic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), to which all the mentioned countries 
 
61 As the only exception, São Tomé and Principe does not figure as authoritarian but it is also not 
listed among the 167 countries analyzed by The Economist. 
62  Respectively Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC with the East; and Angola and the DRC with the 
South. 





are affiliated, with the addition of Rwanda, which had left the organization in 2008, but re-
joined in 2016. 
Observing the presence of organizational overlaps on the sub-region two notorious 
facts should be highlighted: firstly, while almost half of ECCAS member states are only affil-
iated to one REC, which combined with a lower number of regional groupings focused on 
Central Africa, reduces horizontal overlaps, the other six members of ECCAS are also mem-
bers of four other RECs: COMESA and/or CEN-SAD, and/or SADC, and/or the EAC; and 
secondly, the acknowledgment of the presence of a nested overlap between ECCAS and the 
Central African Economic and Monetary Community (known for its French acronym 
CEMAC), an economic integration bloc, with shared currency, also composed of half of its 
members: Cameroon, the CAR, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Chad. Besides ECCAS 
and CEMAC, the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL) is also com-
posed by Central African States. 
On Chapter 2, we affirmed that ECCAS was created in 1983, with the intent of com-
bining the efforts of the CEPGL and UDEAC, CEMAC’s predecessor, in order to represent 
the Central African sub-region, according to the Lagos Plan of Action. Thus, its mandate was 
initially focused on economic cooperation, and accordingly with its member states political 
context, the zeal for democratic principles did not appear on the ECCAS constitutive treaty. 
ECCAS’ initial years were very turbulent and of inactivity: the bloc began its activities in 
1985 but did not function “for several years because of financial difficulties (non-payment of 
membership fees) and the conflict in the Great Lakes area” (AU, 2019b). In fact, with the nu-
merous conflicts undergone, some of which had member states on different sides64, Meyer 
(2015) affirms that between 1992-1998 the RO went through a period of paralysis, referred to 
also as “ECCAS hibernation” (MEYER, 2015).  
The author proceeds to trace that following this stagnation period, the member states 
decided to revive ECCAS, “acknowledging that economic cooperation requires a context of 
political stability” (MEYER, 2015, p.3). Thus, the REC’s mandate was expanded, starting in 
1998-1999, with a significant institutional reform process which established a regional securi-
ty architecture (WELZ, 2016), and finally formalized ECCAS as a pillar of the AU’s African 
Economic Community (UNECA, 2019b). 
In the case of ECCAS, the access to primary data such as official documents, commu-
niqués and legal texts is very scarce, even in French, the main language of most of the mem-
 




ber states. Considering the main normative provisions, nonetheless, the source of ECCAS’ 
mandate against UCGs emanates from one of the structures created by the 1999 reforms: the 
Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX) (ECCAS, 1999; 2000), and its 
instruments. Democracy and good governance are not mentioned on the Constitutive Treaty 
(ECCAS, 1983), and the subsequent documents, post the institutional reforms, directly ad-
dress the terms very few times, mostly combined with the idea of peacekeeping, conflict pre-
vention and lasting peace and development, coherently with its new mandate. 
Three pillars compose COPAX’ action: the Commission for Defense and Security; the 
Central African Early Warning System (MARAC, on its French acronym); and the Central 
African Multinational Force (FOMAC, one of the regional brigades we have previously men-
tioned). The Protocol that regulates the COPAX was adopted in Malabo on February 24th, 
2000 (ECCAS, 2000) and entered into force in 2004 (MEYER, 2015, p.3). Notedly, this mo-
ment of reform is also contemporary to the AU’s concern with UCGs through the Lomé Dec-
laration, and the establishment of the AU’s Peace and Security Architecture, which reaffirms 
the importance of the years 2000 on the African stand against conflicts and its turn towards 
democracy protection and enhancement. 
The “promotion and consolidation of democratic institutions and constitutional legali-
ty in each State” (ECCAS, 2000) is described on art.3, h, of the COPAX Protocol as a princi-
ple for the sub-regional organ, but the objectives and procedures of the Council do not men-
tion standards or further provisions on democracy, focusing on peace related issues. Within 
COPAX’ competencies, the possibility of intervention, including with military aid, is listed 
under its means of implementation, through FOMAC’s assistance.  
The Multinational Force’s mandate is described on articles 23 and 24 of the same Pro-
tocol, but it is actually article 25, d, that provides the clearest reference to UCGs on the nor-
mative, by stating the situations where FOMAC is to be deployed, following a decision of the 
Commission, among which: “in the event of the overthrow or attempted overthrow of the 
constitutional institutions of a member state” (ECCAS, 2000). The institutional formulation 
demonstrates the securitarian approach given to the events of UCG, and they do not further 
elaborate on procedures for the matter65. 
 
65 A posterior normative that regulates the “Standing Orders of the Central African Multinational 
Force” was signed in 2002, and even though it does address the objectives, mission, organization 
and functioning, it does not mention UCGs or democracy protection, only referencing the same ar-




 The list of UCGs provided o Table 2 (p.62) only presents one case that provoked a 
regional response according to existing the norms: The Central African Republic, 2013. As 
we have stated above, this fact is explained not by an abundance of democracy, but as a result 
of the lack thereof. The weak regional standards of peer enforcement caused by the multiplici-
ty of post-conflicts struggling states demonstrates that the existence of a normative provision 
does not suffice without regional capabilities to manage the distresses caused by UCGs, as 
shown by the following example case. 
 
3.2.4.1 Central African Republic, 2013: ECCAS, CEN-SAD, AU 
 
The political unrest in the Central Africa Republic (CAR) is not merely an isolated 
case of UCG, but an ongoing crisis that has demanded different levels of intervention, by dif-
ferent international actors over the years. Appendix B presents at least five successful coups 
having occurred in the country between 1966-2013, but Welz (2018, p. 116) further affirms 
that ever since its independence, the CAR has not witnessed a long period of peace, stability 
and democratic rule, as a partial result of limitations such as colonialism and weak institu-
tions, combined with the sub-regional political turbulent context.  
In fact, the author illustrates the affirmation with numbers: from 1997, when wide-
spread violence due to political and social crises erupted, until 2015, the country went through 
at least 13 peace operations, conducted not only by African regional organizations, but also 
the EU, the UN and France (WELZ, 2016, p. 11), a pattern that Welz and Meyer (2014) have 
previously labeled as “patchwork interventionism” (WELZ, 2016; 2018). Consequently, as 
we address the 2013 political turmoil in the CAR, the history of violent conflict and direct 
intervention should be taken into account upon analyzing the organizational behavior present-
ed by the overlapping ROs. 
Additionally, we underscore the direct link between the 2013 coup d’état and the one 
that had happened 10 years earlier, in 2003, when General François Bozizé managed to over-
throw president Ange-Félix Patassé. Due to political, social and military crises during Patas-
sé’s term in office, the CAR underwent conflicts and had interventions deployed by regional 
leaders, the UN, CEN-SAD and CEMAC (WELZ, 2018), and the instability finally led to 
Bozizé’s power seizing in 2003. 
Bozizé’s rise to the presidency was accompanied by the start of a violent bush war in 
the country (WELZ, 2014, p.602), which only led to a peace agreement in June 2008. The 




generated the ECCAS-led Peace Consolidation Mission in the Central African Republic 
(MICOPAX), (WELZ, 2018, p.117) which stayed in the country until after the developments 
of the 2013 coup, as we discuss below. 
The crisis that led to Bozizé’s overthrow on March 2013 erupted towards the end of 
the year of 2012, when a rebel group called the Séleka (“alliance” in the local Sango language 
(WELZ, 2016, p. 11), it was composed mainly of Muslim anti-government militias on a ma-
joritarian Christian country), under the lead of Michel Djotodia advanced towards Bangui, the 
country’s capital. After efforts by Chadian and South African troops helped by providing 
military pressure, the ECCAS facilitated peace arrangements that led to a new peace agree-
ment in January 2013 (WELZ, 2018, p. 120). However, the period of peace was short lived 
and the Séleka succeeded to overthrow Bozizé and Djotodia declared himself the new presi-
dent on March 25, 2013.  
The coup generated different understandings among regional peers. The AU immedi-
ately condemned the power seizures accordingly with its normative framework on UCGs, and 
decided to suspend the CAR, and to impose sanctions, including travel ban and asset freeze, 
on leaders of the Séleka group, besides encouraging its member states to isolate the perpetra-
tors of the UCG66. However, as Welz points out, the ECCAS’ leaders ended up de facto sup-
porting Djotodia’s coup as they recognized his lead and “considered him as less problematic 
than Bozizé” (WELZ, 2018, p. 120). 
Already at the ground with MICOPAX’ troops and police officers since 2008, ECCAS 
continued its negotiations independently, and at its Summit of April 18, the sub-regional or-
ganization managed to stablish an agreed work plan for a transition a in the country, which 
recognized Djotodia’s election for the Head of the National Transition Council and gave the 
country 18 months to work on it, through its N’Djamena Declaration (CHAD, 2013). The 
Summit also requested AU’s support to the MICOPAX, a support for ECCAS’ leadership on 
negotiations (WELZ, 2018, p. 123). 
ECCAS decision clearly contradicts the AU normative, but the AU was at some level 
forced to recognize ECCAS’ efforts, even though the suspensions were not lifted to this tran-
sitional government and the continental bloc initiated a process of trying to lead the negotia-
tions. Similarly to the Madagascar case, the AU instituted an International Contact Group 
(ICG-CAR)67, which was composed of different countries over its meetings through the years, 
 
66 Cf. PSC Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCLXIII), 25 March 2013. 
67 The decision to stablish the ICG was taken om the 366th meeting of the PSC on April 16th, 2013, cf. 




but constant members were the ECCAS countries, UNSC countries, African regional powers 
such as Nigeria and South Africa, and even other global regional powers such as Brazil, India 
and Japan68. International organizations such as the EU, the OIF, the International Conference 
on the Great Lakes Region, the African Development Bank, the World Bank, and the UN, 
which also had its own operations on the ground during the conflict also participated on the 
group. Even though the CAR is also a member of the CEN-SAD REC, we found no evidence 
or mention to it during this period. 
Welz (2018, p.123-124) additionally points out that the ECCAS’ request for support 
nonetheless ended up opening the door for the AU to take over, as the situation of violent civil 
conflict worsened. On June 17, 2013, the PSC approved the establishment of an African-led 
International Support Mission for the Central African Republic (MISCA for its French acro-
nym), constituted by the contingents serving under the MICOPAX and added personnel69. 
Then, on September 2013, concertation meetings between the AU and ECCAS were held in 
Addis Ababa, regarding the transition process from MICOPAX to MISCA70, and on Decem-
ber, the AU announced the transfer of authority71. 
Even though the organizations have managed to coordinate efforts, it was not without 
friction. Welz’ work (2014; 2016; 2018) highlights the constant competition between ECCAS 
and the AU, and as much as the sub-regional bloc gave way to the AU operation, it also man-
aged to retain influence of the events, by appointing a special representative office that re-
mained in the CAR, and by maintaining strategic control, as they were the main troop provid-
ers for MISCA (WELZ, 2018, p. 125). The author also affirms that the tension between the 
AU and ECCAS provoked consequences as “they delayed the MICOPAX–MISCA transfor-
mation, thus leaving a political vacuum. That in turn led to (or at least failed to halt) the dete-
rioration of the security situation” (WELZ, 2016, p.13), as amid the concertation between the 
 
May 3rd. See also the press statement for its inaugural meeting, available at: 
<https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/press-statement-gic-rca-03-05-2013.pdf>. 
68 The meetings Communiqués present slightly different compositions over time, but that demonstrate 
the international community engagement with the serious conflict over time. For more infor-




69 Cf. PSC Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.1(CCCLXXX), 17 June 2013. 
70 See also the documents on the transition process available at: <http://www.ceeac-
eccas.org/images/traites/conclusions_UA_CEEAC.pdf> 





RO’s, the CAR then faced another menace, the rise of the “anti-Balaka” group a revenge 
movement against the Séleka.  
With the worsening of the conditions, the ECCAS once again managed to sustain its 
influence on the CAR, taking a lead as its members were responsible to negotiate and pressure 
president Djotodia to step down from power on January 2014, as he was seen as unable to 
restore the order in the country (WELZ 2016; 2018). Consequently, a new transitional gov-
ernment was constituted, but with the grave state of circumstances, intervention was taken 
over by other international actors, such as the UN, the EU and France, CAR’s former colonial 
power.  
As the UN approved the deployment of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrat-
ed Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) on April 2014, the AU 
military operation finally was absorbed by the global organization on September 2014 
(WELZ, 2018, p.129). Reports from the ISS Africa also affirm that from that moment on, 
“ECCAS and the AU then resorted to playing second fiddle, until the AU decided to revive 
the CAR peace process with its Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the CAR, starting in 
late 2016” (ISS, 2019b). MINUSCA remains in the CAR as of December 201972, since the 
political and security scenarios continue to be precarious nowadays, but following the suc-
cessful realization of the 2016 elections, the country was finally readmitted to the AU and the 
sanctions were lifted73.  
Results: 
 As Welz (2016) underscores, the AU, ECCAS and also the UN felt responsible for 
crisis management in the CAR, according to their own mandates, and were willing to take the 
lead, “albeit not consistently over time” (WELZ, 2016, p. 13). The perception of a variance of 
position through a time lapse is an important observation for the reflections on organizational 
behavior. 
When the coup broke out in 2013, ECCAS had already been dealing with the delicate 
situation on the ground for a while since the establishment of MICOPAX and therefore the 
sub-regional bloc demonstrated a reluctance to relinquish power over the negotiations to the 
AU. The different understandings on procedures after the coup between the organization also 
generated frictions while the AU followed its UCG normative, suspended the CAR and called 
upon the restoration of the constitutional order; and ECCAS recognized Djotodia, while 
 
72 For more information on the MINUSCA numbers, see also the UN’s official webpage on 
<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusca>. 




working on a plan to restore the order to the country. The common ground between the organ-
izations was therefore to cooperate to protect peace and restore stability to the CAR. 
Regarding horizontal overlaps among RECs, we found no evidence of action from the 
CEN-SAD, and therefore no interaction with ECCAS or the AU. As of other regional organi-
zations, the OIF suspended the CAR from its activities as a sanction following the 2013 coup 
(OIF, 2013), as did the AU, but considering the mediation efforts, the frictions over leadership 
were locally concentrated on the ECCAS-AU axis. Internationally, a competition between the 
AU and the UN can also be perceived, and even though this relationship is not the focus of 
our analysis, we cannot disregard that it also presented itself as a factor for deepening the 
competition between the AU and ECCAS. Since the African continental bloc strived to be 
recognized as a force for peace and security in the region, it tended to search for leadership 
roles, which in turn, provided friction with ECCAS. 
The CAR case is extremely complex, a fact that is clearly demonstrated by the fact 
that the country was only admitted back to the AU almost three years after the coup, in 2016; 
and the constant scene of social and political crises that have lasted decades. We did not in-
tend to exhaust its particularities on this analysis, as we focus on the relationship between the 
AU and the RECs, but some factors had a clear impact on the outcomes, both of the conflict 
negotiations, and of organizational behavior. 
 One point that that cannot be disregarded is the “clear regional dimension” of the 
CAR’s crisis, as stated by Meyer (2015). In many ways, the organizational behavior during 
the overlapping mandates was influenced by the regional context and the positions taken not 
only by the country’s neighbors74, but also by important international players such as France 
or the UN, which had important roles on support and troops deployment.  
Lastly, we underscore the high military character of the interventions used in the CAR 
case. The different mission take-overs, first by the AU upon ECCAS, and then by the UN 
 
74 For instance, the CAR conflict has intense links with ECCAS’ member Chad’s politics. As Welz 
(2014), the country has been perceived as much “as a part of the problem as a contributor to the 
solution”, as for instance it for years seized control over the CAR situation. It first backed Bozizé’s 
coup in 2003 and then recognized Djotodia’s leadership in 2013. The countries links go deeper as 
reportedly opposition to Chadian governments have been formed and based in the CAR, (WELZ, 
2014, p. 608), which together with economic and securitary elements, justifies the strong interests 
among them. While we acknowledge the profound connection between countries and how these 
relationships can constitute causalities for the outcomes, we focus our analysis on the types organ-
izational behavior during the conflict, and therefore for further information, see case specific lit-
erature, such as the mentioned works by Welz, Meyer and  also the International Crisis Group Re-





upon the AU, represent moments where the organizations are forced to cooperate (even if at 
some point they strive to take the lead), and where they admit that the transfer of authority 
could grant that the organization with more access to financial, human, political and techno-
logical resources and experience handles the situation. Thus, considering the gravity of the 
situation on the CAR and the need of military intervention, the take-overs represent more than 
a situation of blockade between ROs, as they acknowledge the different capabilities on the 
ground of each organization, that should be considered, as Welz (2018) recognizes.  
 
3.2.5 Northern Africa 
 
 It is very common on African literature to find a separation between the Sub-Saharan 
part of the continent and the Northern one. That is because the North of Africa is composed 
mainly of Arab countries with a common ethnical background, separated geographically of 
the “black Africa” by the Sahara Desert. This division is also understandable as we regard the 
particularities of the sub-region, that has very close ties with Middle Eastern states, congre-
gated at the Arab League. 
Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia are a part of Northern Africa. 
Mauritania, on Western Africa, could be considered as a Northern African country also, as 
does the UNECA, due to its ties to AMU and the Arab League, as we previously mentioned, 
even if it is technically mostly in sub-Saharan Africa, with a large part of desertic territory. 
The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, which is a partially recognized state, member of the 
AU, is also on Northern Africa, but its territories, on Western Sahara, are occupied by Moroc-
co and a source of conflict for the integration of the sub-region75. 
 Regarding the mandates of the RECs, the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and the Com-
munity of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) are the sub-regional groupings present at the 
region and none of them has a clear mandate on unconstitutional changes of government. 
More than that, both ROs have been described by the literature as “slumbering” RECs 
(BACH, 2016, p.95), as their activities have been limited. Bach (2016) affirms that “the AMU 
has not even been able to function as a regional political forum due to political tensions over 
 
75 Morocco left the AU in 1984 in protest against the recognition of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic 
Republic (SADR) and was the only African state that was not a member of the continental organi-
zation until rejoining in 2017. The scenario of divergent opinions over the sovereignty of the terri-
tory of Western Sahara have been a decisive factor of complication on sub-regional relations in 





Western Sahara and poor relations with Libya” while CEN-SAD,  created by Libya’s Muam-
mar Gaddafi, suffered greatly after the “dramatic exit of its patron and financier” (BACH, 
2016, p.95). 
 The intense event that Bach refers to is the ousting and posterior assassination of Gad-
dafi on the occasion of the uprisings in 2011, after 42 years in power. The rebellions in Libya 
occurred on the context of the “Arab Spring”, a series of protests and uprisings that spread 
across North Africa in 2011 and led to the fall of the governments of Tunisia, Libya and 
Egypt. At the occasion, the AU did not condemn the ousting of governments according to its 
politics against unconstitutional changes of government76, interpreting that the events were 
derived from popular uprisings, and therefore, respected the people’s “desire for democra-
cy”77, which opened a new precedent for the rule which is upon debate to this date78. 
 In fact, in terms of democracy, Northern Africa has one of the longest running ruler’s 
rates in all of the continent, which also helps the understanding of why the RECs of this sub-
region have shown no mandates on this area. For instance, the presidents of Tunisia, Egypt 
and Libya that fell in the Arab Spring of 2011 had been in power for 23, 30 and 42 years, re-
spectively. As for the other countries, Morocco is a constitutional monarchy, where the king 
has executive and legislative powers, and king Mohammed VI has been the ruler for 20 years, 
since the death of his father; while in Algeria and Sudan, their presidents fell in 2019 after 20 
and 30 years in command. 
Table 2 (p.62) also shows only one relevant case treated as an UCG by the AU in 
Northern Africa: Egypt 2013. At the occasion, on July 3, the Egyptian army deposed presi-
dent elect Mohamed Morsi79 and the coup provoked mixed reactions from the international 
community (BAMIDELE, O.; AYODELE, B., 2018)80. The case presented particularities on 
the interpretation of the UCG norm, raising the debate over popular uprisings once more, as 
 
76 This does not mean, however, that the AU did not condemn the violence in these countries. The 
Libyan events prompted reactions not only from the AU but also interventions from international 
actors such as NATO and the UNSC, for example. For more on the subject see KASAIJA, P. The 
African Union (AU), the Libya Crisis and the notion of ‘African solutions to African problems’, 
Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 31:1, 117-138, 2013. 
77 Cf. PSC Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.(CCLX), 16 February 2011. 
78 See also: BAMIDELE, O.; AYODELE, B.. In the Service of Democratic Governance: The African 
Union Normative Framework on Unconstitutional Change of Government and ECOWAS Protocol 
on Good Governance and Democracy in the Post-Arab Spring. Journal of Asian and African Stud-
ies, 53(1), 132–146.2018. 
79 For more information on the events of the coup, cf. “President Morsi overthrown in Egypt” availa-
ble in https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/07/20137319828176718.html 
80 As the authors put it “Although many in the international community did not condemn it, neither did 




the military argued they were acting on behalf of the population and many countries did not 
manage to condemn the coup itself (TOLERA, 2018). 
 Regarding our research object, however, the particularity lies on the fact that none of 
the RECs (neither AMU, nor CEN-SAD) had their own mandates on the issue of democratic 
crises, therefore generating no de jure overlappings. As the political context of the region de-
scribed above denotes, the agenda of the sub-regional groupings had not been centered on 
democracy protection or promotion, as in other parts of Africa. The case analysis on Northern 
Africa could then have been studied under the perspective of a mandate created by the princi-
ple of subsidiarity of the African Union, which would generate a de facto overlapping man-
date as it delegates a role on mediation to the RECs. However, due to the sub-groupings’ 
dormant status, we found no evidence of the evocation of the principle of subsidiarity, nor 
other sub-regional action on the matter81. 
 It then does not completely fulfill the scope conditions for the analysis as the overlap-
ping scenario did not exist de jure nor de facto. For this reason, this case will not be described 
in depth as the ones in previous regions, since we cannot observe the behaviors of overlapping 
ROs, as the overlapping per se did not exist. The perceived result therefore is that the sub-
regional groupings showcase a non-existent rather than a passive behavior, derived from the 
absence of their mandate and their organizational paralysis, while the AU took the lead by 
applying the normative framework on unconstitutional changes of government and suspend 
Egypt82. 
 
3.3 Partial Analysis 
 
Having presented the complex and multiple dynamics of the sub-regions of the Afri-
can continent, we reiterate the research choice to horizontally cover all the parts, in order to 
observe different organizational behaviors and not to produce conclusions based on a single or 
specific experience. While we further develop what types of behavior were identified and the 
 
81 In June 2019, ISS Africa produced an interesting report on how the northern part of the continent 
could benefit from a functioning REC, considering that the AMU has not had high level meetings 
since 2008, and no other REC has taken or been able to take responsibility for primarily ensuring 
peace and security in Northern Africa. Cf. ISS Africa. North Africa could benefit from a function-
ing regional organization. PSC Report. 10 June 2019. Available at 
<https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/north-africa-could-benefit-from-a-functioning-
regional-organisation>.  




dyadic relationships between ROs on chapter 5, on this section we present a partial analysis of 
the findings from Africa. 
First, while on chapter 2 we have traced the institutionalization of regional projects 
back to the independence of the African countries, this chapter provides a clearer understand-
ing that the notion of regionalism was not always accompanied by the ideal of democratic 
protection as it is currently strongly linked. This fact is underscored by the perception of a 
normative evolution, specially from the 2000s, and its different instances, as even RECs that 
had initial mandates strictly focused on economic issues have managed to develop provisions 
on the matter. 
Although one of the justifications for the establishment of a mandate on political crises 
by regional economic integration projects relies on the democratic value for the promotion of 
economic development, the concept of democracy is also strongly linked to the ones of peace 
and security, as seen on the ECCAS and SADC cases, for example, which denotes the deep 
link of the ideal with the perception of stability. This notion is also confirmed by the fact that 
at the institutional level, the organ of the AU responsible for the implementation of sanctions 
after an UCG has taken place is the Peace and Security Council, as we have described above. 
Regarding the African Union’s normative development, some considerations should 
be made. The continental organization has managed to take a solid stand against UCGs by 
coining the term and reinforcing its provisions over the years. The existing framework is very 
direct on listing what ruptures of the constitutional order should be addressed by the Union 
and what are the organizational procedures to follow at the bureaucratic level for the condem-
nation. 
However, at the same time that the documents have presented a feasible evolution, 
there are still some flaws to be addressed by the Union. A critic that has been made through 
the literature speaks to the fact that the provisions only directly tackle the problem of UCGs 
once they have already occurred, being “much weaker, by contrast, on measures to promote 
good governance in normal times (i.e. in the absence of major upheaval)” (HARTMANN, 
2013; STODDARD, 2017). Thus, AU’s actions on UCG remain reactive rather than becom-
ing preventive. 
Additionally, another problem can be illustrated by the number of cases that did not 
get listed as UCGs due to the difficulties of applying the framework. We mentioned through 




Arab Spring in Tunisia, Lybia and Egypt in 2011, but even those are not the only cases that 
have prompted an AU intervention over the past years83.  
Consequently, there is a perceived gap between policy creation and implementation in 
Africa. This gap is also a result of two complementary factors regarding democratic concepts: 
for once, when it comes to definitions, even if the African Charter provides a list of principles 
concerning the meaning of “democracy”, among AU countries and sub-regions there is a huge 
variation regarding the presence and implementation of democratic regimes. Thus, achieving 
consensus between states and ROs on what is acceptable or how to act becomes difficult and 
subject to interpretation. For example, while the Burundian case violated the norms when 
Nkuruzinza decided to run for a third term, on neighboring Rwanda President Paul Kagame 
managed change the constitution on the same year of 2015 and he is currently saving his third 
term in office.  
On table 4, Hartmann (2017) illustrates the differences on “democratic density” be-
tween African sub-regions by evaluating the average years in office of the heads of state of 
the RECs in the sub-Saharan part of the continent. Even though North Africa is not listed, the 
compilated data presented on the previous section demonstrated that among AMU countries, 
until recent events such as the Arab Spring, governments were lasting 20, 30, even 42 years 
on the case of Libya. The approach on leadership transitions is thus presented here as an indi-
cator for the different understandings of “democracy” among the sub-regions that play an im-
portant role on the interpretation of UCG cases. 
 
Table 4 – “Democratic Density” on African sub-regions 






Source: HARTMANN, 201784.  
 
 
83 For instance, on a brief mapping, we have also identified the AU’s intervention in Comoros (2007), 
Somalia (2007), and Sudan (2006), but due to their characteristics of peacekeeping missions on the 
account of civil wars or rebel conflicts, they are not integrated under the same framework as 
UCGs, even if their motivations threaten the legitimacy of the central power of those countries. 
84 Hartmann clarifies that his calculations refer to January 2017 and do not consider Gambia’s 
Jammeh’s presidency nor data for Somalia; and that for parliamentary states such as Ethiopia, Le-




Moreover, the second factor represents a practical flaw derived from the shortage of a 
definition of what conditions represent that the constitutional order has been restored after the 
UCG intervention. This position is also sustained by Dersso (2017), that argues that in some 
cases, the understanding meant the restoration of the ousted head of state, while in others, like 
the Madagascar case, it was the realization of free elections. Thus, procedurally, the regional 
organizations are not yet consistent on a route to follow, adapting to the conditions on the 
ground. While this adjusting can be beneficial by addressing direct needs, it also has conse-
quences on a scenario of overlapping competencies, since with an open space to act and nego-
tiate, frictions can emerge with the sub-regional ROs on procedures, and cause the delay or 
inefficiency on the conflict resolution, as several of the cases have shown. The two above-
mentioned factors can be further understood as we advance to the analysis of the sub-regions 
and their role on political crises.  
A very important particularity of the African continent for the studies of overlapping 
regionalism is the role played by the AU on intending to organize the relationship among the 
sub-regional blocs. In theory, by regulating the interplays, organizational behavior would be-
come more predictable and cooperative, but the available standards have demonstrated to be 
still insufficient.  Even though the RECs technically function as subsidiary bodies of the AU 
in the sub-regions in many aspects, they are independent bodies and have discretion to act. 
Thus, the unclear division of labor, in spite of the principle of subsidiarity, makes the imple-
mentation of the norms subject to the specifities of each sub-region’s political will. 
Furthermore and according to the different interpretations on democracy, there is also 
a notorious difference between normative provisions on UCGs at the sub-regional level: while 
ECOWAS has clear provisions, SADC and ECCAS have managed to develop mandates 
linked to their peace and security institutions, the EAC only mentions democracy as a princi-
ple for the organization and AMU has no provisions. The other three RECs which were not 
involved on the available cases are CEN-SAD, which has no democratic provisions due to its 
own political background, as we have already mentioned; and COMESA and IGAD, which 
have included the promotion of democracy, good governance and the rule of law on their 
mandates, with early warning mechanisms and security units, but no provisions specifically 




85 For more information on their Peace and Security instances, see <http://www.igadssp.org> for 





Table 5 – Compilation of the sub-regional normative framework on UCGs 
Regional Economic Community 
Provisions on democracy 
(as principle/an element 
for peace and security) 
Direct addressment of 
UCGs 
AMU No No 
CEN-SAD No No 
COMESA Yes No 
EAC Yes/No No 
ECCAS Yes No 
ECOWAS Yes Yes 
IGAD Yes No 
SADC Yes No 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
 Having a normative framework is definitely a first step but having the capability to 
execute it is also something that differs starkly among the RECs. For instance, SADC and 
ECCAS might have found a similar way of justifying their mandates but their capacities on 
the ground are very different due to the economic, political and security conditions surround-
ing the member states that compose the organizations. Furthermore, the presented cases have 
shown that the normative framework is not a conditioning factor for action, as ECOWAS is 
the only sub-regional bloc that directly addresses UCGs, and the EAC led the mediation on 
Burundi, even without a normative provision on democratic interventions. 
 At the same time, the existence of a normative framework in the sub-regions presented 
a clear connection with the cases’ outcomes and the organizational behaviors. To exemplify, 
ECOWAS has the better institutionalized provisions on UCGs, the highest democratic density 
from table 4 and it is the REC that has reacted to and condemned more political crises over 
the past years. On the other hand, the AMU has no provisions, has the lowest democratic den-
sity and has not acted; and the EAC that also has no provisions did act, but did not manage to 
condemn an UCG, which was precisely the reason for the AU deadlock. As for the other re-
gions that do have frameworks on democracy protection but not on UCGs, the absence of an 
institutionalized approach has demonstrated to limit the capacity of action upon a conflict to 
the mercy of the involved political actors. 
 Regarding the division of labor among the horizontally overlapping RECs, there is 
also no definition of which of the blocs should be in charge of the negotiations when a coun-
try is a member of more than one. To cite the Burundian case again, since the EAC had no 
provisions, the crisis could have been also dealt with by COMESA or ECCAS, the two other 




“driving seat” on the negotiations, and interestingly, none of the analyzed cases presented 
horizontal competition. 
 As for the relationship between the AU and the RECs on the vertical overlappings, the 
general finding affirmed that the overlappings, de jure or de facto, have propelled the sub-
regional blocs to strongly position themselves in order to have their leadership recognized. 
This situation occasioned competition through cooperation, deadlocks and delays, and even 
fragmented cohesion in some points, as the sub-regional ROs tend to see themselves in a bet-
ter position to act, closer to the sub-regions’ interests. 
Thus, the existing normative framework presents the need not only of better defini-
tions but of the harmonization of them and their policies at the regional and sub-regional lev-
els. Still, on a positive note, the Gambian case demonstrates that the concertation between 
regional organizations can also be achieved through experience and learning: as ECOWAS 
has dealt with more cases and developed a more solid stand against the UCGs, after many 
frictions, the AU seems to have learned how to cooperate with ECOWAS without delegiti-
mizing the other bloc’s actions or its own. In fact, synergic cooperation has actually legiti-





4 OVERLAPPING ORGANIZATIONS AND POLITICAL CRISES IN SOUTH 
AMERICA 
 
 On the first chapter we presented an introductory definition of what would be taken 
under the category of analysis of political crisis on this thesis: democratic ruptures and the 
disruption of the constitutional order. While on the previous chapter the regional context of 
Africa presented the need to establish criteria to slim case selection through the choice of ana-
lyzing Unconstitutional Changes of Government (UCGs), on this chapter we similarly present 
the criteria and the normative framework on democratic protection in South America, before 
moving on to case study. 
 Regional organizations in the American continent do not present the same normative 
specificity of addressing UCGs, but, instead, almost all of them have managed to install dem-
ocratic commitments, both as a membership criterium, and as mandate. The adoption of the 
so-called Democratic Clauses is then the normative framework envisioned for this chapter, in 
a symmetry accordance with the African criteria, as they both take a stand against disruptions 
of the constitutional order and enunciate the procedures to be taken by the ROs. 
 Upon studying the regional context, some common features become noticeable, as for 
instance the occurrence of authoritarian regimes through the 1960s until the 1980s on almost 
all of the South American Countries86, and the democratization processes developed on the 
1990s, as shown on Table 6, on the next page. Thus, the region was also impacted at the end 
of the Cold War by the “third wave of democratization” (HUNTINGTON, 1991) that we pre-
viously mentioned for Africa, and its effects can be perceived on the formation of regional 
preferences and standards on democracy that followed. 
 For instance, the adoption of Democratic Clauses was traced as a consequence to this 
democratization process, as a way to regionally avoid the repetition of autocratic govern-
ments. In fact, Closa, Palestini and Ortiz (2016, p.27) affirm that in the 1990s there was a per-
ception that “economic integration and democratization were mutually reinforcing processes”, 
which was supported by initiatives from the United States “designed to promote free trade, 
hemispheric integration, and the promotion of democracy in Latin America”87.  
 
86 Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2014) affirm that the only countries in Latin America that have not 
underwent an autocratic regime at this period were Colombia and Venezuela. Nevertheless, we 
found no data as well for Guyanan regimes to be added to table 6. 
87 The authors illustrate this affirmation with the proposition of the Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(FTAA or ALCA), that we mentioned on chapter 2. Even though it ended up not being concre-

















Source: author’s compilation, partially based on MAINWARING; PÉREZ-LIÑÁN, 2014. 
 
 Therefore, when refining the criteria for the case selection, we acknowledged the 
timeframe of the 1990s as the first moment that mandates were clearly established on democ-
racy protection in South America, even if the ROs that were created prior to this moment, 
such as the Organization of the American States or the Andean Pact had already mentioned it 
among its principles before. However, due to the time elapsed from the first democratic com-
mitments until their ratification and entry into force, research demonstrated that the overlap-
ping mandates on democracy promotion and protection were only consolidated on the 2000s. 
Since we also consider overlapping actions, we traced the possible cases of concurrent inter-
ventions prior to the ratifications, but the data also demonstrated to not fit the scope condi-
tions, as we discuss below. 
 All things considered, the final research cut then addresses political crises such as 
democratic ruptures that have caused the disruption and questioned the legitimacy of the con-
stitutional order, based on the  definitions ratified on the Democratic Clauses, also known as 
Mechanisms for Democracy Protection (MDPs) (CLOSA, PALESTINI, ORTIZ, 2016). As 
the object of this study are the possible behaviors of regional organizations in overlapping 
situations, the cases also had to fit these scope conditions, and provide behaviors for the anal-
ysis. 
For the chapter’s development, we bring back the three questions that have guided the 
African normative study, before moving on to case analysis: 
1- What are the norms that define the need of action in the case of a political crisis?  
 
88 Table 6 presents a compilation of the period where military/ authoritarian governments were in 
power in South America, even though some countries presented brief returns to the democratic 




2- In what context were these norms created?  
3- What are the procedures that follow once a case is identified? 
The data collection also followed the same criteria from the previous chapter, by using 
primary sources, such as the documents of the ROs, and secondary ones, with case specific 
literature combined with journalistic articles from the time of the democratic breaches. This 
process was facilitated since unlike Africa, in the case of South America, the recent produc-
tion on the subject has already attempted to systematize the effects of overlapping regionalism 
over the cases of political crises that occurred in recent years, through two main works by 
Brigitte Weiffen (2017) and Detlef Nolte (2018). Additionally, other works such as Hoffmann 
(2016) and Closa, Palestini and Ortiz (2016), have compiled the democratic interventions in 
Latin America. 
 By combining the two literatures on overlapping organizations and on MDPs and in-
terventions, we then reached a list of cases of political crises and attempts that interrupted the 
constitutional order, which can be seen on Appendix D, then filtered the ones whose breaches 
propelled interventions, according to the normative framework, and finally selected the ones 
with overlapping actions or mandates, as shown on table 7 below:  
 
Table 7- Democratic breaches in South America with overlapping ROs 
Country Year Political crisis Regional Organizations 










Questioning of electoral outcome, 






Source: Author’s elaboration, adapting from CLOSA; PALESTINI; ORTIZ, 2016. 
 
While some very interesting works by the literature have also addressed political crises 
such as the Paraguayan attempted coups in 1996 and 200089, and the Bolivian political 
 
89 At the occasion of the first coup attempt, in 1996, General Lino Oviedo, a military chief, threatened 
to oust President Juan Carlos Wasmosy, the first civilian elect president after more than thirty 
years of military rule. Even though the coup failed, Oviedo tried to run for presidency in 1998, but 
was arrested, managing to elect an ally. The political tensions grew over time, and escalated with 
an unrest after the assassination of vice-president Argaña and of protesters in 1999; the resignation 




conundrum of 2008, they do not fall into the scope of this analysis, as they do not fulfill the 
conditions established by the research cut.  
The first one because at the time MERCOSUR did not have a clear mandate over 
democratic ruptures. In fact, it was the coup attempt in Paraguay in 1996 that inspired the 
MERCOSUR’s normative provisions that came after it, starting with a presidential 
declaration, and then a protocol, in 1998. Therefore, as MERCOSUR did not have provisions 
on democracy protection at the time of the first failed coup and they were not in force by the 
second attempt, these cases did not produce a de jure overlapping. We could have considered 
a de facto overlapping between MERCOSUR and the OAS, but while in 1996 the main 
mediators for the crisis that have managed to prevent the coup from happening were 
Brazilian, American and Argentinian diplomats90, in 2000 the ROs took no concrete action to 
mediate the crisis (WEIFFEN, 2017, p.187), exerting only diplomatic pressures. Even though 
mediators from Paraguay’s associates Brazil and Argentina acted on the best interests of 
MERCOSUR, declaring that preventing a coup was essential for the bloc’s activities, the 
interplay was not concentrated between OAS and MERCOSUR, but rather a fruit of 
diplomatic efforts, and thus not as interesting for the analysis of organizational behavior. 
As for the Bolivian crisis, at first, it was first considered to be included on the thesis, 
but it also does not exactly fall on the scope of a democratic rupture as described by the rele-
vant protocols, as it did not consist of a violation such an interruption of the constitutional 
order, a coup nor a removal from power, but represented a domestic conflict that jeopardized 
the legitimacy of the central government, with no success. Since we did not include this type 
of cases for Africa, we also do not include them here91. Even though the political crisis could 
have escalated or could be understood as a risk to the functioning of democratic institutions, 
the role played by the ROs at the time was of support for the central government. Further-
more, legally, only the OAS had established a normative framework at the time, as the CAN 
protocol was not in force, and UNASUR did not have provisions on the matter yet.  
 
with Oviedo), and finally another attempted coup, staged by Oviedo’s followers, ocurred in 2000, 
but managed to be contained. 
90 An interesting article written in 2015 by Marcio de Oliveira Dias, Brazilian former ambassador in 
Paraguay for the “O Globo” newspaper highlights the action of Brazilian diplomat Sebastião do 
Rego Barros Netto, on the negotiations following the coup attempt in 1996. The full story can be 
read at <https://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/artigo-quando-brasil-ajudou-impedir-golpe-de-oviedo-
18166197>. 





While this research cut is centered on democratic ruptures, treated accordingly with 
the regional normative framework in force, we clarify that by listing out these mentioned cas-
es we do not mean to affirm that they had no overlapping actions in place at all, even if no 
overlapping de jure was perceived. The OAS did react to both crises, MERCOSUR member 
states backed up the diplomatic efforts in Paraguay; and UNASUR’s leaders showed capacity 
of agency dealing with Bolivia. It is thus a matter of the type of crises or organizational re-
sponses that did not fit the scope conditions to analyze the ROs’ behaviors. 
If the examples of Paraguay and Bolivia illustrate reasons why cases were cut out of 
the analysis, another event that could have been considered is the impeachment of President 
Dilma Rouseff in Brazil, 2016. Though many affirmed it consisted of a parliamentary coup92, 
the impeachment propelled no overlapping responses or sanctions from the competent ROs, 
as according to the frameworks93. Thus, cases that presented no overlapping were also left out 
as they do not provide organizational behaviors for the analysis. 
In terms of structure, this chapter follows a similar organization to the previous one in 
order to allow a very clear panorama for both regions: first, we address the mechanisms for 
democracy protection issued by continental or the most comprehensive ROs: OAS, CELAC 
and UNASUR, and then proceed to the investigation of sub-regions individually, and the cor-
responding responses for political crises through case analysis. The sub-regional divisions 
address the “Andean” America and the “Southern Cone”, as seen below. 
 
 4.1 Development of the normative provisions on democracy in the American continent 
 
Before advancing to the analysis and development of the normative framework on 
democracy protection in the Americas, it is essential to acknowledge the distinction between 
the composition of the organizational overlaps in Africa and in the Americas. While the simi-
larity between the African Union and the Organization of American States relies on them both 
 
92 On the idea of a parliamentary coup, cf. SANTOS, F; GUARNIERI, F. From Protest to Parliamen-
tary Coup: An Overview of Brazil’s Recent History, Journal of Latin American Cultural Studies, 
25:4, 485-494, 2016. Available at 
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13569325.2016.1230940>. 
93 During the impeachment process some countries and organizations expressed their concern with the 
democratic situation in Brazil and raised the possibility of studying forms of sanction if it was un-
derstood that the removal from office of the president had violated the constitutional order. On this 
topic see also Jornal Nexos’analysis of how UNASUR and the OAS saw the impeachment pro-
cess: <https://www.nexojornal.com.br/expresso/2016/04/17/Como-OEA-e-Unasul-veem-o-
impeachment.-E-qual-o-risco-de-Temer-não-ser-reconhecido>. However, after the process was fi-




being continental groupings, they are not equivalent in a sense that the OAS does not try to 
congregate other sub-regional blocs as an umbrella organization, like the AU. Therefore, de-
scribing different scenario sets allows the consideration of different regional behaviors under 
distinct overlapping conditions. 
Also, as the study of the normative frameworks will further demonstrate, the institu-
tionalization of the MDPs in the Americas follow a different pattern, since the idea of democ-
racy is not directly linked to peace and security, and there is no institution such as the AU’s 
Peace and Security Council neither at the continental nor the sub-regional level. Interventions 
such as the military ones occurred in Africa have never happened in South America, and 
democratic preservation is generally linked with the goal of maintaining stability for econom-
ic development. Even so, the multiplicity of regional propositions constitutes a unique over-
lapping mandate in the Americas, and therefore we analyze its effects by following the princi-
ples of comparative regionalism and studying each region’s own experience. 
While we mapped the regional organizations in Latin America in chapter 2, we identi-
fied the Pan-American ideals and the presence of the United States as a hegemon as a driver 
for the creation of the Organization of the American States in a post-conflict world in 1948. 
Thus, initially with security concerns, OAS ties to democracy go as far as its creation but are 
limited to appearing as a principle in the oldest running regional organization in the Americas.  
With the fragilities the governments of the region underwent with authoritarian re-
gimes and the Cold War, the significative elaboration on the issue came with the democratiza-
tion process and the signature of the Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organiza-
tion of American States “Protocol of Cartagena de Indias”, in 1985. The amendments, which 
entered into force in 1988, further emphasized democracy as a principle for the relationship 
between member states, but also commissioned to the OAS the responsibility to promote and 
consolidate the mentioned value, and described it for the first time, by affirming that “repre-
sentative democracy is an indispensable condition for the stability, peace and development of 
the region” (OAS, 1985). 
The next normative development was the adoption by the OAS General Assembly in 
1991 of Resolution 1980. It was the first document to describe procedures to be followed, 
since it instructed the organization to convene a meeting of the Permanent Council once it had 
identified “any occurrences giving rise to the sudden or irregular interruption of the democrat-
ic political institutional process or of the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically 




then “adopt any decisions deemed appropriate, in accordance with the Charter and interna-
tional law” (OAS, 1991). 
This resolution was subsequently supported by the adoption on the following year of 
the Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American States “Protocol 
of Washington”. The document described the possibility of sanctioning a member state with 
suspension from the organization’s activities, after diplomatic initiatives, if the constituted 
government had been “overthrown by force” (OAS, 1992). After ratification and deposits, the 
Amendment entered in force in 1997.  
One last document that should be highlighted is the Inter-American Democratic Char-
ter (IADC), signed in 2001, which, according to Closa, Palestini and Ortiz, currently consti-
tutes OAS’ “most complete mechanism” for democracy protection. In fact, the IADC enu-
merates what elements are essential for the exercise of representative democracy (art. 3), 
which should include  
“inter alia, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, access to 
and the exercise of power in accordance with the rule of law, the holding of 
periodic, free, and fair elections based on secret balloting and universal suf-
frage as an expression of the sovereignty of the people, the pluralistic system 
of political parties and organizations, and the separation of powers and inde-
pendence of the branches of government” (OAS, 2001). 
 
Articles 4-6 go further to address issues such as transparency in government activities, 
freedom of expression, the strengthening of political parties and the participation of all citi-
zens as a necessary condition for the full exercise of democracy. But it is IADC’s democratic 
clause characteristic that calls the attention, since it enlarged OAS’ scope of action on uncon-
stitutional ruptures. 
Weiffen (2017, p.181-182) explains that the IADC’s adoption followed the necessity 
of addressing other challenges on the region: while in the 1990s the documents targeted the 
sanctioning of coups and coup attempts, the IADC, created in the 2000s, “emerged as a reac-
tion to a different type of threat, the so-called self-coups and other instances of authoritarian 
backsliding of the 1990s”. Therefore, the author highlights the distinction then adopted be-
tween unconstitutional interruptions and alterations, which can be seen as article 17 goes be-
yond rejecting the overthrow of governments by force to also covering threats to the “demo-
cratic political institutional process or its legitimate exercise of power” (OAS, 2001). Addi-
tionally, article 19 further details the actions to be condemned by affirming that facing “an 
unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order or an unconstitutional alteration of the 




sents an “an insurmountable obstacle” for the affected party’s participation in the Organiza-
tion (OAS, 2001). 
The procedures advised on the Charter to be taken after the identification of a breach 
follow the pattern of the previous documents, with the Permanent Council being responsible 
to adopt diplomatic initiatives and take the appropriate decisions. The possibility of sanctions 
is described if those actions fail, with the approval of the General Assembly. By determining 
that there was an interruption of the democratic order of a member state, with an affirmative 
vote of two thirds of the member states, the General Assembly can proceed to suspend the 
affected country, in accordance with the OAS Charter (OAS, 2001, art.21). 
After the OAS, two other regional organizations are endowed with a more comprehen-
sive character in terms of affiliations, but they represent different ideas for the region: while 
the OAS comprehends all of the American Countries, the Community of Latin American and 
Caribbean States excludes the USA and Canada and represents only the Latin countries; and 
Union of South American Nations comprises only the countries of South America. While the 
OAS is a result of the pan-Americanistic trend of organization building we described on chap-
ter 2, the two other initiatives would be a fruit of the Latin conception of the Americas. The 
proposition of this initiatives also come in a much posterior moment, in a different wave of 
regionalism, and this knowledge becomes useful for the understanding of the inspirations be-
hind these regional organizations, their behaviors, and their stand on representing the region. 
Even though UNASUR has a regional dimension more limited than CELAC, we start the 
normative analysis with the first due to temporality reasons.  
So, while introducing UNASUR’s normative provisions, as we have abovementioned, 
we bear in mind its posterior timing and thinking than other provisions here presented and 
consider them as a result of the accumulated knowledge and experiences of the continent, on a 
post-hegemonic regional moment, with social and political inspirations. To illustrate, when 
UNASUR was still an embryo, at the first meeting of South American presidents in 2000, 
inspired by MERCOSUR and CAN’s democratic clauses, that had already been adopted, the 
heads of state issued a declaration where democracy is featured specially in a section, affirm-
ing its value as a clause for participation in any future projects of the region, and an essential 
condition for integration (REUNIÃO…, 2000).   
However, Weiffen (2017, p.183), affirms that the democratic priority that had surged 
in the 1990s after the fall of autocratic governments, prior to the creation of UNASUR had 
lost its salience by the mid-2000s, and thus its Constitutive Treaty of 2008 makes swift men-




2000s comes in a different pattern than in other moments, as seen by the bloc’s constitutive 
agenda. By comparison, the UNASUR Treaty mentions the word five times, while MER-
COSUR’s Asunción Treaty (1991) does not mention it and CAN’s Cartagena Agreement 
(1969) does it once. 
The Treaty stipulates the strengthening of democracy as an objective on article 2 and 
ratifies the full validity of the democratic institutions as an essential condition for the devel-
opment of a common future. It values it as one of its principles, and reaffirms the political and 
social character of the post-hegemonic regional projects by affirming that the political concer-
tation will serve as a way to preserve the democratic values of the member states (art. 14), and 
by indicating the will to reduce the democratic deficit through social participation (art.18) 
(UNASUR, 2008a). 
Nevertheless, shortly after UNASUR’s creation, a political crisis in Bolivia (2008), 
and the attempted coup in Ecuador (2010), propelled the organization to institutionalize its 
democratic concern with the adoption of the Additional Protocol to the Constitutive Treaty of 
UNASUR on Commitment to Democracy, as we further indicate while analyzing the Ecuado-
rian crisis below. The new document, also known as Georgetown Protocol, was signed in No-
vember 2010 and is supposed to be activated in “the event of a breach or threat of a breach of 
the democratic order, a breach of the constitutional order or in any situation that jeopardizes 
the legitimate exercise of power and the validity of democratic values and principles” (UN-
ASUR, 2010, art.1). 
Article 2 allows the affected country or another member state to notify the organiza-
tion upon the occurrence of a situation abovementioned described, that should then be ad-
dressed by the Council of Heads of State and Government (or the Council of Foreign Minis-
ters in the absence of the first), to impose sanctions that can range from: 
 
• Suspension of the right to participate in the different organs and in-
stances of UNASUR, as well as the enjoyment of rights and preroga-
tives within the scope of UNASUR's Constitutive Treaty. 
• Partial or total closure of land borders, including the suspension or 
limitation of trade, air and sea transport, communications, energy 
supply, services and supplies. 
• Promote the suspension of the affected State within the scope of other 
regional and international organizations. 
• Promote, before third countries and / or regional blocs, the suspension 
of the rights and / or prerogatives of the affected State under the co-
operation agreements to which it is a party. 






It is also affirmed that the sanctions should be applied in conjunction with diplomatic 
efforts to restore the order on the affected country (art. 5), but more interestingly, it offered 
the possibility of acting prior to the violations, by recurring to the Council of Heads of State 
and Government to “require concrete concerted cooperation measures and UNASUR's pro-
nouncement to defend and preserve its democratic institutions” (UNASUR, 2010, art.6). 
The Additional Protocol should enter into force after the ratification and deposit of the 
instruments of nine out of the twelve member states of the bloc. The landmark was achieved 
in February 2014, with Uruguay’s ratification94 and deposit, since Guyana, Peru, Chile, Ar-
gentina, Venezuela, Surinam, Ecuador and Bolivia had previously done it. As for the remain-
ing countries, Brazil managed to internalize the democratic clause in 201895, but likewise Co-
lombia and Paraguay, we found no evidence of the deposit of the instruments afterwards. 
Accordingly, UNASUR’s democratic clause was not in force at the moment any of the 
crises analyzed by this chapter started, becoming valid amid the Venezuelan political stability 
in 2014. Nonetheless, ever since its creation, UNASUR sought to be a political voice for 
South America, producing thus overlappings in action to be analyzed on the next sections. 
Finally, the last regional mechanism of continental dimensions is the CELAC, which 
has similar foundational inspirations to UNASUR, in terms of political and social commit-
ments, but it has not managed to become institutionalized, as the other organizations. Upon its 
creation in 2011, the Caracas Declaration “In the Bicentenary of the Struggle for Independ-
ence Towards the Path of Our Liberators” made references to the democratic values and de-
mocracy strengthening (CELAC, 2011a), but did not establish a normative framework for 
democracy protection.  
The Special Declaration about the Defense of Democracy and Constitutional Order in 
the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States was additionally signed in Caracas, 
adopting a democratic clause for the organization that enables the affected state to notify the 
Pro Tempore Presidency, in order to preserve the democratic stability (CELAC, 2011b). Once 
a violation is recognized, CELAC should perform diplomatic efforts for the restoration and 
could then impose a suspension from the organization as a sanction. Closa, Palestini and Ortiz 
(2016, p.44) note, however the “unusual character” of CELAC, as it “does not have a consti-
tutive treaty of hard law in the strict sense” and thus its Special Declaration “does not have 
 
94 The official communiqué issued by the Uruguayan Ministry of Foreign Affairs can be read at 
<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-relaciones-exteriores/comunicacion/noticias/uruguay-deposita-
instrumento-de-ratificacion-del-protocolo-democratico-de>.  




the status of a norm of international law, so that, strictly speaking, it cannot be called a demo-
cratic clause”. 
Having analyzed the normative framework of the most comprehensive regional organ-
izations, we move to the analysis of the sub-regional blocs and their democratic crises’ re-
sponse mechanisms on the next sections. 
 
4.2 Sub-regional provisions, responses and case analysis 
 
Another relevant difference between Africa and the Americas is the form we have 
chosen to present and work with subregions, since we have chosen to work with South Amer-
ica as a regional case, and not the whole continent, as we mentioned on chapter 1. The expla-
nation for this choice relies on the understanding presented on chapter 2 that the institution 
building in Latin America was based on a logic of disaggregation, in interconnected sub-
regions such as the Andean America, the Caribbean, Central America, Southern Cone, North-
ern America (PHILLIPS, 2005). Additionally, upon constructing the regional mapping, the 
inductive research demonstrated that the dynamics of each sub-region are very particular, with 
different geopolitical and economic underlying conditions, and that South America presented 
a great complexity on its own, with different overlapping organizations. Besides, including 
Central America, the Caribbean or Northern America would introduce a distortion element, as 
the United States plays a hegemonic role that is more strongly perceived on the countries of 
those sub-regions than in South America due to economic dependencies that could influence 
the outcomes of ROs’ behaviors. 
If we started this section by mentioning one difference between the two regional cases 
of study, one similarity perceived would be the fluidity of the sub-regions and how states see 
themselves as belonging to them. As a form of illustration, the African analysis demonstrated 
that one country can be perceived as an Eastern and as a Southern country at the same time 
and dividing sub-regions in South America was equally as challenging. For instance, Vene-
zuela is geographically an Andean and a Caribbean country, but is a member state to the 
Southern Cone regional organization, MERCOSUR. 
Therefore, when dividing the sub-regions’ sections, we considered the regional organ-
izations that are located on its geographical space and placed the within case analysis accord-
ingly to the most relevant ROs involved on the overlapping crisis mediation. To resume with 
the Venezuelan example, the political crisis occurred in the country from 2013 onwards (here 




country’s physical location and even due to its ALBA membership, but as a member of 
MERCOSUR, and considering this RO’s prominent role on the crisis, it is thus presented on 
the Southern Cone section. 
The countries geographically located on the Andean sub-region are Bolivia, Chile, Co-
lombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela and for the normative framework study, the ROs’ pro-
visions of CAN, ALBA-TCP and the Pacific Alliance, are explored. As for the Southern 
Cone, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay are physically on the sub-region, and Venezuela 
is included by its affiliation to MERCOSUR, the applicable sub-regional organization. Guy-
ana and Surinam are the only two out of the twelve South American countries that are not a 
part of those sub-regions, since they are not members to the mentioned sub-regional process, 
albeit being associate members of MERCOSUR, but are members to the regional blocs UN-
ASUR, CELAC and OAS. 
One last relevant piece of information is that in South America there is no such thing 
as a subsidiarity principle, as the one adopted by the AU and its RECs, and therefore no hier-
archy of action among ROs. 
 
4.2.1 The Andean sub-region 
In 1969, the Andean Pact, predecessor of the Andean Community, was created through 
the signing of the Cartagena Agreement. At this first moment, the regional organization 
affirmed to be sustained by the principles of equality, justice, peace, solidarity and democracy 
(CAN, 2019), and was composed by Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela, 
that adhered to the RO in 1973. Chile left the organization in 1976, but with the decline of the 
dictatorships that had affected the member states through the continent during the following 
decade, in 1980, the heads of State signed the Conduct Letter of Riobamba, which reaffirmed 
the sub-regional integration bloc’s principles and described as a goal the type of  political 
order to be promoted, “generated in a democracy of popular extraction and defined 
participatory character, without prejudice to the principles of self-determination of peoples, 
non-intervention and ideological pluralism” (CAN, 1980). 
 This definition of democracy contained on the Conduct Letter was one of the most 
descriptive ones seen on the normative frameworks at its time, undoubtfully very forward, as 
the majority of the neighboring countries were still experiencing autocratic regimes. However, 
the democratic commitment only advances into a formal legal instrument almost two decades 




occurred on the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, sought to prevent authoritarian rules on the sub-
region. 
 In 2000, following a Presidential Declaration on Democracy and Integration of 1998, 
the CAN adopted the Additional Protocol to the Cartagena Agreement “the Andean 
Community Commitment on Democracy”. This document affirms the consolidation of 
democracy and the rule of law as a foreign policy objective of the organization and establishes 
a mandate to act upon a rupture of the democratic order (CAN, 2000, art.3). The described 
procedures to follow the confirmation of a breach include the adoption of sanctions that might 
include:  
a. The suspension of the participation of the member state in any of the 
organs of the Andean Integration System; 
b. The suspension of participation in international cooperation projects 
developed by member states; 
c. The extension of the suspension to other organs of the System, 
including the disqualification of access to facilities or loans by the 
Andean financial institutions; 
d. Suspension of rights derived from the Cartagena Agreement and 
consultation of an external action in other areas; and 
e. Other measures and actions that are considered relevant in accordance 
with International Law. (CAN, 2000, art. 4). 
Conversely, the Additional Protocol has never been applied, even upon the occurrence 
of political crises on member states after its adoption. Article 9 explains that the document 
should enter into force when all member states have deposited the instrument of ratification at 
the General Secretariat of the CAN. Since Venezuela left the organization in 2006, Peru 
(2000), Bolivia (2001) and Ecuador (2003) have completed the procedures, but the CAN 
archives do not include the Colombian instruments96. Mapping the internalization at the 
national level in Colombia, it was possible to identify that the law managed to be approved 
with reservations by the Constitutional Court in 200497, but there is no evidence that the 
country finalized the deposit of the instruments, thus rendering the Additional Protocol not yet 
valid, a possible causality for its non-application. 
The other ROs to which the Andean countries are also affiliated are the Pacific 
 
96 The complete list of deposited instruments of the Andean Community can be accessed on 
<http://www.comunidadandina.org/Normativa.aspx?link=ID>. 
97 The Colombian Constitutional Court was critic of the absence of a definition of what could be con-
sidered a “rupture of the democratic order” and rejected the possibility of external intervention 





Alliance, composed by Chile, Colombia, Peru, and the external partner, Mexico; and the 
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), to which Venezuela is a full 
member, together with eight Central American and Caribbean countries98, since Ecuador and 
Bolivia have withdrawn their memberships, in 2018 and 2019, respectively. None of the 
mentioned ROs nevertheless present a Democratic Clause, as examined by the research cut, or 
any established mandate on the issue, as their foundational ideas are not centered on this 
scope. 
Finally, as we move to the case analysis, selecting a case on the Andean sub-region 
presented a challenge not because the sub-region does not have crises, as it can be seen on 
Appendix D, but because of the scope conditions. As we intend to perceive overlapping 
organization’s behaviors, the cases did not present overlapping mandates de jure since the 
CAN democratic framework is not in force, ALBA does not have one and UNASUR did not 
have one in force until 2014, leaving only the OAS competent to act. Thus, we focused the 
analysis on the de facto overlapping occurred during the attempted breach of the 
constitutional order occurred in Ecuador in 2010. 
 
4.2.1.2 Ecuador 2010: ALBA, CAN, UNASUR, OAS 
 
 On September 30, 2010, members of the police took to the streets to pressure the 
government of Rafael Correa to veto a law on public service that would affect the interests of 
the security forces. In addition to the streets, protesters took over the country's main airport 
and occupied the National Parliament. Correa tried to negotiate with the demonstrators, but 
after the explosion of a tear gas bomb near the president, he was taken to the Police Hospital 
in Quito, where he was kept under watch. Under the efforts of the army and special forces, 
Correa was rescued, claimed to be the victim of a coup and declared state of emergency to 
contain the situation in the country99. 
 Nolte (2018) argues that although it is not clear whether the intentions of the dissident 
forces were to remove the Correa government, the president's statements accused an 
attempted coup d'état, and the region’s organizations expressed themselves upon his claims, in 
 
98 ALBA-TCP Central American and Caribbean member states are Antigua and Barbuda, Cuba, Dom-
inica, Grenada, Nicaragua, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. 
99 More information on the events in Ecuador can be read on journalistic outlets such as the BBC on 
<https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/noticias/2010/09/100930_equador_correa_hospital_cj.shtml>; 
or Uol on <https://noticias.uol.com.br/internacional/ultimas-noticias/2010/09/30/rafael-correa-e-




order to ensure the stability and constitutional order of the country. At the sub-regional level, 
for instance, ALBA, CAN and even MERCOSUR100 issued Communiqués supporting 
Correa’s government and called for the respect of the constitutional order but their actions 
were limited to diplomatic declarations (ALBA, 2010; CAN, 2010). 
UNASUR and the OAS also expressed their support for Correa and acted. The OAS 
convoked a special session on the same day and issued the CP/RES. 977 (1772/10) (OAS, 
2010) on the Situation in the Republic of Ecuador, repudiating any attempt to the democratic 
institutional system in Ecuador, underscoring the IADC principles and offering the RO’s full 
cooperation through the Secretary General. As for UNASUR, Brazil acted as a regional leader 
and initially called for a coordinated action of MERCOSUR, UNASUR and the OAS 
(WEIFFEN, 2017; NOLTE, 2018), but UNASUR eventually became more prominent 
(NOLTE, 2018). 
UNASUR’s stood out as its Presidents and Heads of State reunited the same day 
(WEIFFEN, 2017; NOLTE, 2018)101 and issued a declaration that besides condemning the 
events, affirmed that their respective governments would not tolerate under any circumstance 
any break of the constitutional order. The Declaration of Buenos Aires on the Situation of 
Ecuador went further and warned about the possibility of sanctions, stating that if any breach 
was perceived, the RO would “adopt concrete and immediate measures such as closures of 
borders, suspension of trade, air traffic and the provision of energy, services and other 
supplies” (UNASUR, 2010b, our translation). 
Additionally, the Declaration informs that the member states deployed a delegation of 
Ministers to support the Ecuadorian presidency and that the heads of state had agreed to adopt 
a democratic clause for the organization the following Ordinary Summit, which took place in 
November 2010, and gave way to the Additional Protocol to the Constitutive Treaty of 
UNASUR on Commitment to Democracy. 
Results: 
The convergence of opinions between all involved regional organizations reinforced 
 
100 As an associate state, Ecuador has been a signatory to the Mercosur Ushuaia Protocol since 2007, 
and it has been in force since the deposit of the instruments in 2009. See also Estadão’s “Mercosul 
condena tentativa de golpe no Equador”, available at: 
<https://internacional.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,mercosul-condena-tentativa-de-golpe-no-
equador,617919>. 
101 See also: “Unasul decide fazer reunião de emergência para discutir crise no Equador” Uol Notícias, 






the position in favor of the Ecuadorian president and influenced the disarmament of the 
conflict. However, UNASUR’s positioning stands out as it is very interesting since at the time 
it did not have a clear mandate on democracy protection to take a strong attitude and propose 
sanctioning unconstitutional acts. This understanding denotes that the organizations were at 
least in part, competing for the leadership on conflict resolution in South America, even if not 
conflicting. 
 An interesting factor to be considered in this scenario is the use of presidential 
diplomacy in UNASUR in the absence of a clear mandate on democracy protection. While the 
OAS acted through its Permanent Council, which repudiated the events in Ecuador, and 
through its Secretary General who arrived in the country the following day, UNASUR acted 
through its presidents, who on the same day met in Buenos Aires and announced measures to 
prevent further democratic ruptures (WEIFFEN, 2017, NOLTE, 2018), and through their 
chancellors, who travelled to Quito. The Ecuadorian case affirms that the form chosen to 
mediate also had influences on the result obtained by the organizations when competing in a 
crisis situation. 
 Regarding the sub-regional overlaps, ALBA, MERCOSUR and CAN’s manifestations 
corroborate OAS and UNASUR’s condemnation, but at the same time do not go further, 
tacitly leaving the task to UNASUR, and thus representing a cooperative, but passive 
behavior.  
 
4.2.2 The Southern Cone 
 
On the beginning of this chapter, we already mentioned that the foundational norm of 
the sub-regional organization that represents the Southern Cone, MERCOSUR, did not 
mention the word democracy upon the creation of the bloc. Focused on the establishment of a 
common market, the Asunción Treaty addressed trade and cooperation as a way to develop the 
member states, in accordance with the guiding principles of open regionalism that guided the 
bloc’s proposition, as we have stated in chapter 2. However, both Weiffen’s (2017) and Closa, 
Palestini and Ortiz’ (2016) work affirm that at this period, marked by a transition after years 
of authoritarian regimes, regionalism was also seen as a way to consolidate democracy on the 
region, even if not directly mentioned on the norm. 
Thus, the first clear stand on the matter came a year after the establishment of the RO, 
when in June 1992, the heads of state of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, reunited in 




that “the full validity of democratic institutions is an indispensable condition for the existence 
and development of MERCOSUR” (MERCOSUR, 1992). Nonetheless, the democratic clause 
as it is known currently, was only adopted six years later, in 1998, as a result of a concrete 
crisis: an attempted coup d’état in Paraguay, in 1996. 
The Presidential Declaration of San Luis (MERCOSUR, 1996), reinforced the Las 
Leñas propositions but was the first to condemn democratic breaches or attempted breaches 
and to consider the application of sanctions to be decided by the member states, ranging 
“from the suspension of the right to participate in the different bodies of the respective 
integration processes to the suspension of the rights and obligations resulting from these 
processes”. The Declaration was institutionalized in 1998, with the adoption of the Ushuaia 
Protocol, a legal document that became binding upon the ratification of all the member states 
in January 2002102. 
The next relevant development on the democratic normative framework was the 
adoption, in December of 2011, of a Protocol that is supposed to render the Ushuaia Protocol 
from its obligations and has thus became known as Ushuaia Protocol II. Its normative text of 
presents many similarities with the UNASUR democratic clause, as it was created posteriorly, 
and it presents progresses on the first Ushuaia Protocol by establishing procedures and 
advancing on MERCOSUR’s mandate through the enlisting of sanctions available.  
For instance, the Protocol starts by broadening its scope of action on a political crisis, 
to cover not only “the rupture or threat of rupture of the democratic order” but also “a 
violation of the constitutional order or any situation that jeopardizes the legitimate exercise of 
power and the validity of democratic values and principles” (MERCOSUR, 2011, art. 1). It 
also provides that the member states can dispose of commissions to assist and monitor the 
affected Party (art.5), before exploring the sanctions on art.6, which gives the bloc the 
opportunity to act as follows: 
 
a.- Suspend the right to participate in the different organs of MERCOSUR's 
institutional structure. 
b.- Close all or part of land borders. Suspend or limit trade, air and maritime 
traffic, communications and the supply of energy, services and supplies. 
c.- Suspend the affected Party from enjoying the rights and benefits arising 
from the Treaty of Asunción and its Protocols and Integration Agreements 
entered into between the Parties, as applicable. 
 
102 On the Paraguayan Foreign Affairs Ministry’s website, it is possible to access the data on the ratifi-






d.- Promote the suspension of the affected Party within the scope of other 
regional and international organizations. Promote with third countries or 
groups of countries the suspension of the affected Party from rights and / or 
benefits derived from the cooperation agreements to which it is a party. 
e.- Support regional and international efforts, particularly within the United 
Nations, aimed at resolving and finding a peaceful and democratic solution 
to the situation in the affected Party. 
f.- Adopt additional political and diplomatic sanctions. 
 
 
All the measures should be combined with diplomatic efforts by the member states’ 
presidents, to promote the restoration of the constitutional order. Furthermore, the Ushuaia II 
Protocol highlights that all measures should keep proportionality and not put at risk the well-
being of the nationals of the affected country, while respecting its sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. Sanctions shall cease once the causes that have motivated their adoption have been 
fully repaired (art.9). 
 However, the Protocol has not yet entered into force. Article 11 establishes that it 
should be ratified and have its instruments deposited by all MERCOSUR member states, and 
as of December 2019, only Venezuela has done it103. More interestingly, the normative faces a 
regional impasse, since the government of Paraguay has vehemently rejected the normative 
framework. The signature of the Protocol was even used as a justification for former president 
Lugo’s impeachment in 2012, as we describe below, and afterwards it was rejected by the 
national government104. Thus, even though it was not into force during the cases below, nor 
presents significative chances of being finally formalized due to Paraguay’s rejection, we 
have added it to the analysis of the normative framework, as it allows for the understanding of 
regional comprehension on the issue of undemocratic ruptures. 
 
4.2.2.1 Paraguay 2012: MERCOSUR, UNASUR, CELAC, OAS   
The Paraguayan case is very interesting due to prominent action of MERCOSUR, and 
for being the first time a sub-regional democratic clause was invoked and produced sanctions. 
Another remarkable characteristic on this case is the role played by regional agreements on 
domestic politics, as we discuss below. 
Fernando Lugo was elected the president of Paraguay in 2008. During his time in 
 








office, his acts faced strong oppositions from national elites and the political instability was 
enhanced by domestic conflicts that were soon to be included on the impeachment request led 
by the Paraguayan Congress. The accusative libel presented five main reasons that had 
motivated the impeachment process (PARAGUAY, 2012):  
1- the approval of the use of military facilities for holding events of a left-wing 
political nature, with public funding;  
2- the instigation and facilitation of land invasions in Ñacunday, with military support;  
3- the president’s inability to deal with growing insecurity, and to capture members of 
the self-styled militia of the Paraguayan People's Army;  
4- the signature of the Protocol of Ushuaia II, which on the Parliaments words would 
constitute “an attack against the sovereignty of the Republic of Paraguay” and had been 
signed with the sole purpose of protecting the presidents of the region by identifying the 
country with the presidential figure; 
5- the president's neglect of the Curuguaty confrontation, which left 17 dead on June 
15, 2012 in a land dispute conflict. 
After the Parliament instituted the political judgement on the basis of poor 
performance from the president on June 21st, 2012, the impeachment process was carried out 
in an express way, and Lugo was deposed in approximately 24 hours. The South American 
neighbors immediately repudiated the speed of the process and summoned ambassadors for 
consultations. In addition to the swiftness of the decision, the concern for democracy in the 
country was visible, since Lugo was the first leftist president of Paraguay after 61 years of 
rule of the Colorado Party. Thus, although the process followed the instructions contained in 
the Constitution, due to the lack of support in the legislative power, Lugo denounced 
impeachment as a "parliamentary coup d'état" (WEIFFEN, 2017). 
The political crisis had already been accompanied closely by UNASUR (and 
consequently MERCOSUR) Chancellors which on the outbreak of the impeachment process 
sent a delegation to Asunción and issued a declaration of support to Lugo (UNASUR, 2012).  
Once the impeachment was concretized, MERCOSUR decided to exclude Paraguay from its 
next ordinary summit, held in Argentina the following week (MERCOSUL…, 2012). Thus, 
on the Friday following the impeachment, June 29, in a joint meeting, UNASUR and 
MERCOSUR decided to suspend Paraguay from its activities in the organizations due to the 
violation of the democratic clause that governs them, until the order was restored, in the 2013 
elections. 




Paraguay from 1-3 July, composed of the Secretary General and a delegation of authorities 
(OAS, 2012). Thus, the OAS took almost two weeks to decide on the situation and opted not 
to sanction the country, understanding that as swift as the impeachment process unfortunately 
was, it had respected Paraguay’s constitutional procedures, as the new government claimant. 
Nonetheless, the RO also decided to send an observation mission to monitor the conduct of 
the 2013 elections, in order to foster political dialogue and to inform the OAS member states 
on the situation in the country (NOLTE, 2018).  
No formal action was perceived from CELAC, as Paraguay was not officially 
sanctioned or suspended, but at the organization’s Summit in 2013, the country was absent, 
with comments from president Federico Franco affirming that it had “not been invited” 
(PARAGUAY…2013). 
Results: 
 In the Paraguayan case the overlap of competencies of four regional organizations 
resulted in a positioning division among them that stands out. When we consider that 
MERCOSUR and UNASUL adopted the same kind of sanctioning through suspension and 
held a joint meeting to resolve the impasse, it can be affirmed that overlapping presented no 
conflict, since redundancy in this case generated the reinforcement of the regional positioning. 
In addition, joint meetings have the bonus of saving bureaucratic efforts and minimizing 
competition between them. 
 As a result from the suspension, since Paraguay was the only member state that had 
not yet voted the Venezuelan accession to the MERCOSUR, the bloc’s member states decided 
upon ratifying Venezuela’s adhesion, a fact that, together with the claims against the signature 
of the Ushuaia II Protocol were a source of great criticism from Paraguay to the Southern 
Cone bloc.  
 Nevertheless, an interesting fact on this case is that, even though UNASUR had 
already signed its Additional Protocol to the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR on Commitment 
to Democracy, it was not yet in force, and thus formally, the organization had no mandate to 
execute sanctions. Even if it was in force at the time, Paraguay never ratified the democratic 
clause, and thus it would not be in force in the country, a fact that raised critics from the 
country upon the RO’s suspension (PARAGUAI…, 2012) 
 With regard to the overlapping between MERCOSUR-UNASUR and the OAS, the 
result was a divergence of interpretation. The continental organization’s failure to understand 
Lugo’s impeachment as a democratic rupture generated norm ambiguity on democracy 




the same time, it intensified the competition between organizations and enabled forum 
shopping, as the Paraguayan government argued against its suspension on MERCOSUR and 
UNASUR with the OAS’s legitimacy recognition. However, as Nolte points out (2018), the 
OAS had no mandate to order UNASUR (or MERCOSUR) to revoke the suspension of the 
Paraguayan government. 
 CELAC’s position caused an ambiguity. As the RO does not have a hard law mandate 
on democratic clauses, it did not formally suspend Paraguay, which would support the OAS’s 
decision, if it weren’t for its ad hoc actions of not inviting the country to its subsequent 
meetings. MERCOSUR and UNASUR’s sanctions against Paraguay lasted until the 
realization of new elections in 2013, but the country refused to immediately reintegrate 
MERCOSUR, in protest against the Venezuelan adhesion. Paraguay also refused to sign the 
Ushuaia II Protocol upon its return to the organization (PARAGUAI…, 2013), as it had 
already been rejected by the Congress (PARLASUR, 2012). 
 
4.2.2.2 Venezuela 2013-onwards: ALBA, MERCOSUR, UNASUR, OAS 
 
The Venezuelan crisis is the longest one in South America to be analyzed, as of 
December 2019 the political crisis is still ongoing. In fact, regarding organizational behavior, 
results indicate that the conflict could be divided into phases for interpretation, since not only 
the responses of regional organizations vary over time but also their level of involvement, and 
the different roles played by them over time. 
The first element of divergence in this conflict comes after the 2013 presidential poll, 
which elected Nicolas Maduro in April to take the place that Hugo Chavez had left vacant at 
his death. The result from the ballots presented a very small margin of votes, of only 1,5% 
which were challenged by the opposition (NOLTE, 2018, p.140). Acts of violence were 
committed both by opposition supporters, and by government supporters during protestations 
following the outcome of the elections. Even so, UNASUR, which had sent an accompanying 
electoral mission, acknowledged the outcome of the voting process. At the occasion, the OAS 
was not invited to send a mission of its own to observe the process, despite its many years of 
experience (WEIFFEN, 2017, p.191). 
The situation did not improve in Venezuela in the course of 2013 and 2014, and in the 
face of escalating conflicts in the country, both UNASUR and OAS expressed their concerns. 
The Pan American organization convened a meeting of its Permanent Council in March 2014, 




dialogue between government and opposition105. Such a resolution was not signed by Panama, 
Canada and the United States, as the countries denounced the violation of civil liberties in the 
country (WEIFFEN, 2017, p.190-191).  
As for UNASUR, the organization issued a resolution of support of the dialogue 
process just a few days after the OAS and, at the request of the Venezuelan government, 
agreed to create a commission to accompany it (NOLTE, 2018, p.141). Thus, the Venezuelan 
government rejected the OAS’s interference, under accusations of meddling, but accepted the 
participation of UNASUR in the dialogue process with the opposition. Rounds of negotiation 
followed, under the auspices of UNASUR and diplomatic efforts, but eventually the 
opposition decided to not participate anymore and raised uncertainties regarding the 
impartiality of the South American organization, and the mission failed (NOLTE, 2018, 
p.142). 
Political instability continued to grow in Venezuela over the course of 2015, especially 
in the advent of parliamentary elections in the country. Once again, only UNASUR was 
allowed to participate as an observer of the process, which renewed concerns for democratic 
stability in the country, as the opposition was worried that the growing authoritarianism of the 
Maduro government could manipulate the results (NOLTE, 2018).  
Even though not invited to accompany the electoral process, the Secretary General of 
the OAS, Luís Almagro, issued an open letter to the head of the Venezuelan National Electoral 
Council (OAS, 2015) expressing concerns with the fairness of the upcoming polls106, “in 
which he accused Maduro’s governing party of taking unfair electoral advantages in its use of 
public resources in the campaign, access to the press, and the disqualification and 
incarceration of key opposition figures”, as underscored by Weiffen (2017, p. 191). With the 
diplomatic pressure exerted by the OAS and the observer mission of UNASUR, the elections 
were held and deemed free and far, with the opposition winning the majority of the parliament 
for the first time in sixteen years (NOLTE, 2018). 
Over the following few months, however, the executive's attitudes sought to neutralize 
the elected legislature, using the “Supreme Court, the national electoral body and military 
forces in their favor, nullifying the deliberations of parliamentarians and suppressing popular 
manifestations of opposition” (CERCA ..., 2017, our translation). 
 
105 Cf.: OAS CP/DEC. 51 (1957/14) “Solidarity and Support for Democratic Institutions, Dialogue, 
and Peace in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela”, adopted at the meeting held on March 7, 
2014. 





Since then, the OAS’ and Almagro’s attempts to enforce the democratic order 
heightened tensions between the organization and the government of Maduro. For instance, 
according to Weiffen (2017, p.191), in May 2016, after an exchange of mutual insults between 
Maduro and Almagro through social networks, the Secretary-General invoked the Inter-
American Democratic Charter and convened a special meeting of the Permanent Council to 
evaluate the sanctions to be applied to Venezuela because of its violations of democracy and 
human rights. It is interesting to note that, Weiffen (2017, p.191) further explains that at the 
time, Venezuela was able to use the competing powers of the existing regional mechanisms 
and to instrumentalize UNASUR through its allies (the ALBA member states), to reject the 
application of the clause, arguing that the ongoing dialogue process in the country could be 
undermined by the condemnation of the Inter-American organization.  
However, by the end of 2016, Venezuela’s support from UNASUR had deteriorated, as 
MERCOSUR key member states, such as Argentina and Brazil no longer had “like-minded 
governments” (NOLTE; WEIFFEN, 2018, p.17). Tensions also grew after continued rounds of 
mediation were not producing the expected results and the central government managed to 
suspend the realization of a recall referendum, a constitutional procedure that would allow the 
population to evaluate the permanence of the Maduro government. Thus, on December 2, 
2016, MERCOSUR decided to temporarily suspend the Venezuelan participation on the bloc, 
on the account of not having internalized core normative frameworks on human rights and 
trade (MERCOSUR…, 2016). 
The warming of tensions and the accusation of “imperialism” from the continental 
organization culminated in 2017 with the Venezuelan request to leave the OAS107, an 
unprecedented situation that could have been motivated in order to avoid a suspension of the 
bloc as well. As the Venezuelan political situation continued to deteriorate, it reached new 
heights with the government instituting a National Constituent Assembly in May 2017, which 
caused controversy by delegitimizing elected candidates on the Parliament since “there would 
be no concrete reasons to change the Constitution” (JORGE, 2017). The elections were held 
on heavy counts of fraud and manipulation of results, even by the company responsible for 
counting the votes (SMARTMATIC…, 2017). The full suspension from MERCOSUR was 
concretized in August 2017, on the basis provided by the Ushuaia Protocol, until the 
constitutional order is restored in the country (MERCOSUR, 2017). 
 The year of 2017 also marked the deterioration of consensus in UNASUR caused by 
 





ideological divisions among its members, which resulted in an incapacity to appoint a new 
Secretary General108 and to continue the RO’s action. It also impacted on the RO’s response to 
the Venezuelan crisis: unlike on the Paraguayan case of 2012, where MERCOSUR and 
UNASUR acted the same way and suspended the affected country, Maduro’s government 
counted on the support of allies such as its partners in ALBA, which made it difficult to obtain 
unanimity on UNASUR for the approval of the suspension.  
In fact, the difficulty of consensus added up to the mentioned incapability of indicating 
a new Secretary General, which deepened the organization’s moments of crises and 
culminated in 2018 with the request for the self-suspension of half of its members (Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Paraguay and Peru) who criticized the RO’s paralysis109. 
Differently from an earlier stage, in 2016, where the Venezuelan government could 
benefit from the overlapping organizations to choose a forum where it could have support, in 
2017 the erosion on consensus among Latin American countries prevented it from happening. 
The Maduro administration even tried to mobilize and convince CELAC’s member states to 
support UNASUR’s mediation, by calling an extraordinary meeting, but the governments of 
the ideologically divergent countries Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, 
Paraguay and Peru did not even attend the event (NOLTE; WEIFFEN, 2018, p.19). In fact, 
these same countries ended up creating a sub-group of their own on July 2017, called the 
Lima Group, which remained seized of the developments of the Venezuelan crisis. 
Due to Venezuela’s prominent role on ALBA, the RO was the only forum that still 
supported the country and criticized the OAS’ action by 2018. However, the Venezuelan crises 
has been proven to be so unsustainable that Ecuador and South American countries that used 
to participate   At the same year, following the electoral process that reelected Maduro as 
president, the OAS reacted (with emphatic words from its Secretary General110) and also 
initiated the procedures for the suspension of Venezuela from the bloc. UNASUR which was 
left emptied by its member states self-suspension, did not act and MERCOSUR maintained its 
suspension sanction against the country. 
Results: 
The Venezuelan conflict is long and still in progress but presents different 
 
108 With the support of Bolivia, Suriname and Ecuador, Venezuela vetoed the indication of Argentina’s 
candidate for the post of Secretary General, and no consensus could be reached. 
109 See also Reuters’ coverage on <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-unasur-membership/six-south-
american-nations-suspend-membership-of-anti-u-s-bloc-idUSKBN1HR2P6> 
110 The whole pronouncement of Luís Almagro after the elections can be watched in a video named 





interpretations for the study of scenarios of organizational overlap. It is clear that the OAS 
and UNASUR competed for a leadership role on the mediation process on the region at the 
beginning of the conundrum, even if some of the competing organizational behaviors are 
caused by Venezuela’s instrumentalization of the overlappings and forum shopping. While 
competing, regional behaviors to a certain extent, act generating blockades by taking different 
positions, and therefore delegitimizing the other RO. 
At the beginning of the conflict, the redundancy of organizations made possible the 
forum shopping on the part of the Venezuelan government, which accepted only the 
monitoring and mediation of UNASUR. As Weiffen (2017, p.191-192) points out, Venezuela 
“clearly adopted a strategy of regime shifting, turning to UNASUR and putting into question 
the legitimacy of the OAS, accusing it to be an instrument of US imperialism”.  
It is these tools that have made it possible for Venezuela to instrumentalize UNASUR, 
that is, to use it and the support of its allies within the OAS to remove the Pan-American 
organization from its domestic interventions. In this sense, competition between ROs for 
leadership made it possible for the member state to de-legitimize one of the interventions, 
while making it difficult to interpret competing concepts of democratic rupture, and thus 
creating a blockade. However, this delegitimization is a fruit not only of the ROs behavior, 
but of Venezuela’s, as the country kept putting the OAS off. 
Even so, as consensus among member states of the ROs started to erode, the 
overlapping scenario began to produce different and less conflicting effects, thus creating a 
new phase for the analysis, where the ROs produce more aligned and cooperative behaviors, 
that in turn are limited by their capability of action. With the escalation of the crisis in 
Venezuela and the country's disagreements with the OAS, the Bolivarian country was 
sanctioned by MERCOSUR, and the OAS and UNASUR only did not follow the same path 
because they could not reach regional consensus, even if the pronunciations of the Secretary 
General of the continental organization, and the abandon of UNASUR by half of its members 
made a clear statement. The only RO that continued to have a fragmented behavior was 
ALBA as its support to Venezuela clashes with the others’ positionings. 
Finally, Venezuela also fragmented regional cohesion by demanding to be excluded of 
the OAS in an attempt to also remove its interference and sanctions. But the blockade 
generated by the country’s behavior did not translate on a fragmented behavior from the other 
RO’s, as the request to leave the Pan-American bloc does not go to the detriment of this 
organization in favor of others that could intervene, since UNASUR is paralyzed and 




due to the non-interaction between them and, should the suspension by the OAS take place, it 
will serve as a reinforcement of MERCOSUR’s position. 
 
4.3 Partial Analysis 
 
 As the African case has done it before, the study of the South American normative 
framework on democracy protection allows for the combined reflection on the development 
of regionalism and its influences on democracy protection and promotion. While almost all 
countries of the sub-region underwent autocratic regimes before the 1990s, the establishment 
of provisions on the issue is then developed with the idea that political stability would be the 
basis for economic development, the goal that motivated regional processes at this time. 
 However, it took the occurrence of political crises such as the Paraguayan attempted 
coup of 1996 to propel the organizations to adopt a stronger stand against democratic 
breaches. Moreover, the consolidation of the normative framework is only achieved from the 
2000s, with the change on the set of inspirations of the regional processes, in a post 
hegemonic moment. Even so, it is notable how the concrete cases have played an important 
role on norm development, since not only it was the 1996 Paraguayan coup attempt that 
originated MERCOSUR’s democratic clause, but also the 2010 Ecuadorian crisis here 
presented, motivated UNASUR member states to adopt a commitment of its own. 
 Regarding the content of the provisions, while all the ROs that have a clear mandate 
on the issue of democratic breaches have managed to adopt a set of sanctions and measures to 
follow an event, one interesting issue concerning the American provisions is the different 
level of detail that has guided the norm setting. As Weiffen (2017, p.192) affirms, for instance, 
“whereas the IADC contains a clear-cut definition of representative democracy, the UNASUR 
democracy clause is characterized by an ambiguity of substantive definitions”. 
 Even though representative democracy is well defined by the IADC, and the South 
American countries all have relatively similar levels of democracy, some missing features 
make the norm passible of interpretation. For instance, as perceived on the African case, there 
are no clear definitions of what the return to the constitutional order would be. And while the 
applicable sanctions are well listed on most democratic clauses, unlike the African provisions 
on UCGs, the ROs do not present a comprehensive list of events that should be interpreted as 
breaches. Thus, norm ambiguity and subjectivity in turn could lead to inconsistent behaviors 




 The case selection only presented cases occurred on the 2000s, even if political crises 
had happened during the 1990s, as a result of the lack of mandates and direct action from ROs 
on this earlier period. In fact, on chapter 1 we stated that Nolte and Weiffen (2018) affirmed 
the existence of a different logic of outcomes of overlapping organizations between the ones 
1990s and on the 2000s: while the first ones would correspond to a more coordinative logic, 
from the years 2000 the responses would range in a more competitive scale. 
 However, while the outcomes are not entirely untrue, the empirical research has 
demonstrated that in the 1990s, the democratic clauses were not yet in force, and most of the 
actions on mediation were not organizational, but actually a fruit of diplomatic efforts, as we 
mentioned on the Paraguayan 1996 and 2000 coup attempt. Thus, the overlapping actions 
were not a matter of competition between MERCOSUR and the OAS, for example, fighting 
for legitimacy on the region, but mostly relied on individual mediator countries’ protagonism. 
While researching for this work, many links and affirmations were found on the litera-
ture between regionalism and democracy in the Americas. Nevertheless, a close look on the 
normative framework available provided a thought-provoking insight: not all documents that 
have been proposed are currently in force or were at the time of the interventions, as the 
member states have/had not ratified, deposited and therefore internalized these protocols. 
Thus, also very interesting is how the actors, be it the ROs or member states, have 
managed to adapt in the absence of a clear mandate and respond to crises. It demonstrates that 
the low institutionality that preceded the adoption of the democratic clauses, led to the instau-
ration of ad hoc solutions that in some cases were even later formalized on regional agree-
ments. Also, due to the intergovernmental character of all of the organizations on the conti-
nent, and the absence of a hierarchy or subsidiarity principle, it can be perceived a logic of 
reproduction of political behaviors and setbacks among member states and regional organiza-
tions. To illustrate, Colombia and Paraguay are the countries that have posed challenges to 
their sub-regional blocs’ normative provisions and have not ratified the Cartagena Agreement 
Additional Protocol and the Ushuaia II Protocol, respectively; together with Brazil111, they are 
also the ones who have not yet ratified the South American democratic clause, which has sim-
ilar demands and sanctions. 
If the 1990s interplay between overlapping regional organizations over political crises 
was mostly cooperative in the absence of a normative framework, the situation changes in the 
 
111 Brazil’s non-ratification was, at first, directly related with the large amount of time international 
acts take to be internalized on the domestic legal order. Currently, there are no perspectives of rati-




2000s when the dissociation of a united South America from the rest of the continent becomes 
clearer after the establishment of UNASUR. At this moment, foundational elements such as 
the OAS’ pan-Americanism links with United States and the UNASUR’s aspiring political 
capabilities for the development of the countries of the region with no external interference, 
take an important role on determining the RO’s actions.  
Thus, when UNASUR presented itself as the legitimate body to bring “South 
American solutions to South American problems”, there was a visible organizational 
competition over leadership on conflict mediation, as the growth of the South American RO 
had a legitimizing potential of its performance, which, in turn, would exclude external 
influences. These external interferences were extremely criticized by the leftists’ governments 
that were in place at the region during the moment of consolidation od UNASUR, which 
affirmed the association of the OAS with the presence of the United States in the region, and 
thus, have managed to shape the ROs’ competitive behavior accordingly.  
Considering the existent normative frameworks and the sub-regions of South America, 
research demonstrated that only the ALBA and the Pacific Alliance do not have democratic 
clauses on their scope, out of the involved ROs. CELAC has a declaration on the issue, but it 
has no validity on international law. The OAS has the more detailed provisions on democracy, 
but MERCOSUR, CAN and UNASUR also managed to sign their own documents, even if not 
all of them have entered into force. 
Regarding the presented cases, all of the selected political crises had as a background, 
the overlap between the OAS and UNASUR, whether due to the competition for the leading 
role in the region or the clash in the ideas proposed. MERCOSUR, with being responsible for 
the democratic preservation among members, also acted when competent, and had prominent 
roles on the Paraguayan 2012 and the Venezuelan 2017 suspension.  
However, the lack of CAN positions was notable, since in the survey carried out only 
declarations of repudiation of crises and support for mediations were found, without active 
action. The causalities of the lack of institutional protagonism, could be explained by the del-
egation of powers to UNASUR, which was in a better position to act, but also, the institution-
al weakening that the CAN has been facing over the last decade cannot be disregarded, nor 
the absence of a formal mandate since the research also found the Democratic Clause to not 
be in force currently. 
Finally, the Venezuelan case has also demonstrated how the absence of supranational 
decisions, norm hierarchy and/or a stronger institutionalization can provoke the erosion of 




configurations of overlapping regionalisms it signified, at first, the possibility of cross-
institutional strategies and forum shopping, the plurality of regional organizations also meant 
the possibility of emptying and abandoning these ROs when no agreement could be reached, 
as the UNASUR dismantling demonstrated. 
With the conclusion of the empiric analysis of South America, we move on to the next 
and final chapter, where we further develop the perceived types of organizational behavior 
and dyadic relationships from the African and South American ROs, and discuss their signifi-
cances for the understanding of overlapping regionalisms and the regional capabilities to ad-




5 ANALSYS AND CONCLUSION: COMPARATIVE REGIONALISM, POLITICAL 
CRISES, DE FACTO OVERLAPPINGS AND REGIONAL COHESION 
 
On chapter 1 we introduced Comparative Regionalism as the methodological back-
ground for this thesis. Börzel and Risse (2016) synthetize the objectives of the field by stating 
that “while building on profound contextual and historical knowledge, comparative regional-
ism employs comparative methods to arrive at generalizations about the emergence, institu-
tional design, and effects of regionalism” (BÖRZEL; RISSE, 2016). Parthenay (2019, p.8-9) 
further explains that the involved concerns are “not only a matter of ontology (what is the 
piece of reality to understand), nor a matter of epistemology (how to understand it)”,  and 
affirms that the purpose and objectives of comparative regionalism should therefore not be 
encapsulated on a theoretical dimension, since its interests are also “empirically grounded and 
oriented”.  
Considering the authors’ conceptualization, the research here presented met the estab-
lished requirements by presenting an empirically oriented cross-regional approach to the re-
sponses or behaviors of overlapping organizations and by aiming to produce generalizations 
for the understanding of regional dynamics. Moreover, the analysis relied on the study of each 
region separately, in order to base observations on their own history and context, and com-
bined the cross-regional study with two regions that are not as often associated, since most 
works tend to have the European continent as an element of comparison. 
The contributions of this approach were already notable on the second chapter, as the 
study of the regional institution building in each continent affirmed that while Europe has 
served as a basis and a model for other processes around the world, the institutionalization of 
responses from South America and Africa followed different drivers and produced different 
outcomes. One interesting illustration is the idea of waves of regionalism, which is broadly 
used on Latin American regional studies, as we previously mentioned, and presents a very 
interesting opportunity to reflect on the literal figure of a wave, which is endowed with crests 
and valleys. These literal representations are translated into moments of upsurge and remis-
sion, respectively, which can be verified on regional projects, for instance if we take into con-
sideration that after a boom of regional engagement on the 2000s, the last half of the 2010s 
have represent a moment of crises for regionalism in South America.  
Thus, the concept of waves as moments where regional processes are inspired to de-
velop is undeniable, since phases such as the democratization period at the end of the Cold 




dix A demonstrates how the framing of all of the regions under a single path (or, in this case, 
wave) neglects the individual contributions for regional studies. For instance, while most 
South American countries were experiencing dictatorships and protectionism in the 1970s, 
and did not create new ROs, the African countries struggling with the ties caused by colonial-
ism on a liberation affirmation moment, institutionalized their former colonial interdepend-
ence into sub-regional organizations. At the same time, as we have previously affirmed, the 
creation of ROs halted on the early 2000s in Africa, as a result of a process of centripetal con-
solidation, in which a continental organization, the African Union, intends to bring together 
the sub-regions; whereas in South America this moment is characterized by a new valoriza-
tion of regionalism with different aspects and sizes (post-hegemonic), which created new 
overlaps and favored sub-regional processes.  
These formative characteristics also play a central role on the conditioning of the re-
gional behaviors that we aimed to investigate. As proposed by the institutionalist theory, the 
idea of path dependence serves to explain even why some organizations do not develop man-
dates over an issue area, while others are bounded by it, by considering contextual character-
istics of the foundational moments and organizational trajectories, aspirations and limitations.  
Furthermore, path dependence also helps on the understanding of limitations that con-
dition a certain kind of action or behavior, for example by perceiving that the ROs on the se-
lected regions have their capacity of agency constrained by the common characteristics of 
having an intergovernmental decision-making system. Even the choice for an intergovern-
mental regional arrangement can be explained by the historical context of those regions and 
the moments of institution building, that favored national autonomy and non-intervention.  
Nevertheless, the contribution of the cross-regional analysis goes beyond the limita-
tions of the formative moments by enabling relevant comparative questionings, such as “if 
both regions’ organizations are bounded by intergovernmentalism, what makes Africa’s insti-
tutionality capable of more directly intervening on a member state domestic matter?”. Raman-
zini Júnior and Luciano’s (2018, p.15) research illustrates the gains of these inquiries on a 
comparative analysis of the security and defense dimension of the AU and UNASUR. The 
authors established that even if both ROs are marked by a significant degree of intergovern-
mentalism, the African RO “possesses a higher degree of bureaucratization than UNASUR, 
insofar as the African Commission plays a key role in setting the agenda and gathering infor-
mation”, which consequently “provides the bureaucrats with a significant degree of autonomy 




These conclusions assist on the reflections over how come in South America the ROs’ 
decisions have to be taken under a unanimous consensus, while the AU Peace and Security 
Council is able to adopt decisions, such as those regarding the application of the normative 
framework on unconstitutional changes of government by a simple majority, even on an in-
tergovernmental setting. Thus, the priorities involved on the institutionalization of regional 
arrangements exemplified by the authors combined, with the higher bureaucratization degree, 
similarly represent factors of influence on a RO behavior, since they will condition its capaci-
ty to act. 
Another contribution of the Comparative Regionalism approach, according to Parthe-
nay, is the possibility of understanding the dynamics posed by diffusion, as “regionalisms are 
mostly inter-related” (PARTHENAY, 2019, p.9). The author’s affirmation is even more rele-
vant when considered that currently, ROs have a multi-purpose characteristic (BÖRZEL, 
2016), instead of a single mandate, and they tend to assume new tasks in a much more fluid 
international scenario, as demonstrated on the previous chapters. 
A very interesting example of regional diffusion between the studied regions appeared 
on the data compilation stage of this research. While gathering regional provisions on democ-
racy protection, some commonalities were perceived among how Africa and the Americas 
addressed the theme. During the field research conducted at the AU Headquarters in Addis 
Ababa, in April 2019, the commonalities among the OAS’ and the AU’s Charters were con-
firmed on an informal interview with an AU Official, that stressed that the 2001 IADC had 
provided inspirations for the 2007 African Charter. In fact, table 8 on the next page demon-
strates how similar the normative frameworks are, even in wording, although the African doc-
ument, which is posterior, goes further on its requirements for democratic implementation. 
As it happens, even among the South American ROs the provisions demonstrate the 
occurrence of norm diffusion, since the contemporary UNASUR’s Georgetown Protocol and 
MERCOSUR’S Ushuaia II Protocol also have similar wordings, especially if considered the 
sanctions to be applied on the event of a democratic rupture. 
Irrefutably, one of the greatest contributions of comparative regionalism is that it does 
not reject experiences but enables their integration for knowledge building. Having consid-
ered these aspects, we move on to the next section in order to compile and compare the find-
ings of the empirical studies on how the regional organizations in Africa and South America 
have managed to deal with the challenges posed by political crises’ management, on a multi-
layered overlapping scenario, in accordance with the presented methodological background. 




prehension on essential elements that compose the complexities of the studied regional sce-
narios before concentrating on the analysis of overlapping RO’s behaviors and the significa-
tions of those overlappings on the subsequent sections. 
 
Table 8 – Commonalities among provisions on representative democracy at the OAS and the AU 
Inter-American Democratic Charter  African Charter on Democracy, Elections and 
Governance 
Chapter 1- Democracy and the Inter-
American System 
Chapter 3- Principles 
Arts. 3-6: Essential elements of representative 
democracy 
Art. 3: Principles 
Respect for human rights and fundamental free-
doms; 
Respect for human rights and democratic princi-
ples; 
Access to and the exercise of power in accord-
ance with the rule of law; 
Access to and exercise of state power in accord-
ance with the constitution of the State Party and 
the principle of the rule of law; 
Holding of periodic, free, and fair elections 
based on secret balloting and universal suffrage 
as an expression of the sovereignty of the peo-
ple, the pluralistic system of political parties and 
organizations,  
Holding of regular, transparent, free and fair 
elections; 
Promotion of a system of government that is 
representative; 
Separation of powers and independence of the 
branches of government. 
Separation of powers; 
It is the right and responsibility of all citizens to 
participate in decisions relating to their own 
development. This is also a necessary condition 
for the full and effective exercise of democracy. 
Promoting and fostering diverse forms of partic-
ipation strengthens democracy. 
Effective participation of citizens in democratic 
and development processes and in governance of 
public affairs; 
Transparency in government activities, probity, 
responsible public administration on the part of 
governments; 
Transparency and fairness in the management of 
public affairs;  
 
The strengthening of political parties and other 
political organizations is a priority for democra-
cy. 
Strengthening political pluralism and recogniz-
ing the role, rights and responsibilities of legally 
constituted political parties, including opposition 
political parties, which should be given a status 
under national law. 
n/a Promotion of gender equality in public and pri-
vate institutions; 
n/a Condemnation and rejection of acts of corrup-
tion, related offenses and impunity; 
n/a Condemnation and total rejection of unconstitu-
tional changes of government; 
 Source: author’s compilation 
 
5.1 Regionalism and political crises: challenges to shared democracy protection 
 




world that have historically struggled to promote development and potentialize the gains from 
their international insertion by decreasing dependence. Ever since the end of the Cold War 
when regionalism gained relevance as a tool for domestic development on a globalized world, 
the notion that democracy would play a relevant role to achieve this goal by fostering regional 
stability shaped the adoption of measures to create regional mechanisms for democracy 
protection (MDPs). 
 Each region has developed their own framework individually, and as a result, Africa 
gained relevance on its stand against unconstitutional changes of government, and in the 
Americas, democracy became a clause for participation on regional forums and a value to be 
protected and promoted. As we demonstrated on the previous section while exposing about 
diffusion on regional studies, the adopted normative provisions have many similarities, which 
indicates a common challenge, but, at the same time, we acknowledge that there is a 
distinction between the frameworks on UCGs and the democratic clauses, regarding the 
capabilities and institutionality available. That being said, it is, however, their dissimilarities 
that makes the comparative study relevant for the comprehension of each regional outcome, 
as we see these differences as a fundamental part of how the regions approach political 
questions, such as crises and breaches, especially on overlapping scenarios. 
 A first aspect we would like to underscore is the fact that African regionalism is not 
“democratic by nature”, since the first regional blocs created after independence were a 
reflection of the new political leaders that took power upon liberation, many through coups, or 
with military support, as seen on Appendix B. ROs such as the Organization of African Unity 
at this time had the main interest of strengthening a common stand against colonization and 
external influence and dependence. Not all countries were (or even are at the moment) stable, 
politically and economically. 
 Thus, it is very interesting that, as provisions on democracy promotion, protection and 
consolidation were posterior to a process of democratization that had different particularities 
and velocities among African countries and sub-regions, the ROs had to adapt what could be 
accepted and what not over time. Even the wording on the normative framework is an 
evidence of it: it is unconstitutional changes of government, not undemocratic. Not all states 
are democracies, and the provisions had to have a certain amount of tolerance in favor of 
integration, even if new transgressions are not supposed to be accepted from the moment on. 
  Therefore, it is undeniable that the African Union managed to do more than just “drop 
a letter” from the OAU, transforming the united voice of Africa from the first organization 




consequence. It also marked a transition on continental perceptions of what types of 
government are going to be expected. In fact, Fioramonti and Mattheis affirm that “the 
transition to the AU has implied some new thinking regarding the concepts of national 
sovereignty and non-interference, especially insofar as crimes against humanity and 
unconstitutional changes of power are concerned” (FIORAMONTI; MATTHEIS, 2016, 
p.682). 
 The adaption on these concepts of “national sovereignty” and “non-interference” is in 
line with Closa and Palestini’s work (2016, p. 146, our translation) that affirms that the 
adoption of MDPs authorizes the states’ “behavior to be legitimately scrutinized, interpreted 
and even sanctioned by third parties and, thus, agrees to limit the principle of non-intervention 
and interference in internal matters”. Besides, on the African case, the strict relationship 
between democracy and peace and security, one of the continent’s main challenges, played an 
essential role on the adaption and the institutionalization of a MDP, as for Ramanzini Júnior 
and Luciano (2018, p.13), the objective of granting efficiency to peace operations mandates 
makes states compensate for their limitations by granting a higher level of autonomy to the 
Commission on decision-making. 
 The same scenario is not seen on South America, where some of the main 
organizations are created after or even as a consequence of the period of democratization. It is 
notable, therefore, that the adopted MDPs also reinforce this moment: the option for 
democratic clauses conditions memberships in the South American case, not only by 
presenting democracy as an entry requirement to the organizations, but as a prerequisite to the 
continuity of the relationship among its countries. 
Even if in Africa democratization has also affected regionalism, another central differ-
ence between the two regions is the uniformity of democratization, regarding the contempora-
neity and types of government adopted. For instance, South American military dictatorships 
fell practically all at the same time in the 1980s-90s, giving birth to similar republican struc-
tures among its countries, while in Africa, not only the periods of democratization are quite 
different country by country, but more than that, the adopted political systems present great 
variations in terms of power distribution, with some long running heads of state and the pres-
ence of almost absolute monarchies. 
 Furthermore, stability in both regions has assumed different meanings since South 
American countries have not witnessed civil wars or significant armed conflicts over the past 
century, and thus the idea of democracy is not directly associated to peace and security, and 




physical intervention, as this need is not a characteristic of the uprisings in South America. 
And this “weaker” need, in comparison to Africa, could be a cause for the stronger intergov-
ernmental features of this region’s provisions, as there is no greater pressure to limit a coun-
try’s autonomy in favor of ROs. 
 The challenge posed by intergovernmental designs on MDPs is that “enforcement be-
comes subject to interstate bargaining, and therefore asymmetric enforcement capabilities 
play a larger role”, creating a “tutelage relationship in which some countries are perceived as 
enforcers and protectors, while others are seen as those to be protected” as stated by Closa and 
Palestini (2018). The authors’ contribution is illustrated by the fact that some political crises 
cases have managed to be framed as unconstitutional changes of government in Africa, and 
democratic breaches in South America, and other similar cases have not. 
 In this sense, double standards are also sources of ambiguity on what the democratic 
order is supposed to be, on both regions. For instance, a country might be considered demo-
cratic for having elections112, or power alternance, what does not mean it presents free and fair 
political spaces. The same argument is valid for when the constitutional order is understood to 
be restored. Therefore, the interpretation of democratic breaches is not uniform, and varies 
according to many factors, which generates exceptionalism, and thus makes difficult the pro-
cess of institutional consolidation on democracy protection.  
 While studying MERCOSUR’s dispute resolution system, Bressan (2012, p.35) af-
firmed that the use of informal or alternative means to address controversies among the RO, 
such as diplomatic mediations, would strategically avoid the use and strengthening of the in-
stitutional mechanism. This conclusion can be analogously applied to the democratic compli-
ance bending regional organizations perform when assessing political crises differently, which 
turns the process of consolidation of MDPs extremely laborious, and democracy protection 
declaratory in the lack of institutionalization. 
 A particularly interesting example of exceptionalism and concept bending comes from 
a literature on good coups and bad coups. Ikome (2007) defined the terms by stating that 
 
“Good coups could be described as those that are informed by a genuine de-
sire on the part of coup-plotters to resolve unsettling societal realities, par-
ticularly in relation to poor leadership and the hardships that it brings to the 
 
112 The specialized literature has raised the concern about the dangers of “electoralism” to democratic 
quality. Schmitter and Karl (1991) have described the term as “the tendency to focus on the hold-
ing of elections while ignoring other political realities”. For more on the topic, see also 
SCHMITTER, P.; KARL, T. What Democracy is… and is not. Journal of Democracy, Volume 2, 




people – and against the backdrop of constrained political space for peaceful 
change. […]On the other hand, bad coups would be those that topple visibly 
legitimate governments, and that appear to have been informed by the nar-
row interests of coup-plotters, rather than the public interest” (IKOME, 
2007, p.14-15). 
 
On the topic, Souaré (2014, p.81) adds that (military) coups are sometimes tolerated as 
they represent a “consequence of bad governance by the ousted regime”. The author also re-
ports that “some regimes bequeathed by coups have turned out to be relatively better than the 
ones they overthrew, some of which were constitutional regimes in the legal sense of the 
word”. This perception consequently poses a potential problem for the MDPs consolidation, 
as cases of political crises are constantly evaluated with exceptionalities. 
Thus, the realization that some coups could be “good” represents one of the challenges 
imposed by the regions’ democratic comprehension to the intergovernmental subjectivity of 
political crises’ addressment. At the same time, on the opposite side of the argument, 
Stoddard (2017, p.477) affirms that strict rules on coups represent an example of a “subverted 
benefit”, in that they serve to protect democracy, but they can also “function to deter coups in 
both democratic and autocratic states alike” (STODDARD, 2017, p. 477). The recent popular 
uprisings in Northern Africa have however demonstrated that organizations have used the 
tools provided by exceptionalism, to “turn a blind eye” on the fall of authoritarian regimes. 
After the analysis of the developments and understandings behind democracy protec-
tion in each region, we once again highlight the role played by comparative regionalism in 
order to cover for aspects that will particularly interfere on the results and behaviors presented 
by each region and its organizations while dealing with shared competencies on overlapping 
settings. Furthermore, we reinforce the importance of studying how regional organizations 
react to the complex scenario of a such a sensitive issue to power and stability, as we compre-
hend that the challenges of norm subjectivity and low institutionalization are also one causa-
tive factor of friction between overlapping ROs. 
 
5.2 Regional behaviors on overlappings situations 
 
On the second chapter we presented the conceptual delimitations and the theoretical 
challenges posed by overlapping organizations for the complementarity and fragmentation of 
the regional scenario. The multilayered setting of international relations also provides defi-
ances for the ROs, which must act and interact on issues related to their interests and man-




instances, on first chapter we presented a preliminary table (table 1, p. 31) with the possible 
types of comportments ROs could adopt on an overlapping situation, based on the outcomes 
the literature has already predicted as potential results of the multiplicity of regional instances: 
synergy; cooperation; conflict; and segmentation (NOLTE, 2014).  
The proposition of a typology assumes that organizational behaviors can be framed in-
to categories that must be excluding in a way that each behavior only belongs to a single type. 
Nevertheless, in the case of overlapping ROs’ actions, the typology must also be understood 
with a dynamic feature, since over time and space, the adoption of diverse organizational 
strategies leads to the differentiation of behaviors, which in turn can also produce a variation 
of types of perceived interactions. 
The main idea defining the preliminary typology was the understanding that ROs’ be-
haviors would have a direct relationship with the possible outcomes, but also be endowed 
with nuances. Thus, behaviors would not be only cohesive or fragmented, but range with 
mixed elements within the possible outcomes. This initial perception was achieved through 
empirical observations provided by the inductive research on case studies, which pointed out 
that ROs could cooperate while also competing for leadership.  
Having analyzed the African and South American regional responses to political crises 
on chapter 3 and 4, we have synthetized the ROs’ actions through cases (see Appendix E) in 
order to provide a compilation of the perceived behaviors within the preliminary propositions. 
As a result, the typology formulation could be enhanced by the confrontation of the initial 
assumptions with the practical regional responses, which are exposed on figure 8 (p. 153). 
The information gathered and displayed on figure 8 reinforces Brosig’s (2011, p.152) 
theoretical approach on the triggers for the interplay between international organizations, that 
considers that diverging norms and behaviors, and the normative obligations are the main 
causes of interaction on overlapping scenarios. Thus, once a political crisis is perceived, it 
propels the reaction from international actors, such as the ROs this research analyses, which 
then will be bounded to respond or not, according to the normative pressure exerted by the 
regional mandates they have subscribed to; or, if this kind of pressure is absent and the ROs 
still react, they produce a divergent behavior, here understood as an ad hoc action. 
Considered the motivations for action and interaction, if a RO does not have a man-
date to respond to the problem situation, and thus does not act, it produces the expected be-
havior of silence, or no behavior at all, since the crisis resolution is not in its scope of action. 




by choice or by inability to concretize action, and then present an indifferent and passive be-
havior. 
 
Figure 8 – ROs’ reactions to political crises in overlapping scenarios 
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
 ROs without mandates that respond to political crises rely on case specific solutions, 
for what we have called them ad hoc actions, but, regardless of the presence or absence of a 
mandate, once the ROs decide to act, the scenario of overlappings causes the behaviors to 
follow a common path that passes through the choice of acting jointly with the other ROs, or 
to perform separately. The observation of comportments on the empirical chapters has, at the 
same time, confirmed the assumptions that guided the preliminary typology, but provided for 
the perception of nuances that amplified the range of available behaviors, as we discuss be-
low. 
 The adopted behaviors which followed the decision to act solo, have been perceived as 
having more conflictive effects, as the scenario of overlappings demands the concertation of 
actions to avoid conflicts and to promote regional cohesion; while the joint actions have pro-
duced more cooperative behaviors, that nevertheless, have not excluded the possibility of fric-




behaviors presented similar characteristics of letting it go and not remaining seized of the con-
flict’s mediation, but opposite outcomes of reinforcing and weakening other ROs’ actions on 
cooperative and conflictive scenarios, respectively.  
Active behaviors, however, presented more nuances, and therefore have received ad-
jectives to distinguish between when joint action produces a full cooperation set (synergic) 
and when the agreements are achieved on a background of competition for a leadership posi-
tion; and to separate action from when one RO’s choice of action precludes other regional 
responses, of when the segmentation of conflict resolution through the adoption of divergent 
views leads to the fragmentation of the regional cohesion. 
 
Table 9 – Updated typology of organizational behaviors 
 Type of organizational 
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prevent other ROs to 
act 
Conflictive-clashing Adoption of divergent actions 
Fragmentation of 






Inexistent behavior n/a n/a n/a 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
Combining the case-specific behaviors compiled on Appendix E and the preliminary 
typology findings provided on table 1, we have categorized the actions that can be framed on 
an updated version of the typology of behaviors which aggregates definitions of behaviors and 
outcomes, as seen on table 9 above. 
In order to advance on the outcomes and possible causalities of RO’s behavior, we 
move on to the ROs dyadic analysis, that is between sets of two organizations. This choice is 




play analysis, as the author affirms that “mechanisms for interaction are more easily detecta-
ble when analyzing dyadic relationships”, which consequently facilitates the detection of be-
havioral mechanisms as well. 
 
5.2.1 Analysis of dyadic relationships 
 
The proposed idea of analyzing dyads is consistent with the behavioral typology’s 
formulation, since the established patterns to be followed by an organization are only noticea-
ble if related to another organization, that is, they are only endowed with meanings if present-
ed in a relative way to the overlapping system analyzed, since perceiving cooperation de-
mands the presence of more than one actor. Moreover, as Weiffen (2017) states, “overlap 
changes the strategies open to national and international actors to achieve their preferences”, 
and thus influences the types of behavior to be chosen. 
The dyadic analysis also contributes to the understanding of specific dynamics of each 
one of the regions presented on this study and provides insights about the influences of the 
composition of the overlapping settings on the behavioral types adopted by ROs, since Africa 
and South America’s regional projects have different levels of interdependence. This affirma-
tion is justified by the comprehension that the AU serves as an umbrella organization that 
tries to harmonize the sub-regional integration settings, as we have previously mentioned, 
while South America is not bounded by any subsidiarity or formal cooperation principle 
among its blocs. 
Furthermore, dyadic analysis provides an opportunity to investigate the differentiation 
among outcomes of vertical and horizontal overlaps while also offering more specific ele-
ments to be included on the reflections of causalities for the perceived behaviors. In order to 
illustrate, on the next page, we present two tables, in which we draw the compilation of 
presences and absences of perceived behaviors among ROs on all the cases analyzed by this 
thesis, which are detailed and systematized on Appendix E (p.194).  
The criteria for the tables’ composition was the presence and absence of the reported 
behaviors in all cases analyzed, regardless of time and space. The exposed dyads prioritized 
the representation of the most relevant interplays, and the perceived actions support the be-






Table 10 – Dyadic analysis of overlapping ROs’ behaviors in Africa   


























































































synergic X X X  X X    
Cooperative-
competitive   X  X X X   
Cooperative-
passive  X        
Conflictive-
passive          
Conflictive-
blockade X  X    X   
Conflictive-
clashing X  X  X  X   
No interaction    X    X X 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
Table 11 - Dyadic analysis of overlapping ROs’ behaviors in South America 











































































































  X  X X X   
Cooperative-
competitive 
      X  X 
Cooperative-
passive 
X X X X  X  X  
Conflictive-
passive 
     X    
Conflictive-
blockade 
X  X X     X 
Conflictive-
clashing 
X  X X X X    
No interaction          
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
Moreover, the results affirm that the horizontal overlaps among sub-regional organiza-




would be supported by Brosig’s (2011) affirmation that the proliferation of international or-
ganizations fosters specialization in order to promote institutional survival. Thus, as states 
have to navigate the plurality of ROs to which they are members of, it is possible that the 
choice for lead mediation relies on the recognition of which sub-regional bloc has the better 
resources for conflict resolution and the direction of support from the other ROs at the same 
level. 
This idea is also supported by Pratt (2018) and explains the occurrence of cooperative-
passive behaviors, as the author explains that deference has distributional effects, meaning 
that “acts of deference confer legitimacy on specific institutions. They also shape or reinforce 
the distribution of governing authority among IOs”. 
Additionally, another possible explanation lies at the other end of the analysis: the 
presence of more conflictive behaviors between regional and sub-regional organizations. 
Nolte (2018, p.147) points out that “nested regional organizations can result in a particular 
conflict potential: the clash over regional domains”. Thus, the actions from regional organiza-
tions could be perceived by sub-regional blocs as a form of interference that questions their 
capacity of action. The author adds that the conflicts on vertical interplays are generally over 
the exclusive right to exercise a mandate on a specific region (NOLTE, 2018). 
This analysis is confirmed in different ways but in both regions. For instance, in Afri-
ca, the competition between ROs on vertical overlappings demonstrate the sub-regional blocs’ 
search for legitimacy as leaders on crises’ management. On the five sub-regions of the Afri-
can continent, competition between the AU and the RECs was only not perceived in two cas-
es: in Northern Africa as no interaction took place; and on the East, in a case where EAC 
blocked AU’s interference by not condemning an UCG. Additionally, all of the conflictive-
clashing behaviors are concentrated on this kind of overlap, in spite of Africa being the only 
region with provisions to organize the relationships among the regional and sub-regional lev-
els. 
In contrast, in South America, most of the vertical overlappings have produced coop-
erative-passive behaviors and deference in action from sub-regional to regional organizations. 
The exception is MERCOSUR, whose behaviors have been more synergic with other organi-
zations, as it has presented central roles on the conflicts it participates, being the recipient of 
deference from the OAS in the only set of dyadic relations marked as cooperative-passive. 
One possible explanation for MERCOSUR’s particular behavior would be its member states’ 




COSUR, UNASUR and CELAC’s actions are practically coordinated until the erosion of 
consensus in the region.  
However, the South American region presents an element of distortion, if we consider 
that part of the organizations at the regional level, namely CELAC and the OAS, have a 
broader scope and cover more than the South American region. Thus, if regarded that the 
overlap among UNASUR and the OAS has characteristics of a vertical or nested interplay, the 
idea that the possibility of external interference would potentialize clashes over regional do-
mains presented by Nolte is confirmed by the constant competition between them through the 
case studies. 
While South America did not present a no interaction case, as even the ROs without 
mandates have opted to act through the studies cases, in Africa no conflictive-passive behav-
ior was framed, since all ROs that reacted to crises have executed their actions, possibly as a 
result of the struggle for affirmation of its competences over the regional domain, as we pre-
viously mentioned. 
Regarding the relationship among the AU and the RECs, ECOWAS and SADC are the 
ones that presented more types of cooperative behaviors with the continental organization. 
But, at the same time, ECOWAS is the one that also presented more types of conflictive be-
havior, even if all of the RECS that have interplayed with the AU displayed a clashing behav-
ior at some point. These observations are coherent with the comprehension that ECOWAS 
was also the RO that had to interact the most with the AU, as it is the REC that most con-
demns UCGs, while they also affirm the difficulty of achieving continental cohesion and 
standards during periods of crises. 
ECCAS was the only REC that did not present a synergic behavior with the AU out of 
the blocs that have interplayed. The difficulty of achieving synergy can be a result of the 
complexity of the case analyzed from the Central African Republic, which involved more 
than an UCG mediation, as it had to deal with multiple military interventions from different 
actors in a failed state. The multiplicity of interferences could be a causality for the competi-
tion displayed even on cooperation as the ROs are constantly trying to remain legit and rele-
vant among the different international actors involved. 
As for the relationships in South America, it is no surprise that the most conflictive re-
sponses are located on ALBA dyads, since even the creation of this RO served as a stand 
against external influences, especially those from the USA. UNASUR was the recipient of 
other sub-regional organizations’ deference during a period of strengthening of the concept of 




sensus among the countries of the region, who lost their space for regional concertation at the 
“pan-South-American” level. Therefore, the possibility of framing multiple behaviors for the 
same set of dyadic relations also confirms the need to understand the typology as a dynamic 
resource, as time and space can interfere on the outcomes. 
In this sense, Nolte (2018) thus affirms that “whether or not overlappings lead to prob-
lems depends on the strategies of those states that are members of different organizations”. 
However, the exposed dyadic behaviors would add to the statement by posing that it is the 
strategies adopted by the states and the involved ROs, plus the challenges of reaching consen-
sus, allied to the ROs’ capacities to navigate the different organizational levels that condition 
the outcomes of overlapping. 
 
5.3 De facto overlappings: Regional Organizations in action 
 
 The empirics of this thesis have provided for the analysis of regional behaviors and 
their influences on the generation of complementarity or fragmentation through the actions of 
overlapping ROs. But additionally, the study of regional behaviors also contributes for the 
understanding of what overlapping organizations really mean to their regions, other than a 
theoretical problem with practical constraints. 
 The relevance of such meanings lies on the fact that the existence of multiple organi-
zations is not a conjuncture anymore, it is rather the structure in which ROs have to act and 
interact. Moreover, it was not only the number of organizations that increased over the years, 
but also the number of areas covered by the scope of the now multi-purpose ROs, which 
therefore present a tendency to increase complexity on organizational relationships on region-
al scenarios. Consequently, the empirical studies of overlapping regional scenarios and the 
possible outcomes generated by their contained interplays have the objective of understanding 
actors’ real behaviors and strategies, in order to minimize losses and increase regime effectiv-
ity through the strengthening of ROs. 
As have previously mentioned, only recently the literature has been more open to the 
idea of the existence of overlappings among ROs that would go beyond the traditional de jure 
overlapping focused on the membership-mandate relationship, as in the face of acute crises, 
these organizations tend to engage in actions that are not clearly prescribed by their mandate 
(NOLTE; WEIFFEN, 2018, p.3). Considering the gap between theoretical propositions and 




case analysis on chapters 3 and 4 and observed the relations between ROs beyond the sharing 
of member states or policy areas. 
Bearing in mind the empirics of this research and the suitability of political crises as 
an acute criterium to observe behaviors, we synthetize what an overlapping in action has 
meant over the case studies. Through the empirics, we have perceived that the overlapping 
responses to political crises presented by the ROs would be a fruit of three situations: the 
presence of a mandate; action even in the absence of a mandate (ad hoc solutions); or the ac-
tion performed on the account of an “extended” mandate, through which we categorize those 
situations where ROs have amplified their scope of action, but have not entirely formalized 
those mandates, either as a result of not having specific provisions over the issue, or of the 
existing normative documents not being in force yet. The categorization of mandates and ac-
tions from the main African and South American ROs described studied on this thesis is then 
shown on table 12, below. 
 
Table 12 – Regional organizations mandates and actions on democratic breaches 
No action Action 
















Source: author’s compilation 
 
We describe as the de facto overlappings all of the overlappings in action that are not 
norm-ruled (de jure), thus the situations where two or more ROs perform concurrently in or-
der to respond to a specific event or issue area, but at least one of them does not have a man-
date over the involved sectoral theme; or derives its competency to act from “extended” or not 
(yet) institutionalized mandates. Since these situations present no established procedures, ROs 
create ad hoc solutions which can be punctual and thus case-specific but can even repeat 
themselves over time until the mandate is formalized.  
After this compilation and considering the case analysis on chapters 3 and 4, we sys-




outcomes in practice, created from the observation of cases in both regions, Africa and South 
America. They are: 
 
• Cases where ROs did not have a formal mandate over an issue but acted through the 
channels of a regional leadership or in favor of intergovernmental relations; 
• Cases where the ROs had already included the sectorial theme on its declarations, 
and/or had mandates not yet in force, and thus engaged in actions that could help for-
malize it; 
• Cases where the absence of a mandate only permitted very limited actions, that never-
theless served as a way of achieving the RO’s objectives by legitimizing another 
blocs’ conduct through diplomatic pressure and support; 
• Cases where the overlapping scenario had nested characteristics and a subsidiarity 
principle convoked sub-regional blocs to act, even if a RO did not have an explicit 
mandate over the issue; 
• Cases where organizational enlargements have produced the creation of provisions and 
competencies over an issue area that was not a part of the RO’s original mandate. 
 
As for the comparison of outcomes between the “traditional” overlapping (mandates 
and memberships) and overlapping in action, case study and figure 8 have demonstrated that 
the produced behaviors and effects are the same once ROs decide to act jointly or separately. 
Nevertheless, de facto overlappings can influence the process of choosing the kind of behav-
ior to be adopted, as the absence of institutionalized rules has the potential to jeopardize co-
operative behaviors by not being able to offer institutional predictability and inter-
organizational trust. As we mentioned before, the use of informal channels also allows for the 
adoption of inconsistent positions, since they are always case specific, which is not helpful for 
the consolidation of regional procedures. On a more positive side, overlapping in action can 





6 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Over the course of this thesis we sought to combine theoretical and empirical elements 
in order to provide contributions on the following main topics, that compile the motivations 
behind the formulation of the research questions: 
1- How do ROs behave when sharing competencies over an issue? 
2- What overlapping really means, both in terms of tracing the scenarios and in 
understanding the practical constraints? 
3- What are the individual regional contributions to the study of regional organi-
zations and political crises with regard to potential causalities? 
4- Under what conditions the analyzed behaviors contribute to complementarity 
or fragmentation on regional cohesion? 
 
For question 1, the empirics presented on chapters 3 and 4 allowed for the inductive 
understanding of the options of actions available on the field, and a compilation of possible 
behaviors was organized on chapter 5 in the form of a typology developed according to the 
theoretical propositions of the consequences of organizational  behavior. The case analysis 
provided by the study of political crises and regional responses to democratic breaches con-
firmed the initial assumptions that the overlapping scenarios would present more nuances on 
the range between full cooperation and total segmentation. Also, during crisis’ resolution, 
these nuances would also be perceived over time, as different actions from the ROs generated 
different behaviors. 
With these results, we advanced to question 2. On chapter 2 we had provided the or-
ganizational mapping of Africa and South America, in order to understand in what conditions 
regionalism was inserted in both cases, with the help of political context and of visual ele-
ments to trace scenarios. But after we traced how ROs behave on a complex scenario through 
the case analysis, we were able to synthetize on chapter 5 what the overlaps really meant to 
those regions pragmatically, and to conceptualize what a de facto overlap meant in pragmati-
cal terms, and what are the constraints imposed by this type of organizational interaction. 
As for questions 3 and 4, while we have already laid out answer elements through the 
thesis, on this last section we would like to compile commonalities of both regions, with the 
aim to contribute to the future theoretical and analytical development of overlap studies. The 
objective is not to provide definitive answers, but to point out elements that were perceived 




sections we first address what are potential causalities for ROs behaviors on overlapping sce-
narios, departing from the African and South American experiences; and then we finalize our 
observations by summing up the practical effects observed on both regions and their contribu-
tions to regional complementarity or fragmentation. 
 
6.1 Potential causalities of overlapping ROs’ behavior choice on African and South 
American political crises 
 
Even though establishing causalities was not a part of the objectives of this thesis, 
some factors and commonalities through the case studies were very noticeable, and their list-
ing could contribute to support the continuity of the research agenda on overlapping ROs, as 
we established before. Regarding political crises, we acknowledge that the complexity of the 
cases presented go beyond the evaluation of an interplay between regional and sub-regional 
organizations and the thesis did not intend to separate it as one particular dynamic of the con-
flicts, or to discuss the merit of the organizational behaviors adopted or the domestic politics 
of the involved states. Instead, we benefit both from the potential for friction presented by 
shared competencies on the resolution of political crises and from the latent commonalities 
and differences between the crises’ characteristics on the two regions in order to gather ele-
ments for the studies of regionalism. 
The first intervenient factor we would like to highlight is the types of ROs and the dif-
ferences in capacities among them. For instance, research has demonstrated the influences of 
the intergovernmental logics adopted by the regional blocs on their ability to concretize their 
actions due to the need of regional consensus. Similarly, the low level of institutionalization 
leads not only to inaction, but when ROs decide to act, it leads to the adoption of ad hoc solu-
tions, or even to the choice for a passive behavior, endorsing other ROs with more capacities 
on the ground. 
Another issue regarding the influences of institutionalization is how the complex sce-
nario is constituted. On the African region, for example, the AU encourages sub-regional 
RECs to act, following a subsidiarity principle. The presence of a coordinating RO tends to 
produce the promotion of joint behaviors and the harmonization of practices. However, sub-
sidiarity is not necessarily the same thing as hierarchy, and the different outcomes achieved 
relatively to each sub-region can vary as not all RO’s are equally dependent on each other 




A second factor of influence would be directly related to the first one, as it regards the 
possibility of interpretation, norm incompleteness, or also the gap between policy creation and 
implementation, among regional provisions on how to act. We have already established that 
there is no clear division of labor in any circumstance, not even on the regional setting ruled 
by the subsidiarity principle. But at times, overlappings’ problematic consequences are not 
caused by the type of behavior adopted by the organizations themselves, but by the lack of 
clarity in the devices, which allows the actors to shape the mediation processes according to 
their preferences.  
These politics generates exceptionalism on conflict mediation and subject the proce-
dural rules to interpretation, damaging the sense of security and predictability the existence of 
common regional institutions was supposed to create, according to the institutionalist theory. 
For instance, the MDPs in South America do not provide a clear list of what situations should 
be framed under the notion of democratic breaches, as the African UCGs provisions do. But 
even with listing provided, African provisions are also subject to interpretation since the chal-
lenges of institutionalization make institutions dependent on other factors for implementation. 
One of them is the involved actors’ political will, which in turn is subject to their limited or 
bounded rationality, and makes institutions not static, allowing actors are able to act and 
shape behaviors within them despite constraints. Thus, exceptionalism can also be perceived 
as a consequence of the absence of common standards among countries, as for example, the 
idea that regionalism was not born democratic in Africa and therefore has to allow conces-
sions with existing characteristics in favor of integration. 
Since we mentioned the actors’ capabilities and standards, a third factor of influence 
on behaviors would be the involved countries’ capacities. Lead regional countries, be it in the 
position of an afflicted country or of a negotiating one, are perceived to directly influence on 
political crises, to decide who gets to be intervened with and how, but even they present dif-
ferent capacities on the ground. One example that clearly illustrated this affirmation is how 
Paraguay in 2012 and Brazil in 2016 were perceived to go through parliamentary coups, even 
though nationally the impeachment processes happened accordingly with constitutional provi-
sions. The different outcomes on regional intervention represent the discrepant regional capa-
bilities for political constraint, with Brazil being the biggest country geographically and polit-
ically of the region. 
Having extremely fragile or weak states also influence the countries’ capabilities or 
political will to propel a regional response in a situation of crises. This can be exemplified by 




might be questionable which reinforces the idea that “people who live in glass houses should 
not throw stones”. 
Along the same lines of reasoning, another influential factor are the regional capabili-
ties involved. As the dyadic analysis have shown, sub-regions present different resources to 
respond to crises. One factor of friction is that due to their closeness on the ground to the af-
fected areas, in comparison with more comprehensive organizations, they often see them-
selves as the legit source of mediation for conflict resolutions, resisting from “external” inter-
ferences. Many cases have indicated that the AU and the OAS are oftentimes received with 
suspicion by affected countries and sub-regional ROs. This can be explained as Brosig (2011) 
has stated that cooperation creates a mutual dependency among international organizations, 
and they prefer to prevent it, in favor of their own autonomy and their hold over the regional 
domain. The author also affirms that cooperation finds its limits when the RO’s autonomy is 
compromised and that on a complex scenario, organizational specialization grants the survival 
of institutions, and thus ROs tend to take stronger stands in order to mark their territories.  
Another issue related to regional capabilities is the presence and absence of overlap-
ping reactions to conflicts. The study of African sub-regions has demonstrated it more clearly: 
the fact that the application of the UCGs framework is more prominent in one sub-region than 
in others is not necessarily a matter of a more conflictive geography. Northern Africa illus-
trates that less framed cases on a sub-region can be the result of weak regional instances (even 
“slumbering” ROs), or of weak domestic stands. Regional and domestic instabilities also lead 
to absence of action, to a point where the overlappings seem not to happen. 
A fifth factor of influence is also directly related to regional and national capabilities 
but involves the presence of personalist political leaderships. In both regions, the proactivity 
of the ROs presidency, on the figure of Secretaries General or Commission Chairpersons have 
influenced the behaviors of ROs. Personal leaderships can also influence behaviors by rejec-
tion of appointed mediators. And, the intergovernmental relations of those leaderships can 
likewise generate impacts on the actions adopted. An interesting example of this last affirma-
tion would be MERCOSUR’s stand against Lugo’s deposition. At the time, all of the four 
member states had a leftist or progressive government, and the impeachment of one of them 
by the opposition was a political blow that could not be tolerated. 
 Finally, one last factor of influence would be the presence of external pressures. Re-
gional overlapping settings do not exist isolated on the international scenario but are rather a 
part of a much more complex system. ROs tend to opt for a proactive behavior and to take the 




have also demonstrated, external actors such as the UN, former colonial powers, international 
powers, and also rising regional powers can exert influence on how the ROs will decide to 
position themselves and act during a conflict. 
Conclusively, the compilation of causalities has presented six main factors that influ-
ence the overlapping ROs behaviors: institutionality, provisions, countries capacities, regional 
capacities, political leaderships, external pressures. All of the perceived factors are inter-
related and centered on the expected gains of the actions, with outcomes that can in turn be 
linked to different aspects: presence and absence of regional and external powers; institution-
alization of normative provisions; realization of member states domestic interests and strate-
gies; relevance of the policy domain to the RO’s core; reluctancy to let norms and behaviors 
be institutionalized; and dispute over the regional domain legitimacy.  
 
6.2 Summing up the observed effects of overlapping actions on political crises for re-
gional cohesion: complementarity or fragmentation? 
 
 Having analyzed the first three questions presented on the beginning of this section, 
the last step of this thesis is to dwell on the effects of overlapping organizations and political 
crises to regional cohesion, as proposed on the title. Are overlapping scenarios enhancing 
complementarity or fragmentation on their regions? We anticipate here that this question does 
not have a single answer, and the gathered results are not binary.  
Still, the existence of friction and the potential for conflict is undeniable, as they not 
only come from the member states, but also from ROs. Weiffen (2017) had affirmed that 
“competition and conflict generally do not exist between organizations, but between states 
that act through these organizations”. Thus, one might argue that it is not the overlapping of 
regional organizations which leads to competition, but that it is power competition between 
states/governments which entails institutional overlap. 
However, it cannot be ignored that regional organizations function as the main actors 
in many situations and they represent the level of analysis here proposed. While we also do 
not disregard the role played by the member states on the agenda setting and institutional ef-
fectivity, as well as the asymmetric capabilities and resource distribution among them, re-
search has demonstrated that sub-regional ROs tend to compete on vertical overlappings in 





Another source of potential fragmentation comes from the comprehension of overlap-
pings in action, as they enlarge the possibilities of overlap and represent yet another area to 
generate friction and insecurity due to the lack of standard formal provisions. At the same 
time, they enable the participation of more actors on the processes, which has the ambiguity 
of enlarging the amount of work needed to grant consensus, but, also to increase complemen-
tarity if the ROs decide to cooperate, or even to prevent institutional blockages that jeopardize 
conflict resolution. On the Gambian case, for example, organizational cooperation provided 
support and legitimacy from the AU to the ECOWAS’ intervention and brought about a rela-
tively swift and peaceful solution. 
Even though opinion and behavior clashes happen, both Africa and South America 
have demonstrated a certain degree of institutional learning from the experiences, either by 
the understanding that the creation of MDPs in both regions came as a result of critical mo-
ments of political crises; or by the observance of how the AU and ECOWAS have managed to 
reduce direct conflict over mediations, seen on the Gambian case, as the repetition of experi-
ences provides for some degree of behavior institutionalization. 
Due to the low level of institutionalization and intergovernmentalism, ROs in both re-
gions suffer greatly from the effects caused by the dependency of member states to act, which 
directly affects the consequences for fragmentation or complementarity. For instance, on 
chapter 2, we presented three possible mechanisms that sabotage cooperation and that mem-
ber states could use on an overlapping situation, as proposed by Gómez-Mera (2015): norm 
ambiguity; inter-institutional strategies; and the constant competition. 
We had established with theoretical support that legal fragmentation can contribute to 
forum shopping, and those situations were empirically observed on the presented crises of 
chapters 3 and 4, when, for instance, Venezuela chooses UNASUR as the only mediator to the 
crisis, excluding the OAS’s harder influences; or when the Burundian crisis lead the EAC and 
the AU to a blockade, as the domestic leaders relied on the sub-regional organization’s lighter 
approach to avoid being sanctioned by the AU under the UCGs normative framework. 
 The second mechanism is also very much perceived on the Venezuelan crises, as the 
country uses the situation of overlap on its favor, in order to create an inter-institutional strat-
egy that destroys consensus at the continental level by having the support of sub-regional al-
lies and partners from other ROs. This type of behavior questions the legitimacy and the au-
thority of a RO and threatens the efficiency of its actions. In fact, the crisis in Venezuela pre-
sented such a severe challenge to overlapping ROs, that not only they were not able to resolve 




perceptions of regionalism ended up imploding UNASUR and destroying its capacity of ac-
tion. It also generated the approximation of the like-minded governments in another regional 
configuration, such as the new regional political forums, the Lima Group and the PROSUR, 
the Forum for the Progress and Integration of South America, which could produce new over-
laps even if not institutionalized, through overlapping actions. 
For the elements here presented, Brosig’s (2011, p.149) affirmation reinforces Gómez-
Mera’s third mechanism by stating that permanent uncoordinated organizational overlaps can 
produce negative consequences in the long run, and they might even “render some policy are-
as ungovernable by depriving IOs of general standards applicable to everyone”. Those effects 
are already noticeable by the time expended on conflict resolution, notedly with how the Mal-
agasy political crisis took almost five years to be resolved, and the Venezuelan crisis has en-
countered no solutions over the past seven years. 
 All being said, even though overlapping scenarios have an intrinsic potential for fric-
tions and fragmentation, the potentiality for cooperation and complementarity is something 
that can be fostered through regional politics. While overlaps are not equivalent to hierarchic 
relations, they also do not need to be if the roles to be played by the different regional actors 
are clear and common grounds are reached. Moreover, considering vertical overlaps, we con-
sider that working to strengthen sub-regional capacities has potential benefits for the whole 
regional set. With more capacities, division of labor and a clearer set of norms, the vertical 
sets of blocs would not have to compete for leadership or take measures to exclude alien ac-
tion, as these resources provide for more predictability and security on interplays, and thus 
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APPENDIX A – REGIONAL ORGANIZATION BUILDING OVER TIME 
 








 Date Country Event 
 
1 13/01/1963 Togo Olympio is assassinated in a coup d’etat by military officers. 
2 28/10/1963 Benin Christophe Soglo leads a military coup d’etat. 
3 17/02/1964 Gabon M’ba is deposed in a coup d’etat by military officers. 
4 19/06/1965 Algeria Ben Bella is ousted in a coup d’etat. 
5 25/11/1965 DRC General Mobutu heads a coup d’etat. 
6 29/11/1965 Benin Tahirou Congacou conducts a successful coup d’etat. 
7 01/01/1966 CAR Jean-Bédel Bokassa takes over following coup. 
 
8 03/01/1966 Burkina Faso 
Sangoulé Lamizana deposes President Yaméogo in a coup 
d’etat. 
9 24/02/1966 Ghana President Nkrumah is overthrown by military officers. 
 
10 08/07/1966 Burundi 
Mwambutsa flees the country, during an unsuccessful coup 
d’etat. 
 
11 19/07/1966 Nigeria 
A military regime takes over after the civilian government is 
overthrown. 
12 28/11/1966 Burundi Michel Micombero ousts Ntare V. 
 
13 13/01/1967 Togo 
Eyadema, a member of the military coup d’etat that over-
threw Olympio, ousts Grunitzky in a coup. 
14 23/03/1967 Sierra Leone David Lansana stages a coup. 
15 19/12/1967 Benin Alley conducts an assassinat coup d’etat. 
 
16 18/04/1968 Sierra Leone 
John Amadu Bangura leads a coup to overthrow Juxon-
Smith. 
17 03/08/1968 Congo Ngouabi overthrows Massamba-Débat. 
 
18 19/11/1968 Mali Moussa Traoré leads military in a coup that ousts Keita. 
19 25/05/1969 Sudan Colonel Niemeiry overthrows government in coup. 
 
20 01/09/1969 Libya 
Army officers led by Qaddafi depose the Idris monarchy in 
a coup. 
 
21 21/10/1969 Somalia 
Muhammad Siad Barre overthrows government in a coup 
d’etat. 
22 13/12/1969 Benin Paul de Souza heads a coup d’etat. 
23 25/01/1971 Uganda Army leader Idi Amin overthrows Obote. 
 
24 19/07/1971 Sudan Major Hashem el Atta overthrows Nimeiry in a coup d’etat. 
 
25 13/01/1972 Ghana 
Akufo-Addo is deposed in a military coup led by Colonel 
Acheampong. 
 
26 26/10/1972 Benin 
Mathieu Kérékou leads a coup to overthrow Presidential 
Council. 
 
27 15/04/1974 Niger Seyni Kountché leads a military coup to overthrow Diori. 
 
28 13/04/1975 Chad 
Tombalbaye is assassinated following coup d’etat led by 
Odingar. 
29 29/07/1975 Nigeria Gowon is deposed in a coup. 
30 03/08/1975 Comoros A coup d’etat removes Abdallah from power. 
 
31 01/11/1976 Burundi 
Jean-Baptiste Bagaza overthrows Micombero in a coup 
d’etat. 
 
32 05/06/1977 Seychelles 





33 12/05/1978 Comoros Said Atthoumani overthrows Soilih in coup d'etat. 
 
34 05/07/1978 Ghana 
Acheampong is forced to resign by Akuffo in a bloodless 
coup d'etat. 
35 10/07/1978 Mauritania Mustafa Salek ousts Daddah in a military coup. 
 
36 24/12/1978 Rwanda 
Army chief of staff Juvenal Habyarimana overthrows Kayi-
barimana in a coup. 
 
37 11/04/1979 Uganda 
Tanzanian troops invade Uganda (at the invitation of Obo-
te). Idi Amin flees the country. 
 
38 04/06/1979 Ghana 






Colonel Obiang Nguema leads a coup against Macías 
Nguema. 
40 20/09/1979 CAR Bokassa is removed from power following coup. 
41 04/01/1980 Mauritania Mohamed Haidalla stages a coup. 
 
42 12/04/1980 Liberia 
Samuel Doe, along with soldiers in the armed forces con-
duct a coup and assasinate Tolbert. 
43 12/05/1980 Uganda A coup d'etat by Paulo Muwanga overthrows Binaisa. 
 
44 14/11/1980 Guinea-Bissau Vieira ousts Cabral in a military coup. 
45 25/11/1980 Burkina Faso Saye Zerbo ousts President Lamizana in a coup d'etat. 
46 01/09/1981 CAR André-Dieudonné Kolingba removes Dacko in a coup. 
47 31/12/1981 Ghana Rawlings conducts another coup, deposing Limann. 
48 07/06/1982 Chad Hissène Habré leads a successful coup. 
 
49 08/11/1982 Burkina Faso 
Zerbo is removed in a coup d'etat led by Jean-Baptiste 
Ouédraogo. 
50 04/08/1983 Burkina Faso Thomas Sankara takes over after coup d'etat. 
 
51 18/08/1983 Swaziland 
Prince Dlamini, an advisor to Sobhuza II, deposes Queen 
Dzeliwe and is briefly the leader of Swaziland. 
52 31/12/1983 Nigeria The military overthrows the Shagari government. 
53 03/04/1984 Guinea Conté seizes power in a bloodless coup d'etat. 
54 12/12/1984 Mauritania Maaouiya Taya comes to power in a coup d'etat. 
 
55 06/04/1985 Sudan 
Former Chief of Staff overthrows President Nimeiry in a 
coup. A ruling military council is established. 
 
56 27/07/1985 Uganda 
Army officers led by General Olara-Okello overthrow Obo-
te. 
 
57 15/01/1986 Lesotho Jonathan is deposed in a coup led by General Lekhanya. 
 
58 03/09/1987 Burundi Pierre Buyoya overthrows President Bagaza in a coup d'etat. 
59 15/10/1987 Burkina Faso A coup d'etat occurs and President Sankara is killed. 
60 05/11/1987 Tunisia Ben Ali overthrows Bourguiba and assumes power. 
 
61 30/06/1989 Sudan 
A military coup led by Omar al-Bashir brings the National 
Salvation Revolution to power. 
62 09/09/1990 Liberia Doe is executed by Prince Johnson. 
63 01/12/1990 Chad Idriss Déby heads a successful coup d'etat. 
64 27/01/1991 Somalia President Siad Barre is overthrown. 
65 26/03/1991 Mali Touré leads a coup to overthrow Traoré. 
66 14/01/1992 Algeria Boudiaf leads a coup d'etat removing Benhabyles. 
67 26/08/1993 Nigeria Babangida leads military officers to overthrow Buhari. 
68 27/10/1993 Burundi Ndadaye is assasinated in a coup d'etat. 
69 22/07/1994 Gambia Jammeh overthrows President Jawara in a coup. 
 
70 17/08/1994 Lesotho 





71 15/08/1995 Sao Tome and Principe Trovoada is overthrown by Manuel Almeida. 
72 28/09/1995 Comoros Combo Ayoubo comes to power after a coup. 
 
73 16/01/1996 Sierra Leone 
Army officers led by Valentine Strasser depose Momoh in a 
coup. 
74 27/01/1996 Niger Maïnassara leads a coup. 
 
75 06/03/1996 Sudan 
Bashir becomes president after overthrowing Al-Mirghani 
government. 
 
76 29/03/1996 Sierra Leone 
Strasser is ousted in a coup by members of his own military 
regime. 
 
77 09/05/1996 Uganda The military, led by Museveni overthrows the government. 
 
78 25/07/1996 Burundi 
Pierre Buyoya seizes power from President Ntibantunganya 
in a coup d'etat. 
79 17/05/1997 DRC Laurent Kabila overthrowns Mobutu Sese Seko. 
80 15/10/1997 Congo Sassou-Nguesso heads a coup d'etat. 
 
81 10/03/1998 Sierra Leone 
Koroma leads a coup to overthrow Kabbah and becomes 
head of state. 
82 08/06/1998 Nigeria Sani Abacha conducts coup and becomes head of state. 
 
83 09/04/1999 Niger Maïnassara is assassinated in a coup led by Malam Wanké . 
 
84 30/04/1999 Comoros Colonel Azali Assoumani heads a successful coup d'etat. 
 
85 07/05/1999 Guinea-Bissau Mané leads soldiers in a revolt to depose Vieira. 
 
86 24/12/1999 Cote d'Ivoire Military officers overthrow Bédié, who flees the country. 
87 16/01/2001 DRC Kabila is assassinated. 
88 15/03/2003 CAR François Bozizé takes over in a coup d'etat. 
 
89 16/07/2003 
Sao Tome and 
Principe Menezes is deposed in a coup led by Fernando Pereira. 
 
90 14/09/2003 Guinea-Bissau Seabra leads a coup d'etat, which deposes Lalá. 
 
91 03/08/2005 Mauritania 
The army stages a coup while President Taya is out of the 
country. 
 
92 06/08/2008 Mauritania 
The military stages a coup to remove President Abdellahi 
from power. 
 
93 03/12/2009 Guinea 
Camara establishes the National Council for Democracy and 
Development as an interim government. 
94 18/02/2010 Niger President Tandja is overthrown by Salou Djibo. 
 
95 23/08/2011 Libya 
Qaddafi is toppled and killed in a coup by rebel forces, after 
ruling Libya for 42 years. 
96 22/03/2012 Mali Sanogo leads a military coup to overthrow Touré. 
 
97 12/04/2012 Guinea-Bissau 
Kuruma leads soldiers in a coup to depose the interim presi-
dent, Pereira. 
98 24/03/2013 CAR François Bozizé is ousted in a coup. 
 
99 03/07/2013 Egypt President Morsi is toppled in a coup led by the military. 
 
100 21/11/2017 Zimbabwe President Mugabe is pressured to resign by the military. 
 





APPENDIX C – OTHER CASES 
 
On the thesis prospectus presented to the committee, two other cases of UCG in Africa 
figured among the examples of the sub-regions: Côte d’Ivoire 2010-2011, and Guinea Bissau 
2012. They were cut out of the final text analysis in order to prioritize other cases in all Afri-
can sub-regions, since their results were very similar t1o those presented on the Malian 2012 
case. Additionally, one case of political crisis from South America, the Bolivian case of 2008, 
was cut from the final examination as it did not entirely fulfil the scope conditions presented. 
The three cases are added here in this appendix as they corroborate the argument of competi-
tion between regional organizations, either among ECOWAS and the AU, or between UN-
ASUR and the OAS. 
 
Côte d'Ivoire 2010-2011 
 
The conflict in Côte d'Ivoire begins in December 2010, after the elections, where there 
is doubt as to who was the winner: Laurent Gbabo, the country's president since 2000 or the 
opposition candidate, Alassane Ouattara. The election was the first in ten years, and the coun-
try's electoral commission declared the winner Ouattara with 54.1% of the vote. However, 
Gbabo refuses to relinquish power, claiming fraud in the north of the country, and appeals to 
the country's Constitutional Council, calling for the cancellation of the region's votes. The 
Constitutional Council supports Gbabo and proclaims the winner of the elections with 51.45% 
of the votes. 
After attempts at negotiation, the electoral crisis generates a split in the country and 
escalating civil violence. ECOWAS and AU present themselves to intervene, but the perfor-
mance is not coordinated. The Pan-African bloc sends external mediators to the sub-region, 
without combining efforts with ECOWAS, among them Thabo Mbeki, former president of 
South Africa. Although the AU formally recognized the election of Ouattara, Mbeki's media-
tion is viewed with suspicion by members of ECOWAS, as South Africa is a country outside 
the western sub-region, with a history of positioning itself as a pro-government. Other media-
tors have their work in the AU similarly mined (OBSERVATOIRE ..., 2011). 
ECOWAS then calls upon itself the responsibility of intervention in Côte d'Ivoire, de-
fines its support for Ouattara, decides to suspend the country of the organization until the set-
tlement of the conflict and threatens to intervene militarily. In this situation, the positioning of 




An interesting piece of information on ECOWAS's position is the instrumentation of 
the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), a sub-regional integration bloc 
in which ECOWAS members participate, to restrict access to financing by Côte d'Ivoire, 
while the suspension lasted. 
Meanwhile, Gbabo uses the divisions between the blocs to lobby the AU, securing 
support from South Africa and Angola. In January 2011, the AU attempts to take the lead, 
discussing new ways of resolving the conflict, which would involve sharing power. However, 
Gbabo is irreducible, and in the face of the firm positioning of ECOWAS, the AU is unsuc-
cessful, Thus, in March 2011, the AU backs out and agrees with the position taken by ECO-
WAS. 
Results: 
In the intervention carried out in Côte d'Ivoire, the overlapping of ROs generated a 
split in their actions, which compete for protagonism in the resolution of the conflict. Alt-
hough finally the agreement between the organizations led to the resolution of the controver-
sy, the way the negotiation takes place indicates the importance of the national actors in their 
blocs. 
The strength of ECOWAS's positioning shapes the position of other international ac-
tors and is endorsed by the use of the nested economic bloc (WAEMU), as well as UN Securi-
ty Council support for intervention by the Ouattara government. Thus, the AU is under pres-
sure to abide by the decisions and has its credibility undermined by internal divisions and by 
the difficulty of speaking unitarily in the face of the conflict.  
We found no evidence of CEN-SAD acting. 
 
Guinea Bissau 2012 
 
A military coup in April 2012 interrupts the electoral process in the country and seeks 
to justify its legitimacy by questioning the presence of Angola's Military and Technical Assis-
tance Mission in Guinea Bissau (MISSANG) that was installed in the country, to prevent it 
being instrumented by the deposed government. The case of Guinea Bissau is complex be-
cause no democratic transition since its independence in 1974 is effective (DERSSO, 2013), 
and the crisis in Mali brings inspiration for the military to propose the creation of a junta, the 
National Transitional Council (NTC). 
In the face of the situation, both ECOWAS and the African Union react, as well as 




United Nations. Initially, the repudiation of the situation is unanimous. The AU defines that 
the CNT does not meet its demands. ECOWAS considers it unconstitutional and authorizes 
the use of the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) to assist in the transition. 
 However, as of the end of April of the same year, ECOWAS was more willing to ne-
gotiate with the military junta, despite strong criticism from other international actors, such as 
the European Union and the CPLP (DÖRING; HERPOLSHEIMER, 2018). Thus, in May, 
ECOWAS signs a new transitional agreement and employs a military and police force mis-
sion - ECOMIB - to facilitate the withdrawal of MISSANG and protect central power. Mean-
while, the position of the AU is maintained by the repudiation of the coup and by the suspen-
sion of the country from its activities until the restoration of democracy. 
Results: 
The case in Guinea Bissau reinforces the competition between the sub-regional and 
continental mechanisms for the leading role in the conflict. In addition, there is divergence in 
the mediator approach, which would enable forum shopping. Thus, ECOWAS’choice of act-
ing and its agreement to negotiate with the junta, despite the initial repudiation, lead to ambi-
guity of interpretation between it and the AU, since the acceptance could give the impression 
of legitimacy to the junta's government. 
In addition to the issues of competition and coherence between the regional mechanisms that 
are visible in this case, the fact that the AU maintained the Guinea-Bissau sanction until the 
2014 elections could have further hampered ECOWAS's efforts to mobilize financial support 
for its work on the country (DÖRING; HERPOLSHEIMER, 2018), generating the effect of a 
veto actor. 
Therefore, the case becomes the basis for questioning the division of labor between the 
AU and the RECs, as Dersso pointed out in 2013: 
Despite the fact that the AU expressed support for ECOWAS’ efforts in 
Guinea-Bissau, there is a continuing difference between the two on how they 
enforce the norm against unconstitutional changes of government. While 
ECOWAS has lifted the sanction on Guinea-Bissau, the sanction that the 
PSC imposed remains in effect. Apart from raising issues of consistency in 
the application of the norm against unconstitutional changes of government, 
this clearly illustrates the inadequacy of existing frameworks on the AU-
REC relationship for ensuring policy coherence between the AU and RECs 
(DERSSO, 2013, p. 70-71). 
 







 The Bolivian conflict is triggered by tensions between the central government and the 
eastern departmental governments, which, rich in natural resources, were dissatisfied and 
demanded the redistribution of the revenue accumulated by hydrocarbons. The provinces of 
Beni, Pando, Santa Cruz and Tarija, which had governors opposed to Evo Morales, were the 
scene of violent protests and their demands for greater autonomy threatened even the 
territorial integrity of the country (WEIFFEN, 2017). 
Faced with the escalation of the conflict, Chilean President Michelle Bachelet, who led 
the pro-tempore presidency of UNASUR at the time, convened a special meeting in Santiago, 
to which the Secretary General of the OAS was also invited, so that a joint action between the 
two blocs could have been thought of. However, UNASUR chose to send its own mission. As 
Nolte (2018) points out, “as a new player, UNASUR (or the governments promoting the new 
organization, including Chile as the holder of the pro tempore presidency), had an interest in 
gaining visibility, and therefore acted separately”. 
Results: 
 In the Bolivian case, there is no conflict of action, since both UNASUR and OAS 
stood against the secessionist movement from the opposition. Weiffen (2017) points out that 
there would be no forum shopping because the Bolivian government accepts the mediation of 
the two organizations, but Nolte (2018) states that UNASUR's performance was preferred by 
the president and the majority of the country's Constitutional Assembly. 
 Something that should not be disregarded in this and subsequent cases is the 
association of the OAS with the presence of the United States in the region, which is much 
contested by leftist governments. Early in the Bolivian conflict, for example, on suspicion of 
encouraging opposition rulers, the US ambassador was expelled from the country. 
Accordingly, although the redundancy in the positioning of organizations has a 
positive effect of strengthening the central government's cause, one should not ignore the 
competition between the blocs in mediation, since the growth of UNASUR in this case has a 
legitimizing potential of its performance, which, in turn, would exclude external influences. 
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APPENDIX D – POLITICAL CRISES IN SOUTH AMERICA 1990-2017: coups d’état, 
attempted coups and impeachments as ruptures of the constitutional order 
 
 
 Country Year Event 
1 Peru 1992 President Fujimori perpetrated a self-coup by dissolving the Congress, the constitution and the Supreme Court  
2 Venezuela 1992 
Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolutionary Move-
ment 200 attempted a failed coup against president Car-
los Andrés Pérez in 1992 
3 Brazil 1992 
President Collor de Mello resigned during an impeach-
ment process against him over corruption scandals. The 
process continued after his resignation and he had his 
mandate terminated and political rights suspended  
4 Venezuela 1993 President Pérez was impeached after the popular mani-festations known as the Caracazo 
5 Paraguay 1996 General Lino Oviedo attempted a coup against president Juan Carlos Wasmosy 
6 Ecuador 1997 President Abdalá Bucaran was removed from office by the Congress over claims about his sanity 
7 Paraguay 1999 Assassination of vice president Luís María Argaña and resignation of president Cubas  
8 Paraguay 2000 Attempted coup allegedly by Oviedo’s followers and political destabilization 
9 Peru 2000 
Questioning of electoral outcome as president Fujimori 
won for a third term on a dubious process followed by 
his resignation after fraud allegations 
10 Ecuador 2000 Coup against president Jamil Mahuad after a period of severe economic crisis 
11 Argentina 2001 President De la Rúa resigned after protests over a rigor-ous economic crisis 
12 Venezuela 2002 
Attempted coup d’état against president Hugo Chávez. 
The coup lasted 47 hours before Chávez was brought 
back with popular support 
13 Bolivia 2003 President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada resigned forcedly after violent popular protests  
14 Ecuador 2005 President Lucio Gutierrez was removed from office by the Congress after claims of constitutional violation 
15 Bolivia 2005 President Carlos Mesa resigned after popular revolts and political instability 
16 Ecuador 2010 Attempted coup against President Rafael Correa put him in house arrest 
17 Paraguay 2012 President Lugo was impeached in 24 hours  
18 Venezuela 2013-ongoing 
Questioning of electoral outcome, democratic rupture 
and political violence  
19 Brazil 2016 President Dilma Roussef was impeached and removed by the Congress under accusations of misconduct 
 









For the African region, the Gambian case is not explored on the tables as it only 
produced cooperative-synergic behaviors among ECOWAS and the AU. Similarly, as the 
Egyptian case propelled no overlapping actions and we could not analyze the RO’s behaviors, it 
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For the South American cases, we have divided the Venezuelan crisis in two parts, 
since the adopted behaviors have varied under different regional compositions. Moreover, the 
second part of the crisis has a particularity that the behaviors perceived are not directly institu-
tionalized by the involved ROs, meaning it is not ALBA the organization that blocks other 
RO’s actions, or MERCOSUR that precludes UNASUR from acting, but the position adopted 
by its member states. These events are possible due to the low institutionality of South Amer-










 UNASUR - OAS 
Cooperative -  
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UNASUR: 
Cooperative - competitive  
Both organizations condemn the 
coup attempt 
UNASUR takes the lead on its 
diplomatic efforts 
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CAN and ALBA: Cooperative - passive 
















Cooperative – Synergic – both ROs 
MERCOSUR and UNASUR convene a joint meeting and decide to con-
demn and sanction Paraguay 
MERCOSUR/UNASUR/ 
CELAC – OAS 
OAS:  
Conflictive - passive 
OAS:  
Conflictive - clashing 
The OAS takes a long time to 
decide how to act  
The OAS does not condemn Paraguay, 
imposes no sanctions and causes the 
















MERCOSUR/ ALBA –  
UNASUR 
Cooperative-synergic – both ROs 
All organizations offer support to Venezuela’s “democracy”. MER-




Cooperative - competitive 
UNASUR: 
conflictive - blockade 
Tries to take the lead on nego-
tiations 
The Venezuelan government manages 





















MERCOSUR - OAS 
OAS: Cooperative-passive 
MERCOSUR has suspended Venezuela and OAS’ behavior would have 
been synergic if it weren’t for the bloc’s lack of institutional autonomy to 
apply sanctions on member states without reaching a unanimous consen-
sus. Thus, the OAS’ statements reinforce MERCOSUR but are also pas-
sive for not being able to act 
ALBA/ CELAC –  
UNASUR/ OAS  
Conflictive - blockade* Conflictive - clashing* 
Due to intergovernmental institu-
tional constraints, the OAS is unable 
to condemn Venezuela, considering 
that the country relies on its AL-
BA/CELAC partners to prevent 
consensus to be achieved at the con-
tinental level.  
Inaction generates fragmentation 
since the region is not able to 
provide a cohesive response to 
the crisis, and it leads Venezuela 
to ask to leave the organization, 
besides ruining UNASUR, as 
seen below 
UNASUR - OAS 
No behavior 
UNASUR is imploded by the lack of consensus caused by the Venezue-
lan crisis, which leads half of its member states to abandon the organiza-




MERCOSUR member states’ 
actions prevented UNASUR to 
support Venezuela after the ag-
gravation of the conflict 
The impasse derived from the ina-
bility of consensus or action ruined 
UNASUR as the member states that 
had clashing views walked out of 
the organization 
Source: author’s compilation 
